India’s Afghan policy is driven by many extraneous factors such as its geographical constraints, its search for a transit route to Central Asia through Afghanistan and Iran, its troubled relationship with Pakistan and the growing threat of terrorism in India and Afghanistan and the recent coming of Trump’s policy.

India recently sent two former diplomats as “non-official” participants at the recent “Moscow format” multilateral meeting that included Taliban delegates. Indian government-nominated representatives sharing the table with a Taliban delegation for the first time is notable.

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India’s current relationship with Afghanistan:

• India’s development assistance has been the source of its considerable influence and goodwill among Afghan citizens.
• Major projects, such as the Salma Dam and Parliament building in Kabul, that began in 2008-09, have now been completed.
• Last year India and Afghanistan agreed to initiate an ambitious and forward-looking ‘New Development Partnership’, according to which India agreed to take up 116 high-impact community development projects to be implemented in 31 provinces of Afghanistan, including in the fields of education, health, agriculture, irrigation, drinking water, renewable energy, flood control, micro-hydropower, sports infrastructure and administrative infrastructure.
• India has been giving a lot of non-lethal military assistance. In 2016 four MI 25 attack helicopters were given to Afghanistan.
• India is the biggest regional donor to Afghanistan and fifth largest donor globally with over $3 billion in assistance.
• India has built over 200 public and private schools, sponsors scholarships and hosts Afghan students.
• India has shied away from involving itself in full scale war in Afghanistan.

India’s traditional position with Taliban:

• India was among the countries that had refused to recognise the Taliban regime of 1996-2001.
• India watched Taliban’s growth with concern, assessing early that it was being driven by Pakistan’s army and the ISI.
• The Kandahar hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 forced India to negotiate.
• At other times, it supported anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
• Throughout the 1990s, India gave military and financial assistance to the Northern Alliance fighting the Pakistan-sponsored Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
• Meanwhile the 9/11 attacks and the US crackdown leading to the fall of the Taliban regime took place.
• When the Taliban re-emerged in 2006-07 to once again challenge US forces, India maintained it was not going to talk with the Taliban.

India should engage with the Taliban as there are a host of concerns:

• USA’s diminishing role:
  • A period of adjustment has become essential following US President unilateral announcement that US is pulling its troops out of the conflict-ridden country.
  • Another development is the “framework” deal between the US and Afghan Taliban after six days of discussions at Doha.
  • The Afghan war has already become the longest war in US history. With the passage of time, the conflict has not only become more intense – it has also become more complicated
• Control of Afghan government:
  • The Afghan government controls barely half the country, with one-sixth under Taliban control and the rest contested.
  • Most significant is the ongoing depletion in the Afghan security forces because of casualties, desertions and a growing reluctance to join
  • Afghanistan launched the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation and also made an unconditional dialogue offer to the Taliban. The Taliban rejected his overture, declaring that they were ready to engage in direct talks only with the Americans.
• Increasing Taliban attacks:
  • Recently there has been a spike in violence, with the Taliban carrying out a set of coordinated assaults around Afghanistan, rejecting an offer of a three-month ceasefire by President of Afghanistan and laying siege to Ghazni city.
  • The violence this year has also put 2018 on course to be the deadliest year for Afghan civilians, with an average of nine people killed every day, according to UN data.
• Pakistan factor:
  • The major challenge is the cooperation of regional players. Peace in Afghanistan and the wider region can only be achieved through a multilateral mechanism involving the US as well as major regional players, including Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China, India and Saudi Arabia.
  • Despite six months of concerted American punitive actions on Islamabad, the Pakistan establishment is not shutting down support for Taliban fighters.
  • The role of Pakistan is going to expand significantly, with the US depending upon it to implement the interim deal. This will be a diplomatic victory for Pakistan.
• Iran factor:
  • US administration’s collision course with Iran is another hurdle to realising its South Asia policy. Iran is a neighbour to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and any action against Tehran will have consequences on the region.
  • US is also against Iran which is important to give access to the sea to landlocked Afghanistan through Chabahar port- which is in India’s interests etc.
• Islamic state:
  • After losing occupied territories in and around Mosul, IS is now slowly enlarging its presence in neighbouring countries, particularly Afghanistan.
  • It is now targeting mainly the Shias and the Hazara minority, joining forces with the Taliban thereby changing the dynamics of the war in Afghanistan.
• Indian interests would be hurt:
  • More fighting and political instability in Afghanistan would be damaging, as much for Indian interests as for regional stability.
  • Delhi is concerned about the vital role that all the powers are giving to Pakistan. Iran and Russia, two of India’s closest allies during the Northern Alliance’s battle against the Taliban regime in the 1990s, seem out of sync with Indian interests.
  • An emboldened Taliban is sure to impinge on security scenario in India’s troubled Kashmir Valley. The outfit seems positioned to emerge as the ideological bulwark of Kashmir’s renewed insurgency.
  • US criticism of India’s Afghan policy and the plans to exit could cast serious doubt on the US’s role as a strategic ally for India.

Way forward:

• The U.S.’s eventual pullout as Afghanistan’s peacekeeper is inevitable, close bilateral consultations should be made to help Afghanistan according to its own needs.
• India has always supported for Afghanistan’s democracy. Use of her ‘soft power’ – ranging from telecommunications to education, community development programmes can be pushed forward.
• India’s best course with Afghanistan remains its own regional strategy, not becoming a part of any other country’s strategy.
• India must seek to build capacities and capabilities of Afghan nationals and its institutions for governance and delivery of public service, develop socio-economic infrastructure, secure lives and promote livelihood.
• Inactive SAARC must now be revived to strengthen the regional co-operation in South Asia.
• Tier-II diplomacy and involving other stakeholders: India, which has been against holding talks with the Taliban for a long time, finally sent two retired diplomats, at the ‘non-official level’, to join them at the Moscow peace talks.
• India’s participation, however, is crucial, even though it is at a non-official level.
• Continuing the efforts of implementing mega infrastructure projects, providing military equipments and training to Afghan personnel on the sidelines.
• Use of regional groupings like SCO to combat the terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.
• Echoing the Afghan stand, India has been asserting that the peace process must be “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled.”

Conclusion:

Defeatism or a lack of ambition for the India-Afghanistan relationship at this juncture would be much more detrimental to India’s interests than anything the Taliban’s return to Afghanistan’s political centre-stage can do.