Rise of Communalism in India

Communalism is a belief that all those who have a common religion, also have, as a result common social, political, cultural and economic interests and identities. In other words, it is the notion that religion forms the base of the society and a basic unit of division in the society; that it is religion that determines all the other interests of man. To understand it better, let us look at it differently. Man is a multi faceted social being, who can, at the same time have a number of identities. His identity can be based on his country, region, sex, occupation, position within the family, caste or religion. A communalist would choose from this wide range, only the religious identity and emphasize it out of proportions. As a result, social relationship, political behaviour, and economic struggles might be defined on the basis of the religious identity. So, briefly put, it is the super-imposition of the religious category over all others, which becomes the starting point of communalism. Two more things need to be clarified at this stage:

Firstly, in the context of pre-independence India, communalism expressed itself mainly in terms of a conflict between certain sections of the Hindus and Muslims. It was partly for this reason that communalism was also referred to as the Hindu-Muslim problem, or the Hindu-Muslim question, in contemporary debates and literature. However, from this we should not assume that the problem was confined only to the Hindus and Muslims or that it was a religious problem at all.

Secondly, communal beliefs and propaganda did not always remain at the same pitch. In fact, as the society got more politicized and as the struggle for independence intensified, communalism also, correspondingly, shifted to higher levels of propaganda. Briefly, the communal propaganda and arguments had three levels.

i)     that the interests of all the numbers of a religious community were the same; for example it was argued that a Muslim Zamindar and a peasant had common interests because both were Muslims, (or Hindus or Sikhs as the case might be),

ii)    that the interests of the members of one religious community were different from the members of another religious community. In other words this meant that all Hindus had different interests from all Muslims and vice-versa,

iii)   that not only were these interests different, but also antagonistic and conflicting. This, in other words meant that Hindus and Muslims could not co-exist in peace because of conflicting interests.

Needless to say, these arguments were false, based on a wrong understanding of interests and had no roots in reality. Throughout the medieval period large sections of Hindus and Muslims had co-existed with tolerance and harmony. Although they maintained their religious differences, the common people, among both Hindus and Muslims lived in peace throughout and continued to interact on a cross-communal network.

Causes of communalism in India

Socio-economic factors

The British conquest brought about a change in the power structure which generally penetrated down to all the sections of the Indian society. To begin with, the British conquest marked the decadence of the upper class Muslims. It was particularly so in Bengal, where they lost their semi-monopoly in employment in the upper posts of army, administration and judiciary. They were also slowly evicted from their dominant position in land-holding as well. In particular the Permanent Settlement of 1793 and the making of English as the official court language in 1833, deprived the upper class Muslims of their wealth, power and influence. As it happened, owing to the uniqueness of the Indian situation, the loss of the Muslims invariably went in favour of the Hindus who had responded more positively to education and other modernizing forces than, the Muslims who remained largely backward. In other words, “economic development within the British imperialist system benefitted a group of Indians of whom a far larger proportion was Hindus than Muslims”. (W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, 1946)

Muslims, adapted later than Hindus to such British novelties as education, the new professions, posts in the administration, and culture. Consequently an intellectual awakening resulting in a re-assessment of the old beliefs, customs and values was also late among the Muslims, compared to Hindus. This time ‘lag’ between Ram Mohan Roy and Syed Ahmed Khan for instance, would help to explain, a feeling of weakness and insecurity on the part of the Muslims, leading to a reliance on religion and traditional ways of thinking.

This ‘lag’ theory i.e. the theory of a time lag between the Hindus and Muslims in responding to the forces of modernization and socio-economic development in the 19th century had not been found to be wholly acceptable by recent historians. It should, therefore be taken with same reservations. One major reason is its different application in different regions. If the Muslims as a group suffered in Bengal and as a result of the British rule, they benefited in some other parts like U.P. Still the ‘lag’ theory holds importance for as it gives us a clue to the 20th century phenomenon of the Muslims’ alienation from the national mainstream. The relationship of the lag theory with communalism was summed up very accurately by Jawaharlal Nehru in a letter to his friend, written in 1939.

