India by far is the largest country in terms of area, population, and economic and military capabilities, larger than all its neighbours put together. Each neighbour shares some significant ethnic, linguistic or cultural features with India but not so much with the others in the subcontinent. It is this asymmetry which shapes the neighbourhood’s perception of India and vice versa. But India also must recognize that the asymmetry is still not of the scale that can compel its neighbours to align their interests with its own. This is the challenge of proximity. Since its independence, when the subcontinent itself saw major rearrangements, India frequently has had to compete with other suitors for its neighbours’ affections. This leads to either excessive and often misdirected generosity and accommodation, or harsh overreaction.However, during the past decade there has been a visible change in India’s approach to its neighbourhood and to SAARC. This is the result of a growing recognition that economic integration in South Asia is indispensable for the Indian economy as it globalizes. Since 2014, when India’s neighbourhood policy was first enunciated by inviting leaders of all South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries to swearing-in ceremony, of new government, India’s neighbourhood policy now seems adrift.

Reasons for Disconnect with neighbours

• Unfavorable Structural Challenges: India has historical legacies of border conflict, ethnic and social tensions and India’s are the dominant structural handicaps working against success of India’s policy in South Asia. For example, the issues related to Madhesis in Nepal, Tamils in Sri Lanka, border and river water disputes with Bangladesh are accorded to various structural handicaps of India.
• Lack of Consensus on Core issues of Security and Development: South Asia is one of the only regions without any regional security architecture nor there is an effort to evolve any such architecture due to lack of consensus. India’s big brotherly stature has been seen as more of a threat by other countries of the region rather than an enabling factor to cooperate for security and development of the region.
• Impact of China:
  • China has made foray into India’s neighborhood of alternative trade and connectivity options after the 2015 India-Nepal border blockade (e.g. highway to Lhasa, cross-border railway lines to the development of dry port).
  • In Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Pakistan, China holds strategic real estate and has stake in their domestic policies.
  • China already had growing presence in infrastructure and connectivity projects and now it is undertaking political mediations such as stepping in to negotiate a Rohingya refugee return agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh, hosting a meeting of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s foreign ministers to bring both on board with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and is also mediating between Maldivian government and opposition.
• India’s Hard Power Tactics: India has a central location in South Asia and being the largest geographically and economically, India should be expected
• to hold greater sway over each of its neighbors but many of its hard power tactics do not seem to work:
  • The 2015 Nepal blockade and a subsequent cut in Indian aid did not force the Nepali government to amend its constitution as intended and may have led to reversal of India’s influence there.
  • Indian PM’s Cancellation of visit to Male in 2015 and criticism of emergency in Maldives have also failed to yield desired changes in government and led to Maldives cancelling its participation in the Indian Navy’s “Milan” exercises.
• Political loggerheads: For various reasons other governments in the SAARC region are either not on ideal terms with India or facing political headwinds.   o In the Maldives, President Yameen Abdul Gayoom has challenged India through its crackdown on the opposition, invitations to China and breaking with India’s effort to isolate Pakistan at SAARC.
  • In Nepal, the K.P. Sharma Oli government is not India’s first choice, and both countries disagreements over Nepalese constitution, Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950 etc.
  • In Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, where relations have been comparatively better for the past few years, upcoming elections could pose the challenge for India.

Suggestions

Many of these factors mentioned are hard to reverse but the fundamental facts of geography and shared cultures in South Asia are also undeniable, and India must focus its efforts to “Making the Neighbourhood First Again”:

• Soft Power: Despite the apparent benefits of hard power and realpolitik, India’s most potent tool is its soft power. Its successes in Bhutan and Afghanistan, for example, have primarily been due to its development assistance than its defense assistance. Considering this India’s allocations for South Asia have also increased by 6% in 2018 after two years of decline.
• Change in approach towards China: Instead of opposing every project by China in the region, India must attempt a three-pronged approach:
  • First, where possible, India should collaborate with China in the manner it has over the BangladeshChina-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic corridor.
  • Second, when it feels a project is a threat to its interests, India should make a counter-offer to the project, if necessary in collaboration with its Quadrilateral partners, Japan, the U.S. and Australia.
  • Third, India should coexist with projects that do not necessitate intervention, while formulating a set of South Asian principles for sustainable development assistance that can be used across the region.
• Learn from ASEAN: Like ASEAN SAARC countries must meet more often informally, interfere less in the internal workings of each other’s governments, and that there be more interaction at every level of government. Further some experts have argued that like Indonesia India too must take a back seat in
• decision-making, enabling others to build a more harmonious SAARC process.
• Understand limitations of neighborhood first: India needs investments, access to technology, fulfilment of its defense and energy needs and defend its interests in international trade negotiations, besides seeking reform of the international financial and political institutions to obtain its rightful say in global governance which may not be fulfilled by its neighbors.