The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is a high military office that oversees and coordinates the working of the three Services, and offers seamless tri-service views and single-point advice to the Executive (in India’s case, to the Prime Minister) on long-term defence planning and management, including manpower, equipment and strategy, and above all, “jointsmanship” in operations. It shall provide “effective leadership at the top level” to the three wings of the armed forces, and to help improve coordination among them.

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Need for office of CDS:

• The move was considered necessary after the 1999 Kargil War and was first approved by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee cabinet in May 2001.
• India has had a feeble equivalent known as the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC); but a toothless office in the manner of its structure.
• The senior-most among the three Service Chiefs is appointed to head the CoSC, an office that lapses with the incumbent’s retirement.
• The post did not further tri-service integration, resulting in inefficiency and an expensive duplication of assets.
• By 2001, it had become clear to the leaders of India’s strategic establishment that jointness—the combination of land, sea and air power—was necessary to effectively combat adversaries, who employed everything from terrorists and militants to regular troops through to nuclear weapons.
• With information, cyberspace and space becoming military domains already, the jointness which is required surpasses merely getting the groups in uniform together.

CDS – a significant defence policy reform:

• The appointment of the CDS will certainly change the civil-military balance, and, if done correctly, will address some of the grievances of the Armed Forces pertaining to their status vis-à-vis the civil services.
• The underlying rationale for appointing a CDS is to separate management and command of the Armed Forces.
• To take the logic of the CDS to its conclusion, the Armed Forces must be operationally restructured into theatre commands—complete joint war-fighting formations—led by combatant commanders.
• In the years ahead, a combination of climate change, violent non-state actors and volatile politics will increase the demands on the government to deploy military forces beyond the subcontinent.
• Despite a multitude of threats, India’s Armed Forces have very limited capacity to operate overseas. Hence, the need for an expeditionary CDS.
• From a defence policy perspective, the CDS presents us with the opportunity to optimize defence economics and make expenditure more effective.

Way forward:

• To take the logic of the CDS to its conclusion, the Armed Forces should be operationally restructured into theatre commands
• The late strategic thinker K. Subrahmanyam argued that the army and navy chiefs should first hand over their command to theatre commanders, with the air chief doing so at a later stage.
• Three theatres are straightforward: Northern, Western and Southern to address the threats from China, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean, respectively.
• He envisaged doubling the air force to 60 squadrons by 2030 and placing them under theatre commands.

Conclusion:

Most countries with advanced militaries have such a post, albeit with varying degrees of power and authority. The United States Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), for example, is extremely powerful, with a legislated mandate and sharply delineated powers. The role of the CDS becomes critical in times of conflict.