Context: COVID-19 has made it clear that our traditional imagination of national security is no longer credible. In this article we discusses the national security threat emanating from biological weapons. 
Background

• Synthetic biology is a revolutionary technology. It can help us manipulate biological organisms and processes for human betterment, especially in treating diseases, by re-engineering cells.
• Till now there is no clarity over the origin of Coronavirus, but it is clear that bio-weapons can be made in labs.
• However, the preparedness of nation-states and weak global security arrangements are not sufficient in dealing with the misuse of synthetic biology.

What are the concerns associated with the misuse of synthetic biology?
Firstly, its misuse has national and global security implications.

• In 2014, for instance, the U.S. Department of Defense categorised synthetic biology as one of the six disruptive basic research areas.

Secondly, there is always a chance of accidental leaks of experimental pathogens.

• Various factors such as insufficiently trained staff, inadequately safeguarded facilities, and lack of proper protocols followed during experiments might trigger the leak in the future.

Thirdly, poor regulation of bio-weapons even after growing military interest in synthetic biology.

• Bio-weapons are recognised as the ‘weapon of mass destruction’ (WMD) but nothing is done by the international community.
• Nuclear weapons have received maximum safety and security due to attention given by the institutional arrangements.

Fourthly, the attack through bioweapons takes time to show its impact. In that case, it is difficult to ensure accountability.

• For example, in case of attacks carried out by state actors against the enemy, it would be difficult to pin responsibility as the incubation period is high, and the pathogen can be modified to hide its origin.

Why Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is not effective in dealing with the misuse of synthetic biology?
Firstly, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 has no implementing body and does not have a verification clause.

• Also, it has not clearly laid down rules and procedures to guide research.

Secondly, the dilemma in Article 1 of the BTWC.

• Bio-weapons are banned, but research for medical and bio-defence purposes is allowed for peaceful purposes.
• But the issue is that there is a thin line between bio-defense research and bio-weapons research.

Thirdly, the report of an ad-hoc group to negotiate a protocol to ensure transparency was not accepted by the member states of BTWC. The Ad Hoc Group was set up in 1994 at the Fifth BTWC Review Conference in 2001.

• Lastly, the traditional distinction at the international institutional level between biological weapons (BTWC) and diseases (domain under the World Health Organization) is not useful anymore.

Why India is more vulnerable to bio-weapon attack?

Firstly, lack of preparation and poor infrastructure.

• India is not having a strong disease surveillance system.
• The poor state of the healthcare system was visible during a pandemic.

Secondly, there is a multiplicity of bodies and the absence of an empowered coordinating body, which makes coordination difficult.

• For instance, the implementation of biosafety guidelines is the responsibility of the Science and Technology Ministry and the Environment Ministry.
• However, labs dealing with biological research are set up under the Indian Council of Medical Research and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, which are under the Ministries of Health and Agriculture, respectively.

Thirdly, the traditional ministry-wise separation is not useful in the case of zoonotic diseases as it requires “one health approach”.

• Lastly, India has porous borders with ill-trained border control institutions, and they are not prepared for defending against pathogens.

Road Ahead

• There is a need for cooperation between health specialists and bio-weapons/defence specialists. It is highly prone to misuse, thus there is an urgent need for international measures for monitoring and verification.
• The November 2021 BTWC review conference must review advances in the field and address the thinning line between biotechnology research and bio-weapons research.
• Covid-19 should serve as a wake-up call to give BTWC more teeth in dealing with the bio-weapons with a suitable institutional mechanism.