The United Nations Secretariat held a meeting of what it calls the “6+2+1” group on regional efforts to support peace in Afghanistan recently. India was conspicuous by its absence from the meeting, given its historical and strategic ties with Afghanistan. As India seeks to fight back its exclusion there are certain issues that need to be addressed. India’s reluctance to enter into talks with the Taliban in one such issue, which needs a rethink.

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Changing geopolitical situation in Afghanistan:

• Recently, the United Nations Secretariat held a meeting of what it calls the “6+2+1” group on regional efforts to support peace in Afghanistan, a group that includes six neighbouring countries: China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; global players, the United States and Russia, and Afghanistan itself.
• India was conspicuous by its absence from the meeting, given its historical and strategic ties with Afghanistan, but not for the first time.
• India was left out form talks similarly in 2001 and 2010.
• In both 2001 and 2010, however, India fought back its exclusion
• At the Bonn agreement of 2010, India played a major role in Northern Alliance accepting Hamid Karzai as the Chairman of the interim arrangement that replaced the Taliban regime.
• After the 2010 conference, New Delhi redoubled its efforts with Kabul, and in 2011 India signed the historic Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was Afghanistan’s first such agreement with any country.

India’s position on Afghan-led peace process and reality

• India’s resistance to publicly talking to the Taliban has made it an awkward interlocutor at any table.
• Its position that only an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled process can be allowed is a principled one but has no takers.
• The Ashraf Ghani government does not lead, own or control the reconciliation process today, comprising the U.S.-Taliban negotiation for an American troops withdrawal, and intra-Afghan talks on power-sharing.
• The U.S.-Taliban peace deal means that the Taliban, will become more potent as the U.S. withdraws soldiers from the country.
• Taliban will hold more sway in the inter-Afghan process as well, as the U.S. withdraws funding for the government in Kabul.

Implications for India:

• New Delhi’s decision to find grounds for Ashraf Ghani government has had a two-fold effect:
  • India’s voice in the reconciliation process has been limited
  • It has weakened its position with other leaders of the deeply divided democratic setup in Kabul such as the former chief executive Abdullah Abdullah.
• Meanwhile, India’s presence inside Afghanistan, painstakingly built up since 2001, is being threatened anew by terror groups.
• These include the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), believed to be backed by Pakistan’s establishment.
• The recent brutal attack that killed 25 at a gurudwara in Kabul was meant for the embassy in Kabul.
• Intelligence agencies had also warned of suicide car bomb threats to the consulates in Jalalabad and Herat in December 2019.
• The government has said that the novel coronavirus pandemic prompted its decision to clear out both consulates in April 2020.
• But the truth is that a full security reassessment is under way for them.
• Either way, India’s diplomatic strength in Afghanistan should not appear to be in retreat just when it is needed the most.

Importance of Afghanistan for India:

• Afghanistan serves India’s security and economic interests.
• Afghanistan is tied to India’s vision of being a regional leader and a great power, coupled with its competition with China over resources and its need to counter Pakistani influence.
• India’s ability to mentor a nascent democracy will go a long way to demonstrate to the world that India is indeed a major power, especially a responsible one.
• The pipeline project TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), which seeks to connect an energy-rich Central to South Asia, will only see the light of the day if stability is established in Afghanistan.
• India’s interest in Afghanistan relates to its need to reduce Pakistani influence in the region.
• New Delhi needs Kabul to get a better view of Islamabad and hence it is pertinent that it fosters positive relations.
• For access to the landlocked Central Asian countries that border Afghanistan.
• The country is home to resource deposits worth one trillion dollars, according to the US Geological Survey.

Possible future course for India:

• New Delhi must move swiftly to regain the upper hand in the narrative in Afghanistan.
• The following should assure India a leading position in Afghanistan’s regional formulation:
  • India’s assistance of more than $3 billion in projects
  • trade of about $1 billion
  • a $20 billion projected development expenditure of an alternate route through Chahbahar
• India’s support to the Afghan National Army, bureaucrats, doctors and other professionals for training
• Three major projects include the Afghan Parliament, the Zaranj-Delaram Highway, and the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam (Salma dam).
• These and other hundreds of small development projects have cemented India’s position there, regardless of Pakistan’s attempts to undermine it.
• So, it would be a mistake, at this point, if India’s support is only to Kabul or the Ghani government.
• The Indian government must strive to endure that its aid and assistance is broad-based, to centres outside the capital (Kabul) as well.
• This should be the case even if some lie in areas held by the Taliban.
• India must also pursue opportunities to fulfil its role in the peace efforts in Afghanistan, starting with efforts to bridge the Ghani-Abdullah divide.
• An understanding between Iran and the U.S. on Afghanistan is necessary for lasting peace as well, and India could play a mediatory part.
• India should also use the UN’s call for a pause in conflicts during the novel coronavirus pandemic, to ensure a hold on hostilities with Pakistan.
• Above all, New Delhi must consider the appointment of a special envoy, as it has been done in the past, to deal with its efforts in Afghanistan.