• India’s first indigenous ballistic-missile armed nuclear submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant, recently completed its first deterrence patrol.
• In this context, it is high time that India makes a reassessment of its policy on nuclear weapons.

Why is SSBN so significant?

• The capability to launch nuclear-armed missiles from nuclear-powered submarine is a greatest form of deterrence a country can possess.
• It requires a very high degree of technological sophistication -

1. to be able to manufacture such submarines indigenously
2. to equip them with missiles of the desired range
3. to fire them safely

• The ability to operate one or more SSBNs requires the highest possible degree of professionalism.
• It covers a wide range of functionaries as

1. the prime minister
2. the national security advisor
3. the commander of the strategic forces
4. the commanding officer of the submarine
5. every single member of the crew

What is the larger need?

• It is paradoxical that nuclear submarine provides the fullest deterrence only when the captain and his senior officers have the ability to press the symbolic red button on their own.
• However, despite the government’s claims, there are reasons to believe India is not yet there, but is getting closer.
• The completion of the triad thus calls for a profound review of India’s policy on nuclear weapons.
• India is close to achieving credible second strike capability.
• Given this, it must shift focus from negotiating its way through international nuclear weapons control regimes.
• It should certainly move to shaping a world where these weapons of mass destructions are not used.
• India must go from the defensive to the assertive and must champion a global no-first use (GNFU) treaty.

How has the global scenario so far been?

• The 20th century method of trying to prevent more countries from possessing a nuclear weapon has failed.

• The great powers first selectively proliferated nuclear weapons technology to their allies.
• Meanwhile, they tried to keep it away from their adversaries.
• They then foisted an unequal treaty on the rest of the world.
• It aimed at promising to disarm, in return for the rest of the countries committing not to build their own arsenals.
• They then failed on this promise too and decided that they would keep their bombs in perpetuity.
• However, they insisted that the rest forever keep to their no-bomb commitments.

What should the approach be?

• Non-proliferation might not be dead, but it’s a 20th-century idea that has run its course.
• A realistic idea for the 21st century would be the prevention of first-use of nuclear weapons.
• Global no-first use (GNFU) can co-exist with, and can even reinforce, the movement towards disarmament.
• Getting the world’s powers to commit verbally and textually to no-first use will be the first step.
• The strategies to verify, to have assurance, and to deter potential defectors from GNFU and so on will have to be worked out.
• India should take the lead in changing the international narrative to GNFU, move towards working out strategies and mechanisms to make it work.
• GNFU can cause China to make new calculations and there is scope here for India and China to collaborate at international security level.