“After the Indian mutiny of 1857, there was a period of intense repression and both the Hindus and the Muslims suffered from it but the Muslims probably suffered more. Gradually people began to get over this suppression. The Hindus took to English education which led to state services much more than the Muslims. The Hindus also took the professions and to industry in large numbers. Among the Muslims, the reactionary elements prevented the spread to modern education as well as industry. The Hindus developed a new middle class during this period, while the Muslims still continued to remain largely feudal. The Hindu middle class laid the foundation of the nationalist movement, but about a generation later, the Muslims went the same way, took to English education and state service and professions and developed a new class also. A conflict arose between the various middle class elements for state services and this was the beginning of the communal problem in its modern phase.”

Communalism in India was, therefore, a struggle for jobs between various communities, unequal educationally, politically and economically. Historian K.B. Krishna (Problems of Minorities, 1939), one of the earliest scholars to work on the communal problem felt that these struggles were accentuated in an epoch of the development of Indian capitalism, under feudal conditions, by British imperialism by its policy of counterpoise. It was therefore a product of imperialist-capitalist-feudal structure of India. To quote K.B. Krishna: “History of the communal representation is the history of British policy in India, also one of the growth and diversity of middle class consciousness in India and the demand of the middle class for political powers. But British imperialism is one aspect of the problem. The social economy of the country another.”

Role of British policy

The British policy holds a very special responsibility for favoring the growth of communalism. If communalism could flourish in India and reach monstrous proportions, which it did in 1947, it was possible largely because of the support it received from the British government. But before we discuss the British policy in detail certain clarifications might be made.

The British did not create communalism. We have seen the certain socio-economic and cultural differences already existed. They were not created but only taken advantage of by the British, to serve their political end, W.C. Smith (Modern Islam in India, 1946), has made this point very forcefully:

“The political policy of the government would have been less successful than it was, had there not been powerful economic factors operating to reinforce it. Communalism could not have proved so effective a divisive force, nor could the upper class Muslims have been so effectively repressed, had the Hindu and the Muslim sections of the class concerned been of the same economic level. But they were not.”

It is therefore, quite obvious that the British policy of ‘divide and rule’ that we are going to talk about, could succeed only because something in the internal social, economic, cultural and political conditions of society favoured its success. It is important to note that conditions were remarkably favourable for the use the growth of communalism as well as for the policy of ‘divide and rule’. Communalism grew and prospered not only because it served the political needs of the British rule but also because it met the social needs of some sections of the Indian society. Communalism was not a British creation. It was the result of a combination of a variety of factors.

The history of the British policy toward communalism can be easily traced to the period just after the rebellion of 1857.

The post-1857 period made it imperative for the rulers to adopt a new set of policies in order to combat the possible threat to their empire. The British policy, therefore, underwent significant changes after 1857 and acquired a dual character. It now consisted of a combination of liberal and imperialist policies. Liberal-in so much as it recognised and conceded the claims and aspirations of the new classes and sections as they arose; and imperialist because what was conceded was always circumscribed by imperial interests, utilizing the rivalries of various classes and interests. This policy was formulated with a double edged purpose to make friends by catering favourably to the aspirations of some newly emerging sections, and then to counterpoise one against the other, to offset one sectional interest against the other, one class against the other. This was, in a nutshell, the role of British policy, a policy of concession, counterpoise and coercion.

Once this policy became operative, its net result was the spread of communalism. But even while pursuing this policy, the communal ideology became a useful ally in serving the political objectives of the government. Generally speaking, at this stage, there were two main objectives before the government.

1.    To make some friends in the society, to offer patronage to some sections mainly in order to exercise influence and extend control and thereby strengthen its base in the society.

2.   To prevent a unity of the Indian people. If all the sections of the society could unite under any ideological influence, they could threaten the British Empire. Therefore communal ideology had to be used and spread to deny the oneness of the Indian people. This was done more effectively in the 20th century when the communal demands and organisations were encouraged to negate the legitimacy and credibility of the nationalist demands, ideology and organisation. Thus on the one hand, all attempts were made to keep the Muslims away from the Congress, and then the claims of the Congress were run down on the grounds that it did not represent the Muslims!

Communalism served the government in yet another way. Communal deadlock and the worsening communal situation could also be used as justification for the continuation of the British rule. The argument they gave, went something like this-the major political parties i.e. Congress, Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha could not come to an agreement among themselves. The Indian people were divided amongst themselves, and were therefore incapable of governing themselves, if the British rule ended. The impossibility of any Indian alternative to British rule was, thus, emphasized. This was the British policy of first encouraging communalism and then using it for their own political ends.

