US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently held a video conference with his counterparts from India, Australia, Brazil, Israel, Japan and South Korea on issues related to the coronavirus pandemic. Pompeo and his counterparts discussed the importance of international cooperation, transparency, and accountability in combating the COVID-19 pandemic and in addressing its causes.

Key Points 

• This meeting comes in the backdrop of another meeting held earlier this month between senior officials of the four “Quad” countries. Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But off-late we've seen the Quad countries widen their scope and add other like minded countries, which is special.
• The meeting also discussed collaboration toward preventing future global health crises and reaffirming the importance of the rules-based international order. 

About Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 

• It is the informal strategic dialogue between India, USA, Japan and Australia with a shared objective to ensure and support a “free, open and prosperous” Indo-Pacific region.
• The idea of Quad was first mooted by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007. However, the idea couldn’t move ahead with Australia pulling out of it, apparently due to Chinese pressure.
• In December 2012, Shinzo Abe again floated the concept of Asia’s “Democratic Security Diamond” involving Australia, India, Japan and the US to safeguard the maritime commons from the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific.
• In November 2017, India, the US, Australia and Japan gave shape to the long-pending "Quad" Coalition to develop a new strategy to keep the critical sea routes in the Indo-Pacific free of any influence (especially China).

About Quad Plus

• Ever since the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) bringing together four maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India) was first conceptualized in 2007, it has remained a grouping in search of relevance. 
• From the very outset, the purpose of the Quad itself has been ambiguous. It is meant to be a security dialogue but seems to lack a clear objective. 
• The initial perception that it is a response to counterbalance China’s maritime expansionism in the Indo-Pacific turned to ashes the moment the dragon spat fire and individual members promptly distanced themselves from such an assumption. 
• Even in 2017, when the Quad was revived on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit with a meeting of mid-level officials, the divergence in each country’s perception of the grouping became apparent in the statements they issued after the meeting. It was therefore obvious that the Quad would be a nonstarter if indeed counterbalancing China was the aim.
• The Quad, by its very composition, comprises an arc of maritime democracies located at the peripheries of the Indo-Pacific region. 
• It  is committed to a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and principles and respect for international law”  but until recently had not felt the need to include the countries that are central to this strategic  construct — the countries of Southeast Asia, four of whom are embroiled in maritime territorial disputes with China and are constantly being subjected to Chinese bullying. 
• It is their vulnerability that China is exploiting while consolidating its dominance of the waters east of the Malacca Straits (and also advancing steadily westwards into the Indian Ocean). 
• This oversight led to suspicion about the Quad’s motives even among these countries. Fortunately, firm support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms in the region is now a part of the Quad narrative.

Challenges

• China’s Territorial Claims: China claims that it has historical ownership over nearly the entire region of South China Sea, which gives it the right to manufacture islands. However, the International Court of Arbitration rejected the claim in 2016.
• China’s Closeness to ASEAN: The ASEAN countries also have a well-knit relationship with China. The Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a recent example of China’s increasing influence over ASEAN nations.
• Economic Power of China: Considering the economic might of China and the dependence of Quad nations like Japan and Australia on China, the Quad nations cannot afford to have strained relations with it.
• Convergence among Quad Nations: The nations in the Quad grouping have different aspirations, aims at balancing their own interest. Therefore, coherence in the vision of Quad nation as a grouping is absent.

Concerns associated with Quad

• It is often stated that the Quad is still a work in progress and therefore should first focus its attention on “low-hanging fruit” like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), search and rescue (SAR) operations, and countering nontraditional transnational threats that jeopardize good order at sea. 
• It is felt that these relatively benign and constabulary operations would enable consolidation in areas of convergence and dissipation in areas of divergence through a shared understanding of each other’s operating philosophies and national security imperatives. 
• A further sign of this consolidation is reflected in the enhanced level of engagement, which now includes meetings among the foreign ministers and foreign secretaries of these four countries.
• An encouraging trend that augurs well for the success of this arrangement are the bilateral and trilateral engagements in diverse areas such as cybersecurity and maritime domain awareness.
• If “low-hanging fruit” is indeed the way ahead, then a golden opportunity has presented itself with the COVID-19 pandemic, which is devastating populations and economies and has exposed vulnerabilities in nations, big and small, rich and poor. 
• A coordinated global approach has not been forthcoming. The United Nations has proven woefully unequal to the task and even smaller multilateral groupings like the G-20, comprising the 20 largest economies in the world, have fallen short of expectations. 
• China, in fact, has been the first off the block to capitalize on the vulnerabilities created by the spread of this pandemic. It has reached out to nations and offered support that obviously comes with strings attached. 
• While there has been some pushback against coercive debt-trap diplomacy, the ability of the poorer or smaller nations to avoid succumbing to Chinese pressure will depend on the alternatives available to them to withstand this onslaught.

?Issue which are still in dilemma

• Can the Quad, comprising the world’s largest, third largest, fifth largest, and 14th largest global economies (by GDP), grab this opportunity and provide such an alternative?  They certainly have the capacity to do so and individually each one of them is taking various initiatives but is there a collective will to do so? 
• The signs have not been very encouraging so far. The United States organized a conference call with the other Quad members, Vietnam, New Zealand, and South Korea. According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs press release, “The participants shared their assessments of the current situation with respect to COVID-19, and discussed ways to synergize their efforts to counter its spread.” The time for discussion is long past but tangible outcomes are yet to become visible.

Road Ahead

• The inability of the Quad to pluck even this low-hanging fruit has, on the one hand, allowed China to wrest the advantage, and has, on the other, damaged the credibility of the Quad. With no coordinated action even in a time of dire need, it is increasingly doubtful that the grouping can inspire confidence in the region as a meaningful entity for ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. 
• The Quad should focus on building a robust regional consultation mechanism and coordinate with ASEAN nations on issues of regional importance.
• The Quad framework derives its geopolitical validation from India’s association and presents a unique opportunity for India to be an active participant in shaping regional security architecture with global undertones.