SAARC was set up in 1985 and today it has 8 members: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Srilanka. Afghanistan joined SAARC only in 2007. SAARC member nations cooperate on a range of issues from agriculture, economy, poverty alleviation, S&T and culture to encourage people to people contact.

                China has been an observer member in SAARC since 2005. China has recently lobbied to be upgraded to full membership and thus push its way to a dominant position in all of Asia.                

The Charter of SAARC requires consensus among all members for admitting a new member. If China is to be admitted it must get the support of all the members. China expressed its interest in joining the organisation in the 18th summit held in Kathmandu, Nepal in 2014. However, this was not endorsed by India for geopolitical reasons.

India’s reasons of not endorsing China’s full membership are:

• Non-South Asian country: The perception that China is not a South Asian country as it doesn’t share a history and culture with the people of South Asia. China is not a mainstream South Asian country.
• Hegemony of China: A number of SAARC countries have reportedly supported full membership for China, including ally Pakistan, as well as Nepal and Sri Lanka. China potentially dominating the organization and working against India interests within it. This may further drive China’s BRI interests.
• Impact on Bilateral ties and SAARC: Sino-Indian political difficulties limiting SAARC’s effectiveness and activities, as India-Pakistan ones have done; and Sino-Indian interactions within SAARC exacerbating China-India mistrust.

However, the reluctance of India to admit China into SAARC could work against India’s interests.

• Strategic importance:
• The inclusion of China as a dialogue partner in the SAARC framework would provide a forum to discuss concerns related to Beijing-led regional infrastructure development and connectivity projects.
• It will also help address several issues related to terms and conditions of loans, benefits for the local economy and sovereignty concerns of countries in the region.
• The US-China trade war and frequent meetings between the leaders of India and China post-Doklam standoff worked towards setting up a hotline between India-China military headquarters.
• This will strengthen communication and build trust and mutual understanding to make their military manoeuvres and movements more predictable.
• With USA reducing its military presence in Afghanistan; SAARC can act as a better forum to help Afghan rebuild than China’s single handed approach. This reduces China’s direct leverage in Afghanistan.
• Economic Avenue:
• Currently, as an observer, China cannot initiate any proposal nor can it participate in discussions and deliberations within the forum.
• New Delhi must reconsider its strategy, as China’s inclusion as a dialogue partner will not grant it a veto but rather increase the likelihood of bringing in Chinese economic and political capital to strengthen the SAARC.
• New vigour to SAARC:
• As the SAARC is mostly dysfunctional, having only paltry and symbolic successes to its credit, Chinese inclusion as a dialogue partner needs to be mulled over.
• This can help SAARC get a new life.
• Structure of SAARC:
• A lopsided structure rare in the world of multilateral diplomacy; SAARC has more observers (9) than actual full-fledged members (8). Indian officials accept that the grouping will need to be expanded at some stage.

Conclusion:

India must, at first, assess the role and function of SAARC itself due to its disfunctionality. The implications of full membership are crucial, given that it comes with a veto. Any assessment of China’s role needs to factor in India’s perception, as well as the current and future direction of the relationship. It also requires analyses of China’s relations with individual SAARC members and its approach to the region.