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Context: Recently, Ten security personnel returning from a counter-insurgency operation and a civilian driver were killed by Maoists, in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada.
Media seems to be confused with the terms and uses Maoists and Naxalities quite inter-changeably for Left Wing Extremism (LWE).
According to the MHA, Maoist violence in the country has gone down by 77% since 2010.
The number of resultant deaths (security forces + civilians) has come down by 90% from the all-time high of 1,005 in 2010 to 98 in 2022.
Chhattisgarh accounted for more than a third of all Maoist-related violence in this period.
Anti-state ops: The Maoists have carried out this attack as part of their strategy of heightened military activity and more attacks on security forces.
Revenge: CRPF conducts Tactical Counter Offensive Campaigns (TCOCs) from Feb to June yearly as monsoon makes offensive operations in the jungles difficult from July.
Dense forests: The absence of roads in the interiors of Chhattisgarh has stymied the operations of security forces.
Asylum for the offenders: Police of neighbouring states had pushed Maoists from their states to Chhattisgarh, making it a concentrated zone of Maoist influence.
Lack of governance: The minimal presence of the administration in the interiors of South Bastar has ensured that Maoists continue to have influence in the region and enjoy local support through a mix of fear and goodwill.
Naxalites vs. Maoists
Originated as a rebellion against marginalisation of the poor forest dwellers and gradually against the lack of development and poverty at the local level in rural parts of eastern India.
Began with an armed peasant uprising in Naxalbari village of Darjeeling district in West Bengal in 1967 Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed in West Bengal around 1966.
Originated from the split that took place in the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1967.
Spread to lesser developed areas like Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh.
CPI-ML has been fighting elections in several states across India Do not support elections
Focuses on mass organizations Relies mainly on armed struggle
May have an armed wing, but not their sole reliance
Originated in China as a form of communist theory derived from the teachings of Chinese political leader Mao Zedong.
A section of communist rebels retained a distinct identity after the Naxalbari uprising.
Initially kept a low profile, shot into prominence in Bihar in mid-1980s when they killed 54 Rajputs in Dalelchak-Bhagaura village of Aurangabad.
Do not support elections.
Relies mainly on armed struggle.
Existence depends on their armed militia.
Security forces have the numbers and the training, but they have no local knowledge or intelligence.
They lack the sharp combat capabilities
Lack of infrastructure developments: There are no proper roads, no proper schools, and proper no hospitals.
Infrastructural problems, for instance, some villages are not yet connected properly with any communication network.
The terrain and demography are different.
The minimal presence of the administration in the interiors of Some regions has ensured that Maoists continue to have influence in the region and enjoy local support through a mix of fear and goodwill.
The Centre has maintained a massive presence of the CRPF in the affected states for almost two decades.
In Chhattisgarh, the CRPF has been consistently enlarging its footprint by opening new camps deeper into the jungles of South Bastar.
The CRPF raised a Bastariya Battalion the recruits for which were taken from the local population, who knew the language and terrain and could generate intelligence
Centre is pushing for the erection of mobile towers in the interiors, which would help the local people connect with the mainstream, and also generate technical intelligence.
Since 2014, as many as 2,343 mobile towers have been erected in LWE zones.
The Centre has also unleashed the Counter-terrorism National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the Enforcement Directorate on CPI(Maoist) cadres, leaders, and sympathisers with the aim of choking their funding.
The government of India (GoI) approved a ‘National Policy and Action Plan to address LWE’ in 2015 to address the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) menace holistically.
Security Related Expenditure (SRE) focuses on equipping security forces to fight Maoists.
The Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) aims to strengthen local police and intelligence setups.
Special Central Assistance for building infrastructure such as roads in LWE districts
The Border Security Force’s air wing has been strengthened with the induction of new pilots and engineers in the past one year to aid the anti-LWE operations and the MHA has also taken initiatives to choke the funding to banned outfits
It was through the active involvement of local police in the leading role that states such as Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Odisha and Jharkhand were able to end their Maoist problem.
All these states formed special units of their police forces with personnel and officers drawn from the state, gave them special training, and won the battle with concerted security and development efforts.
The Greyhounds force was formed in 1989 by K.S. Vyas, an IPS officer, to combat the growing Maoist threat in Andhra Pradesh.
It is a widely accepted principle in counter-Maoist strategy that the war against Left Wing Extremism can be won by the state police and not central forces.
This is because the state police have local knowledge, understand the language, and have local networks that are essential for the generation of intelligence.
The Maoists must be compelled to give up their armed struggle and this can only happen if the tribal people and civil society activists promoting peace are also empowered.
Civil society and the media need to build pressure on the Left Wing Extremists to eschew violence and join the mainstream.
It is the belief of the Government of India that through a holistic approach focusing on development and security-related interventions, the LWE problem can be successfully tackled.
By: Shubham Tiwari ProfileResourcesReport error
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