Recasting the Selection Process of the ECs

Context: Reports of the CEC and the ECs attending an informal meeting with the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister last year has brought the focus on the independence and the impartiality of the ECI.
Need for changes in the appointment process

• The changes in the appointment process for ECs can strengthen ECI’s independence, neutrality and transparency. 
• The appointment of ECs falls within the purview of Article 324(2) of the Constitution, which establishes the institution.

Article 324(2) contains a ‘subject to’ clause which provides that both the number and tenure of the ECs shall be “subject to provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament, be made by the President.”

• Apart from enacting a law in 1989 enlarging the number of ECs from one to three, Parliament has so far not enacted any changes to the appointment process.
• In 1975 itself, the Justice Tarkunde Committee recommended that ECs be appointed on the advice of a Committee comprising the Prime Minister, Lok Sabha Opposition Leader and the Chief Justice.
• This was reiterated by the Dinesh Goswami Committee in 1990 and the Law Commission in 2015.
• The 4th Report (2007) of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission additionally recommended that the Law Minister and the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha be included in such a Collegium.

Violation of Article 14 and 324: Three Writ Petitions, with one pending since 2015, are urging the Supreme Court to declare that the current practice of appointment of ECs by the Centre violates Article 14, Article 324(2), and Democracy as a basic feature of the Constitution.

• Precedent does exist in the case of Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd, to argue against the Executive being the sole appointer for a quasi-judicial body.
• The Supreme Court had recognised that “Election Commission is not only responsible for conducting free and fair elections but it also renders a quasi-judicial function between the various political parties including the ruling government and other parties.”
• In such circumstances, the executive cannot be a sole participant in the appointment of members of Election Commission as it gives unfettered discretion to the ruling party.

Suggestion

• Establishing a multi-institutional, bipartisan committee for fair and transparent selection of ECs can enhance the perceived and actual independence of ECI.
• Such a procedure is already followed with regard to other Constitutional and Statutory Authorities such as the Chief Information Commissioner, Lokpal, Vigilance Commissioner, and the Director of the Central Bureau of Intelligence.
• Changes in the appointment process for Election Commissioners can strengthen the ECI’s independence, neutrality and transparency.
• Appointments: In 1975, the Justice Tarkunde Committee recommended that Election Commissioners be appointed on the advice of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Lok Sabha Opposition Leader and the Chief Justice of India. This was reiterated by the Dinesh Goswami Committee in 1990 and the Law Commission in 2015.
• The Fourth Report  of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission additionally recommended that the Law Minister and the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha be included in such a Collegium.
• Separation of powers is the gold standard for governments across the world.

Road Ahead

• ECI’s constitutional responsibilities require a fair and transparent appointment process that is beyond reproach, which will reaffirm our faith in this vital pillar of our polity.