Separate-electorates

The declaration of separate-electorates in the legislative bodies in 1909, as a part of the Morley-Minto reforms is a major landmark in the history of communalism. Separate-electorates meant grouping of constituencies, votes and elected candidates on the basis of religion. In practical terms it meant introducing Muslims constituencies, Muslim voters and Muslim candidates. The election campaign and politicization was thus strictly confined within the walls of each religion. All this was to have disastrous consequences.

The introduction of the separate-electorate was based on the notion that the Indian society was a mere collection of interests and groups and that it was basically divided between the Hindus and Muslims. Indian Muslims were on the other hand, regarded as “a separate, distinct and monolithic community”. It was also based on the motive of entrusting power in the hands of potential allies as well as preventing Hindu-Muslim unity. Arguing against joint-electorates, Minto pointed out to Morley:

“Under the joint scheme, the Hindu would not only be able to elect their own men, but a Mohammedan as well, who might not represent bona fide Muslim interests.”

According to these reforms, the Muslims were assured that they would be granted representation in the councils, not merely according to their ‘numerical strength’, but also according to their ‘political importance’. This Minto assured a Muslim deputation:

“The pitch of your address, as I understand it, is a claim that in any system of representation ... the Mohammedan community should be represented as a community ... you just claim that your numerical strength, both in respect to the political importance of your community and the service it has rendered to the Empire entitle you to consideration. I am entirely in accord with you ... I can only say to you that the Mohammedan Community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded in any administrative reorganization with which I am concerned ...”

The impact of the separate electorates was as follows:

1.    it created the institutional structures containing separatism.

2.    it was to produce severe constraints on the Congress and limit its space for nationalist activities,

3.    it was to active the communal groups and organisations, and

4.    it ensured the impossibility of a common agreement among Indian political groups.

However, the impact of the separate-electorates was to surface in Indian politics only later. David Page (Prelude to Partition, 1982) in a recent book has summed it up very well:

“The granting of separate-electorates appears to have been an attempt by the Raj to shore up a crucial part of its system of control ... it was an attempt to extend and broaden the base of its rule by extending and broadening the support of its traditional allies.”

19th century revivalism

The revivalist tendencies in the 19th century acted as a contributory factor in the growth of communalism. Revivalism was a very general phenomenon under imperialism the world over. It meant an attempt at restoration of self respect which had been deeply injured by political subjection. This self respect was sought to be restored by glorifying India’s past, which was projected as a compensation for India’s existing humiliation.

Although revivalism solved some problems i.e. of inculcating a sense of pride in one’s past, it creates some other problems. One such problem was the projection of different glorious origins for Hindus and Muslims. This added a historical factor to the already existing religious, cultural and socio-economic differences. The reformers among the Hindus glorified Indian’ ancient past and condemned the medieval period as an age of barbarians. Their Muslim counterparts looked to the history of the Arabs for pride and glory. So at a time when Hindus and Muslims needed to be united in very sense, they were shown to be different people, historically. This damage became clear in the 20th century when Mohammed Ali Jinnah, while formulating his two-nation theory declared that Hindus and Muslims were two nations also because they had a different history and that often the hero for one was a villian for the other.

Political trends

Related to the question of revivalism was the emergence of certain political trends in the late 19th century among a section of the Muslims in India. Although these trends were far from being communal, they nevertheless, provided the background and a certain justification to subsequent communal politics. In this connection a reference may be made to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.

The views and political activities of Syed Ahmed Khan were always marked with certain ambivalence. He started his activities without any communal bias. His main aim was to introduce reforms among the Muslims, impress upon them the necessity of modern education and secure official patronage for them. For this purpose, he formed the Aligarh College which received financial support from many Hindus and had many Hindu students and teachers. He himself preached harmony between Hindus and Muslims.

