Weber rejected both the positivist[1] contention that the cognitive[2] aims of the natural and the social sciences as it is impossible to make legitimate generalizations because human actions are not subject to the regularities that govern the world of nature. Against the historicists, Weber argued that the method of science, whether its subject matter be things or men, always proceeds by abstraction and generalization. Against the positivists, he took the stand that man, in contrast to things, could be understood not only in external manifestations, that is, in behavior, but also in the underlying motivations.
Weber insisted that a value element inevitable entered into the selection of the problem an investigator chooses to attack. There are no intrinsically scientific criteria for the selection of topics; here every man must follow his own demon, his own moral stance, but this in no way invalidates the objectivity of the social sciences. But, value relevance touches upon the selection of the problem, not upon the interpretation of phenomena. Hence, the relativity of value orientations leading to different choices has nothing to do with questions of scientific validity. What are relativized in this view are not the findings but the problems.
Weber countered that interpretations can be submitted to the test of evidence. This, he argued, is to be distinguished from the fact that the choice of subject matter—as distinct from the choice of interpretation—stems from the investigator’s value orientation, which may be the case with the natural scientist as well.
Value relevance must be distinguished from value-neutrality, since they refer to two different orders of ideas. In the first place, ethical neutrality implies that once the social scientist had chosen his problem in terms of its relevance to his values, he must hold values—his own or those of others—in abeyance while he follows the guidelines his data reveal. He cannot impose his values on the data and he is compelled to pursue his line of inquiry whether or not the results turn out to be inimical to what he holds dear. Value neutrality, in this first meaning of the term, refers to the normative injunction that men of science should be governed by the ethos of science in their role as scientists.
Weber believed, but investigator cannot make value judgments. Weber wrote, “Science today is a ‘vocation[1]’ organized in special disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of prophets dispensing sacred values, nor does it is contemplation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe.” The scientist finds dignity and fulfillment in the quest for truth.
Therefore, And against both these approaches, Weber emphasized the value-bound problem choices of the investigator and the value-neutral methods of social research.
[1] Vocation- A vocation is an occupation for which a person is suited, trained or qualified. It is also the inclination to undertake a certain kind of work, often in response to calling.
[1] positivist- Positivism is a philosophy that states that the only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge. As an approach to the philosophy of science deriving from Enlightenment thinkers like Pierre-Simon -Laplace (and many others), positivism was first systematically theorized by Comte, who saw the scientific method as replacing metaphysics in the history of thought,