Hermeneutics

The branch within sociology which deals with the human interpretation, human emotions, human thinking is considered as, ”Hermeneutics”.it is a branch of sociology which deals with the human mental situation, his emotions, collective views and emotions of an individual and also their interpretations. The Hermeneutics helps to understand social behavior of an individual towards an event and accordingly event is managed to make it more effective and more popular. The branch studies the historical background and took reference from such cultural context of an individual which had given shape to the individual’s culture. An early theologian and philosopher, in his written document, have mentioned the broader concept of hermeneutics: broader in such a way that the focus of hermeneutics shall extend beyond the religious text. The name of such a sociologist was Friedrich Schleiermacher Writing was done during the early nineteenth century. He asked a society to view the facts and trends running in society from and beyond religious view.

Vision of future

Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols. Weber’s vision of the future is both pessimistic and paradoxical. It is pessimistic because Weber believed that modern bureaucratization and instrumentalism were, in large part, “escape-proof”.  It is paradoxical because, although he viewed modern Western rationalism as a “steel-hard cage”, Weber rejected all evolutionary theories that treated history as if it could be viewed as the development or unfolding of predetermined and universal stages.

Weber was too much of a historicist to believe that a general theory of social evolution was possible.  For Weber, “cultural reality” results for the value orientations of social actors. Because of his belief that there was no foundation for values other than the spontaneous and nonrational decisions of historical individuals, Weber concluded that history is an open-ended process.  It is this tension between Weber’s belief in the escape-proof characteristics of bureaucracy and the open-endedness of history that makes his pessimism about the future appear paradoxical. 

Similarly, Weber pointed out that, although the rationalization – and, ultimately, the secularization – of metaphysical-ethical world views has left the individual with a feeling of mastery over the world, contemporary  individuals now contemplate a universe that has become indifferent to humanity and devoid of meaning. Primitive people had viewed the world as an enchanted garden full of spirits and supernatural forces with whom they had personal familiarity.  Modern individuals, on the other hand, over  the cosmos as a resources to be manipulated and used for instrumental gain.

Weber suggested, therefore, that there is a necessary ambivalence and tension in the modern world.  Modern societies have replaced substantive meaning (founded or orientations toward things of ultimate significance) with a form of rationality that is highly formal and empty of any significance other than instrumental effectiveness in the service of goals that can no longer be questioned.  We have become technically rational, but we have also lost sight of the ultimate ends of action.  Weber believed that this loss of innocence was irreversible. He rejected out of hand the possibility of a political solution to the problem of meaninglessness and alienation.  In response to Marx, Weber believed that socialism – which, he conceded, was the alternative to capitalism – was likely to accelerate rationalization.  Socialism, Weber suggested, would place a greater emphasis on technological mastery of people and things than would capitalism; it would create a vast state bureaucracy, undermine all forms of privatism, and regulate and standardize both the production and consumption of goods and services.

Weber pointed out that as the modern nation-state improved an refined technical-cognitive, or bureaucratic, modes of domination, the control of managerial positions in society would become increasingly important.  Political dominance in early capitalist society, Weber suggested, might well be dependent on ownership of the means of production. In advanced capitalist societies, however, such dominance was tied more to rational-legal authority than to class position.  This is not to say that Weber failed to understand the symbiotic relationship between bureaucratic domination and capitalist accumulation in the modern world. For instance, he claimed that collective or state ownership of the means of production would not reduce worker alienation; on the contrary, it would rationalize the administration of the work force in the interests of productivity to an even greater extent.  Weber did insist, however, that the Marxist equation of political domination with property ownership had been falsified by forces of development that were endemic to capitalist culture.  He predicated that the twentieth century would see not the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but the “dictatorship of the official.” 

Weber believed, therefore, that the choice between an ossified and bureaucratized socialist or stage-capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and a liberal and competitive capitalism on the other, was the only viable choice for contemporary political society.  He preferred competitive capitalism and a market economy to a planned economy and socialism because he believed that a liberal capitalist order was most likely to promote mobility, social dynamism, and personal freedom. Weber was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that both “socialist” and “capitalist” states of the future would use the scientific-technological mode of rationalism in the interests of the state and in pursuit of economic goals.  He suggested that freedom for the individual would be maximized by resisting this convergence between economic and political goals.  To this extent, unlike Hegel and Marx, actively supported the differentiation of civil society and the state.

Like Marx, however, Weber was centrally concerned about the fate of the modern individual in advanced industrial nations.  Once Weber conceded that the Protestant ethic was no longer necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist relations of production, his analysis of the predicament of the modern individual became not dissimilar to Marx’s.  Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not believe that the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could be brushed aside by a political movement.

Weber acknowledged that even in the most bureaucratic of states the possibility of the rise of charismatic leader cannot be discarded.  As noted earlier, however, this alternative to the rigidities of the “steel-hard cage” is totally unrelated to a philosophy of enlightenment.  Charismatic leaders might develop a rhetoric of emancipation; but charismatic domination itself is spontaneous, nonrational, and based on the affective and emotional power of collectively binding symbols.