Inter state water disputes

Causes of Inter-state River Water disputes

• River doesn’t follow political limits
• Uneven distribution of water resources
• Increasing Rainfall variability and frequent draughts
• Increasing demand of river water
• Regionalization of the national polity

According to the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, if there is an interstate water dispute or if any state government senses the likelihood of a water dispute because of any executive action or legislation passed or proposed by another state, it can bring it to the Centre's notice. Apart from this, the states can also complain about violation by other states in implementation of any water sharing agreement between them.

If the Centre feels that negotiations cannot settle the dispute, it is supposed to constitute a water dispute tribunal within a period not exceeding one year from the complaint date. (It is, however, important to note that the act was amended in 2002 after the Sarkaria Commission's recommendation, which stipulated that any dispute settled by a tribunal before the commencement of the Inter-State Water Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2002 shall not be re-opened).

The tribunal then investigates the matters and it is supposed to give its decision within three years. However, if some unavoidable reasons delay its decision, the central government can grant it an extension of a maximum of two years. The central government has to publish the tribunal's decision in the official gazette, after which it comes into force. The decision made by the tribunal is final and binding and has the same force as an order or decree of the SC.

Cases resolved by tribunals

The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT), constituted in October 1969 to settle the dispute over the sharing of Narmada waters, gave its decision in December 1979, awarding a specified quantum of utilizable waters to be shared by Gujarat, MP, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Similarly, the Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal constituted in April, 1969 gave its verdict in 1975.

Other interstate water disputes

The dispute between Maharastra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh over the Krishna river waters has resulted in a tribunal, while the dispute between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan over the waters of the Ravi and Beas is going on even after a tribunal gave its verdict long ago. Similarly, a tribunal's decision failed to resolve the Kaveri water dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. There are also disputes between Orissa and Andhra on a proposed canal on the Vamasadhara. Similarly, the waters of the Mahadayi or Mandovi are a bone of contention between Goa, Karnataka and Maharashtra.

Role of Special Leave Petition Art 136 Article 262

The Inter-State Water Disputes Act 1956 (ISWD), which was amended in 2002, does provide for a reference by the parties back to the Tribunal after it gives its final order.

There is a clear and explicit bar on the jurisdiction of the courts in the case of a river-water dispute that has been referred to a Tribunal under the ISWD Act. Such a bar is provided for in Article 262 of the Constitution and it is part of the ISWD Act. In other words, it is a constitutionally sanctioned bar.

The concerned states approach Supreme Court under Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136. The wording of the Article, and in particular the reference to “any Court or tribunal in the territory of India,” seems to bring the ISWD Tribunals within the purview of the Article.

Zonal Councils[19]

Recommendations of Punchhi Commission

The major recommendations may be enumerated as follows

1.      There should be an amendment in Articles 355 and 356 to enable the Centre to bring specific trouble-torn areas under its rule for a limited period.

2.     The commission has proposed “localising emergency provisions” under Articles 355 and 356, contending that localised areas — either a district or parts of a district — be brought under Governor’s rule instead of the whole state. Such an emergency provision should however not be of duration of more than three months.

3.      The commission however supports their right to give sanction for the prosecution of ministers against the advice of the state government.

4.      To make an amendment in the communal violence Bill to allow deployment of Central forces without the state’s consent for a short period. It has proposed that state consent should not become a hurdle in deployment of central forces in a communal conflagration. However, such deployment should only be for a week and post-facto consent should be taken from the state.

5.      Among the significant suggestions made by the Commission is, laying down of clear guidelines for the appointment of chief ministers. Upholding the view that a pre-poll alliance should be treated as one political party, it lays down the order of precedence that ought to be followed by the governor in case of a hung house:

a)      Call the group with the largest prepoll alliance commanding the largest number;

b)      The single largest party with support of others;

c)      The post-electoral coalition with all parties joining the government; and last

d)      the postelectoral alliance with some parties joining the government and remaining including Independents supporting from outside.

6.      The panel also feels that governors should have the right to sanction prosecution of a minister against the advice of the council of ministers. However, it wants the convention of making them chancellors of universities done away with.

7.      As for qualifications for a governor, the Punchhi commission suggests that the nominee not have participated in active politics at even local level for at least a couple of years before his appointment. It also agrees with the Sarkaria recommendation that a governor be an eminent person and not belongs to the state where he is to be posted.

8.     The commission also criticises arbitrary dismissal of governors, saying, “the practice of treating governors as political football must stop”. There should be critical changes in the role of the governor — including fixed five year tenure as well as their removal only through impeachment by the state Assembly. It has also recommended that the state chief minister have a say in the appointment of governor.

9.      Underlining that removal of a governor be for a reason related to his discharge of functions, it has proposed provisions for impeachment by the state legislature along the same lines as that of President by Parliament.This, significantly, goes against the doctrine of pleasure upheld by the recent Supreme Court judgment.

10. Endorsing an NCRWC recommendation, it says appointment of governor should be entrusted to a committee comprising the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Speaker of the Lok Sabha and chief minister of the concerned state. The Vice- President can also be involved in the process.

Key terms

Federal: A political system in which there is an equal distribution of powers between the central Government and the respective units called as States.

Unitary: A political system in which powers remain concentrated in the hands of the Central Government and whatever little powers given to the states is essentially a delegation of such powers from the centre onto the States.

Union List: A list of subjects in the Seventh schedule under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union Government or for that matter, Parliament.

State List: A list of subjects in the Seventh schedule on which State legislature is competent to legislate.

Concurrent List: An intermediate list of the subjects in the seventh schedule on which both Union and states are competent to legislate.

Residuary Powers: The rump area in the legislative sphere that does not fall under any of the above three lists on which only Parliament is competent to make laws.

Cooperative Federalism: A federal arrangement in which the Union and the States are considered to be the coordinates with each other rather than under the hegemony of the former over the latter.

Full faith and Credit clause:  (Art. 261) states that the final judgments and orders of the civil courts delivered in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of enforcement or execution anywhere in India. But be noted that this clause is applicable only for the civil courts or civil judgments and not for the criminal judgments.

National Development Council:  It is an extra constitutional and extra legal body formed in 1952 as an adjunct to the planning commission mainly to associate the states in the planning process.

Extra-constitutional body: A body or functionary not created under the provisions of the constitution, but either under an executive order or statutory enactment of the legislature.

De-facto executive head: “De- facto” meansby means of fact. Its opposite is called as de-jure which meansby virtue of law.