However, his politics changed after the formation of the Congress in 1885. He found his priority of securing administrative posts for Muslims and of professing loyalty to the British rule, to be in absolute contradiction with the anti-imperialist edge of the Congress. Although his main opposition with Congress was on the attitude towards the British government, he voiced his disapproval in terms of the Congress being a Hindu body, and therefore opposed to the Muslims. Thus he laid down the foundation of certain basic themes of communalism. One such theme was that being a majority Hindus would dominate the Muslims and override their interest, if the British rule ended and the power was transferred to Indians. It was on this ground that Syed Ahmed Khan was opposed to the establishment of representative democratic institutions. According to him the democracy would only mean the power to the majority as “it would be like a game of dice in which one man had four dice and the other only one”. He also felt that any system of elections would put power into the hands of Hindus. Hence, the three main themes of communalism i.e.

1.    opposition to the nationalist forces,

2.    opposition to the democratic process and institutions, and

3.    loyalty to the British Government

         could be traced back to the ideology of Syed Ahmed Khan and his followers.

Needless to say these arguments were wholly incorrect. Although there were many Hindus in it, the congress could not be called a Hindu Organisation, by any stretch of imagination.

There was nothing Hindu about its demands and programme. Badruddin Tyabji, a Muslim, presided on its session in 1887, and the number of Muslim delegates to the Congress Session increased in subsequent years so as to include many prominent Muslims in it. Also, democracy or modern representative institutions, posed absolutely no threat to the Muslims. In fact it posed the threat only to the Rajas, the feudal and Jagirdari elements among the Muslims (as also among the Hindus) of whom Syed Ahmed Khan was a representative.

Partition of Bengal and the formation of the Muslim league

The partition of Bengal (1905) may have started as an administrative measure, but it was soon transformed into a major political advantage for the government as it intended to convert Bengal into areas in Hindu majority and Muslim majority. It was thus the result of the British desire to weaken the nationalism of Bengal and consolidate a Muslim block against it. Said Curzon the Viceroy:

“The partition would invest the Muslims of East Bengal with a unity which they had not enjoyed since the days of old Mussalman Viceroys and Kings”.

The partition scheme and the subsequent Swadeshi Movement was followed by the formation of the All India Muslim League towards the end of 1906, with official patronage. It consisted of a group of big Zamindars, ex-bureaucrats and other upper class Muslims, like Aga Khan, the Nawab of Dacca and Nawab Muslim-ul-Malik. Its motive was to thwart the young Muslims from going over to the Congress, and thereby into the nationalist fold. The Muslim League was formed as purely a loyalist body whose only job was to look up to the government for favour and patronage. And they were not disappointed.

Another important feature of this period was the growth of Muslim separatism, because of

1.    the surfacing of Hindu revivalist tendencies during the Swadeshi movement.

2.    the British propaganda that the partition of Bengal would benefit the Muslims, and

3.    spurts of communal violence. A number of communal riots broke out in Eastern Bengal, in the period following the Swadeshi movement.

Lucknow pact

Lucknow Pact (1916) was an attempt made by the Indian organisation, namely the Congress and Muslim League, to arrive at a settlement. The Congress conceded separate electorates as a temporary arrangement, in order to obtain Muslim League’s support. Two things need to be remembered regarding the Lucknow Pact:

1.         It was an arrangement between the leaders, not between the people. The Congress-League settlement was wrongly equated with a Hindu-Muslim settlement, the assumption being that the Muslim League truly represented the Muslims.

2.         Soon the Lucknow Pact became redundant because of the Government of India Act, 1919, which granted much more to Muslims than the Lucknow Pact.

Khilafat

The Khilafat agitation, was a product of a particular political climate where Indian nationalism and Pan-Islamism went hand in hand. It witnessed Muslims’ participation in the national movement at an unprecedented level. However, communalism started making inroads into Indian politics and society, just after the withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation Movement following the violence at Chauri-Chaura. There were many symptoms of increasing communalism in the period 1922-27:

1.    Communal violence erupted at an unprecedented level. In U.P. alone there were as many as 91 riots from 1923-1927. Issues of cow-slaughter and music before mosques come into prominence.

2.    Khilafat bodies representing Hindu-Muslim unity gradually petered out.

3.    The Muslim League got revived during 1922-23 and began to openly preach separatist politics.

4.    Its Hindu counterpart, the Hindu Mahasabha, formed in 1915 and lying inactive since then, found good climate in which to revise itself.

