IN SEPTEMBER 1995, the presidents of the fve republics which constitute the watershed of the Aral Sea - Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan - met in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakstan, the autonomous republic of Uzbekistan (the worst-afected by the tragedy). This was the fourth meeting of the presidents within three years. The objective: to deal with the Aral Sea crisis and efectively try to contain the terrible after-efects of this gigantic ecological disaster. The meeting was preceded by an international conference where the presidents called upon the international community to help them save the Aral Sea. A resolution was taken up to formulate a regional treaty to share the waters of the rivers feeding the Aral Sea. Since these states were until recently part of the former Soviet Union, non-governmental organizations have rarely been involved in ecological work. But signifcantly, for the frst time, on paper at least, the ofcial Nukus Declaration stated government intent to provide space for NGOs to be involved in the revival of the Aral Sea. The conference laid bare all the elements of the crisis - the need for humanitarian aid, the need for plans to move towards “sustainable development” and ecological restoration. But the one question uppermost in the minds of concerned environmentalists - Will the Aral Sea ever recover its former glory? - remained unanswered!

The genesis: The quest for self-sufciency is indisputably a lofty goal, a meaningful aspiration, especially when it seeks to change the destiny of a land and its teeming millions. But sometimes when dreams run contrary to reason, failing to take cognizance of ground realities and existing truths, the outcome can be devastating. The Aral Sea crisis is one such disaster. A colossal blunder, borne of short-sighted planning, triggered by nothing but an all-consuming concern for self-sufciency. Ever since Lenin had decreed in 1919 that the USSR should become self-sufcient in cotton, the country’s central planners concentrated on cotton production. A process that sets into motion a series of chain reactions leading to a calamitous, culde-sac gateway to eventual catastrophe.

The future, as perceived by the Soviet planners, lay in the development of ambitious irrigation schemes that would milk the rivers to quench the growing, almost insatiable demands of cotton production. And if at the end of it all a sea was to be sacrifced, what of it? So, the Aral Sea was made to pay for the consequences of mega planning that paid no heed to ecological considerations.

One of the most ancient lakes on earth, the Aral Sea, which is bounded by three deserts and shared by the fve newly independent republics of Central Asia, had been the USSR’s second largest inland water body and the world’s fourth-largest inland sea. Fed mainly by two rivers - Amu Darya and Syr Darya - which collect the runofs and glacier melts from the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - it had an average depth of 16 meters and a maximum depth of 68 meters with a salt content of 1 percent only. It had abundant fsh resources and a busy shipping trade extending from its northern port of Aralsk in Kazakhstan to the river ports of Amu Darya, some as remote as Tajikistan. But all this was about to change. The Aral Sea and the adjoining tract of Central Asia were soon to feel the efects of these changes.

More than three-quarters of the territory in Central Asia is desert lowland, part of a closed basin with no open sea or ocean outlet. Its hydrological cycle is strongly afected by the prevalent climatic features. There is very little rainfall in the lowland plains as all the monsoon-bearing winds from the Indian Ocean to the south are blocked by the high Himalayan peaks. The high temperatures, low humidity, and high solar radiation combine to create very high evaporation rates.

The fertile irrigated land between the two rivers is an ancient area of human settlement and has a history of approximately 3500 years. Sophisticated water distribution systems were in operation here, especially in the regions of Khorezm and Fergana. Archaeological research has shown that millions of hectares of water were locally managed by village councils, which allocated and controlled water use and enforced water laws. According to tradition, users of irrigation water took part in the construction and maintenance of irrigation networks. When Russians conquered the Khanates of Turkestan (now Central Asia) in the late 19th century, they introduced technologies and began large-scale cotton cultivation. With the consolidation of Soviet power in the ‘20s, cotton was extensively developed in suitable areas. Sovietization led to a diminished appreciation by the inhabitants of the precious character of its water resources.

As recently as the late ‘50s, most surface water for irrigation came from smaller streams, and only about 15-17 percent of the Amu and Syr Darya fows were used for irrigation. Because of the low level of irrigation, the volume of the Aral Sea basin was more or less in equilibrium, with the evaporation from the surface being counterbalanced by the river infow, groundwater aquifers, and rainfall. The volume of water fuctuated by only 100-150 cu km, and the surface area by 4000 sq km. Sponging of a sea: When the decision to divert the waters of the two major rivers feeding the Aral Sea, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, was implemented, the fate of the once-mighty Aral Sea and the inhabitants of the region was sadly and irrevocably sealed. These diverted waters were to irrigate the ancient steppes (grasslands) of Central Asia, which had traditionally supported shepherds and nomads. But the Soviet planners were fully aware that this diversion would eventually starve the Aral Sea and compel it to shrink. They, therefore, had a contingency plan up their sleeves - the waters of the Siberian rivers fowing into the Central Asian region would be diverted to the Aral Sea to bolster the loss of Amu Darya and Syr Darya river fow. However, while the Central Asian irrigation plan went on stream, the plan to divert the Siberian rivers encountered stif opposition from several ecologically concerned Soviet scientists. Struck down by the sheer vehemence of such overwhelming protest, the planners backed of, leaving the poor Aral Sea to face the brunt of a decision that was to recoil most tragically on its perpetrator and victims alike.