Introduction

Indo- Pak relations have always been a concern both bilateraly and internationally eversince the two nations came into being progressing through their colonial history. Despite 3 full fledged wars and major skrimishes, the turn table always points to a diplomatic failure on both sides of the game, leaving exploitative intent of superpowers to hold up a grand bargain which favours block politics more than the 2 nations.

Pakistan’s doctrine

• Over the past seven decades, the corner stone of Pakistan’s national policy has been its obsession with India as an existential threat. To deal with this illusory challenge, Islamabad persistently sought strategic parity vis-a-vis New Delhi.
• Having repeatedly failed to achieve its grand objectives through conventional war, the Pakistan Army changed its strategy in the early 1980s.
• The fuelling of militancy in Punjab marked the beginning of Pakistan’s ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC) warfare against India.
• Around this time, President Zia’s policy of Islamization including of the military redefined its motto; Iman (faith), Taqwa (abstinence) and Jihad (war in name of god). In pursuit of its ‘bleed India strategy’, the Pakistan Army unleashed a ‘Proxy War’ in Kashmir towards the late 1980’s.
• The mainstay of this new game was Pakistani jihadi terrorist outfits, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and later Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), complemented by Hizbul Mujahidin (HM) cadres.

Indian Strategy

• Ironically, India’s approach of dealing with the Pakistan sponsored ‘Proxy War’ as ‘cross border terrorism’ was a strategic blunder.
• What this resulted in was a tactical response: the adoption of a counter infiltration posture astride the LoC and establishment of a ‘Counter Insurgency’ grid in the hinterland.
• There was no action plan to take on the jihadi breeding grounds inside Pakistan or raise the costs for the Pakistan Army – the real perpetrators of the new form of warfare.
• This ‘low cost-high return’ option served Rawalpindi well, evident from the fact that, during the last three decades, the Indian security forces suffered over 5000 fatalities. Despite eliminating some 21000 terrorists during this period, the security situation in the Kashmir Valley remains volatile.

Strategic Shift

• 26 February 2019 marked a turning point in India’s fight against terrorism. The events of that day signified a strategic shift in the Indian approach from ‘Counter Terrorism’ operations inside own territory to ‘Counter Proxy War’ inside Pakistan.
• This change from a defensive to an offensive approach manifested itself in the form of the pre-emptive strike by Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft against a Jaish-e- Mohammed (JeM) training camp at Balakot in Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa, a non-military target across the International Border (IB).
• India’s actions against Pakistan sponsored terrorist groups has until then been confined to the Line of Control (LoC), primarily by way of fire assaults.
• As a politico-military action, the Balakot operation was an astounding success. It achieved the strategic aim of conveying a clear message to Pakistan that, here on, the proxy war will be fought on its soil.
• The international community stood by India and even Pakistan’s closest allies, China and Saudi Arabia, were rather tight lipped in their response, advocating restraint.
• The PAF’s employment of F 16 jets, in violation of the purchase condition that they would be used only for defence and counter insurgency operations within own territory, came under close scrutiny.
• Pakistan as a State is a combustible mix of religion and politics. Its Army runs the nation’s foreign and defence policies, with nuclear weapons and terrorists serving as strategic assets.
• Therefore, the odd aerial strike by India is not going to change Pakistan’s basic strategy of ‘proxy war’.
• Until Pakistan takes irreversible actions to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and provides verifiable proof, India must not let Islamabad off the hook.
• This implies making cross border terrorism a cost prohibitive option for Rawalpindi.

A Comprehensive Approach

India’s strategy has been shaped by goals that have sought to alter the situation on three interrelated levels.

• First, changing Pakistani behaviour so it ceases or decelerates cross-border terrorism.
• Second, changing Pakistan’s internal structure and its imbalanced civil–military relations that perpetuate a structural confrontation with India.
• Third, changing how the international community, particularly the United States (US) and China, perceive India’s predicament and are willing and able in their self-interests to restrain Pakistan’s proxy war.

Way Forward

In tune with Joseph Nye’s conception of ‘Smart Power’, India needs to combine its resources into a successful strategy through the intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defence, development and other tools of hard and soft power. In other words, defeating Pakistan’s Proxy War is a national effort demanding the employment of all components of ‘National Comprehensive Power’.

There is an urgent need to formulate a ‘Counter Proxy War Doctrine’ that is multi-pronged and all-encompassing. There has to be a ‘zero tolerance policy’ against Pakistan providing safe haven to terrorists. A relentless diplomatic offensive to isolate Islamabad must be sustained and cooperation with nations like Iran, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, which too are victims of Pakistan sponsored terrorism, must be scaled up. On the economic front, a concerted effort is required to tighten the noose around Pakistan through international bodies like the IMF and FATF. Militarily, all options must be on the table including covert ones, to punish Islamabad if it continues with its misadventure. Simultaneously, internal fault lines need to be addressed on priority.