5.    Movement like Tabligh (propaganda) and Tanzim (organisation) arose among the Muslims. They were partly a response of Shuddhi and sangathan among the Hindus. These were again in part a response to the forcible conversions made during the Moplah rebellion. All this vitiated the atmosphere considerably.

6.    R.S.S. (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) was founded in 1925.

There were many reasons for this worsening communal situation:

The Khilafat alliance brought religious heads into politics. But they entered politics on their own terms. The withdrawal of the movement however, did not lead to a withdrawal of their participation from politics. This gave a certain religious interpretation to politics.

The nature of the political structure itself contained the seed of communalism through the introduction of separate-electorates. This structure was enlarged by the Montagu-Chelmesford reforms (1919) which created space for communal propaganda and political alignments along communal lines.

The spread of education without a corresponding growth in the employment opportunities left an army of unemployed educated people who could use religion for jobs, favour, etc.

The political situation as it stood in 1927 was far from satisfactory. Nationalist forces were divided and at a low ebb. Communalism was gaining momentum.

Parting of the ways

The arrival of the Simon Commission and its near unanimous boycott by all sections of political opinion, once again provided an opportunity for unity. A section of the Muslim League, under the leadership of Jinnah, took the initiative and was willing to give up separate-electorates in favour of joint-electorates, if certain conditions were met. These were:

1/3rd representation for the Muslims in the central legislature

separation of Sind from Bombay as a separate province,

reform in the North-West Frontier provinces, and

Muslims’ representation in the legislative council in proportion to their population in Punjab and Bengal.

These demands were accepted by the Congress, which opened up prospects for unity. But its rejection in uncompromising terms by the Hindu Mahasabha at the All Parties Conference (1928) complicated matters. The incompatibility between the League and Mahasabha frustrated all attempts at unity. The Nehru Report (framed by Motilal Nehru and Tej Bahadur Sapru), was rejected by the Muslim League as it did not incorporate all their demands.

The impact of the Nehru report

It led to the estrangement of Jinnah, who called it a ‘Parting of the Ways’ with the Congress, went back to the separate-electorates, and formulated his famous fourteen points (including separate-electorates, reservation of seats in the centre and provinces, reservation of jobs for Muslims, creation of new Muslim majority provinces, etc.) which became the text of the communal demands.

It increased the distance between various political groups and pushed Jinnah more toward communalism.

It also contributed to the aloofness and even hostility of most leaders among the Muslims towards Civil Disobedience Movement.

Towards a mass base- extremist phase

The event of 1928-29 demonstrated a drifting apart of the communal forces. Soon this drifting apart was to reach a point of no return. This was the starting point of communalism transforming into an irresistible mass force. By 1940, all the communal demands were to pale into insignificance in front of the new demand-the demand for Pakistan, as a separate homeland for Muslims. This demand was finally achieved in 1947. Let us look at these events in more details.

The Government of India Act, 1935, provided for provincial autonomy and a wider franchise than earlier. Elections were held in early 1937 under separate-electorates. The results were quite revealing. In the general constituencies Congress swept the polls, was in a position to form ministries in six provinces and was the largest single party in two others. In the Muslim constituencies however, the Congress performance was disappointing. Out of 482 Muslim constituencies, Congress contested 58 and won 26. Quite interestingly, even the Muslim League, claiming to be a representative of the Muslims, performed very badly, did not get a single seat in the North-West Frontier Provinces, got 2 seats out of 84 in Punjab and 3 out of 33 in Sind. It was not a position to form a ministry anywhere. In the crucial provinces of Bengal and Punjab, the ministries were formed by regional parties (Unionist Party led by Sikander Hayat Khan in Punjab and Praja Krishak Party led by Fazl-ul-Haq in Bengal).

The election results confronted the Muslim League and the Congress with different messages. For the Congress, the message was loud and clear. It had a strong base among the Hindus but was yet to establish itself as a representative of the Muslims. However, the only hope was that even its rival among the Muslims, the Muslim League, could not claim to represent them. The congress, therefore, had a two-fold project.

To work among the Muslims masses and bring them into the Congress fold. In 1937, it did not seem a difficult task because the Muslims seemed to be completely independent of any dominant political influence-communal or nationalist.

To ignore the Muslim League completely as it had the feet of clay. There seemed no point in trying to make a settlement with the league as the election results had demonstrated its unrepresentative character. Nehru, therefore, declared quite trimumpantly that there were only two forces in the country-nationalism and imperialism being represented respectively by the Congress and the Government.

To achieve these two-fold tasks, the Congress decided to launch a ‘Muslim mass contact campaign’. This was an attempt to ignore all the organisations and make a direct appeal to the Muslims to join the Congress. Jinnah was quite alarmed by this move and warned the Congress to stay away from the Muslims, because, according to him, only the Muslim League could represent the Muslims.

Muslim League had, hitherto, been an elite organisation, dominated by the princes and the Zamindars and had absolutely no base among the masses. In order to succeed in the electoral politics and be in a better bargaining position vis-a-vis other dominant groups, it was important to have a mass base and be a popular organisation, much like the Congress was.

By 1937 all the fourteen points of Jinnah had been granted by the government. And yet he found himself nowhere! He was just not able to carry himself and the League, of which he had become the permanent President, to a position of Political respectability. Therefore, it was important to maximize the league’s membership and also to place the demand at a much higher pitch since all the other demands (like separate-electorates, reservation of seat, etc.) had been acceded.

In order to achieve these two-fold tasks. Jinnah did the followings:

1.    A massive campaign for the population of the League was launched. The Muslim League actually broke out of its elite shell and began to acquire a mass character (although among Muslim masses only). Membership fee was reduced, provincial committees were formed and the party programme was also transformed so as to acquire a socio-economic content.

2.    An equally strong campaign was launched to denounce and condemn the Congress ministries. They were shown to represent Hindu-Raj, and hostile to Muslim minorities. This was the surest way of creating a Hindu-Muslim divide. The Congress was asked to concentrate only on the Hindus, as it was seen by Jinnah, as a Hindu Body.

In 1940, at the Lahore session Jinnah came up with the two-nation theory. It said that Muslims were not a minority, they were a nation. Hindus and Muslims, consisted of two nations, as they were different people economically, politically, socially, culturally and historically. Therefore the Muslims of India should have a sovereign state for themselves. Hence the proposal for Pakistan as a separate homeland for Muslims was raised.

As a result of all that has been discussed above, communalism began to emerge as a mass force. Although it had not become one by 1940, but the process of the transformation of communalism into a mass force had been set in motion. This was to lead to partition of India in 1947.

Role of communal organisations

Once communalism raised its head, then in addition to being encouraged by the Government, it grew on its own. It seemed to have the inbuilt system; whereby it could increase its strength, even independent of any external support. Communal organisations played a vital role in this process. The leading communal organizations, All India Muslim League (formed in 1906) and the All India Hindu Mahasabha (formed in 1915) were opposed to each other, but they always provided justification for each other and increasingly made each other more communal. Through their political activities and propaganda they prevented the Hindus and Muslims from coming together, made them distrust each other and thereby spread communalism among the people.

Weaknesses in the national movement

The growth of communalism in the 20th century could have been checked by a nationalist upsurge. The communal ideology could be defeated by the nationalist forces and ideology. But the Indian National Congress, as a representative of the nationalist forces and ideology, failed to prevent the spread of communalism among the people. Although fully committed to secularism and nationalism, and desirous to bring about a unity of the Indian people, the Indian National Movement fought a battle against the communal forces but lost ultimately due to a variety of reasons.

To begin with, the Congress could not comprehensively understand the nature of communalism. As a result of this, the Congress did not have a central strategy to combat communalism. Therefore, it kept shifting between temporary sets of strategies. Also the Congress could not keep pace with the fast changing character of communalism.

Besides, certain Hindu revivalist tendencies entered into the national movement and successfully prevented its attempts to reach out to Muslims and incorporate them into its fold. Also the use of certain religious symbols (like Ramarajya for instance) acted as a barrier.

At the level of implementation the Congress sometimes made wrong choices while dealing with the communal forces. It tried to offer concessions and made compromises with them, which only increased the credibility of the communal groups. On certain other occasions, opportunities for a compromise were lost, thereby creating a deadlock.

However, while pointing out the limitations, the complexity of the problems, particularly because of the attitude of the Government must be accounted for. The British government did all it could to prevent a settlement between various political groups. No matter what the Congress offered to the Muslims, the Government always offered more, thereby making the arrangement redundant.