Context:

Recurrent conflicts between India and China at the border have brought to light the existing Border dispute between India and China. The failure of the two nations to resolve the issue has had a profound impact on the bilateral relations and the given article discusses the need for a more balanced approach.

Border Dispute:

The India-China border dispute can be broken down into three sectors:

• Western Sector: This region is originally a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir but is claimed and presently administered by China as part of its autonomous Xinjiang region post 1962 war. India claims the entire Aksai Chin territory as well as the Shaksgam valley (Indian Territory gifted to China by Pakistan). China contests Indian control over Daulat Beg Oldi.
• Central Sector: China has accepted Sikkim as a part of India and this region is less contested.
• Eastern Sector: This disputed territory lies south of the McMahon Line. It was formerly referred to as the North East Frontier Agency, and is now called Arunachal Pradesh. It is the largest disputed area, covering around 90000 sq. km. It was occupied by the People’s Liberation Army during the 1962 war but later withdrew beyond the International boundary represented by the Mcmahon Line.

Background:

• The frontier politics of British India, led by short term interests of protecting their Indian interests from other challengers like the Russian and Chinese, failed to produce a single integrated and well-defined northern boundary separating the Indian subcontinent from Xinjiang and Tibet.
• In the eastern sector, the British had largely attained an ethnically and strategically viable alignment via the 1914 Shimla conference of British India, China and Tibet. The McMahon Line was part of the 1914 Shimla Convention between British India and Tibet, an agreement rejected by China contending that Tibet was not a sovereign state and therefore did not have the power to conclude treaties.
• The western sector was never formally delineated nor successfully resolved by British India. The ever-changing British approach in this sector was shaped by the geopolitical goals of the Empire, and was never envisaged for establishing of an international border. In 1947, no definite boundary line to the east of the Karakoram Pass existed. This complicated the issue. India and China were faced with a “no man’s land” in eastern Ladakh, where the contentious Aksai Chin lay.
• Conventionally, India considers the Johnson line of 1865, which put Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, China recognizes the Macartney-Macdonald Line as the actual boundary which puts Aksai Chin in Xinjiang region of China.

Fallouts of the border dispute:

• The India-China War of 1962: though there were other factors at play the dispute over the sovereignty of the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh was the major factor for the war. India suffered a huge setback and was badly defeated. China achieved its objective of acquiring control in the Aksai chin.
• There have been recurrent India-China border conflicts even after the war. There have been several instances of Chinese troops entering the Indian side. In 1967 when there were two incidents of armed conflict first at Nathu La and then at Cho La.
• The Recent Doklam crisis which led to a 70-day stand-off between the two armies was also a fallout of the unresolved issues between the two neighbours. It took high-level delegation talks to disengage the two sides.
• The claim of the Chinese over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh and their policies like the issuance of stapled visas to people from Arunachal Pradesh has been a constant irritant for India.
• The recent visit of the Dalai Lama to Tawang monastery had become such a contentious bilateral issue. Tibet has become a sticking point between the two neighbours although India way back in 1950’s itself recognized Tibet as an integral part of China.
• While China’s support for resolution of border disputes stands subservient to Tibet issue, India would continue to hold on to the Tibet card unless the border-disputes are resolved. China’s move towards ‘assertive regionalism’, its strengthening ties with Pakistan – has only worsened the chances of a quick resolution.
• The unresolved issue has been a deterrent to taking the bilateral relations to the higher levels which would be in the interest of both the countries.

Agreements and initiatives to resolve border disputes:

Prior to 1962 war:

• Shimla Conference
• Panchsheel Agreement of 1954: The Panchsheel doctrine clearly indicated the willingness to ‘Respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’.
• Swap Principle: In 1960, Zhou Enlai, proposed China accepting present-day Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory in exchange for India accepting Aksai Chin as Chinese territory prompting an attitude of mutual accommodation. This is also sometimes referred to as the package settlement. But fierce domestic opposition in India and the reluctance of the leadership led to non-acceptance from the Indian side.

Post 1962 War:

• In the early 1980s, the two nations began negotiating the border dispute, but 21 rounds of negotiations have not yielded any concrete results.
• In 1989, India-China formed a Joint Working Group for Confidence building measures (CBMs) to mutually settle all border disputes.
• India-China Agreements regarding the Line of Actual Control LAC which would act as the effective military border which separates Indian controlled areas of Jammu and Kashmir from Aksai Chin. This border is not a legally recognized international boundary, but rather it is the practical boundary.
• In 1993, ‘The Agreement for Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC was signed between India and China.
• In 1996 an agreement took place on Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the LAC.
• In 2003 India and China signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation and also mutually decided to appoint Special Representatives to explore the framework of a boundary settlement from the political perspective.
• In 2005 “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question” agreement was signed. It accepted that prominent geographical features would be a basis for determining the border. Two, there was an acknowledgement that interests of “settled populations” must be taken into account while arriving at a border settlement. It proposed a three-step resolution to the border disputes:

1. A bilateral agreement on the laid down principles.
2. This was to be followed by an exchange of maps between the two countries.
3. Once satisfied with the markings, the final demarcation of borders was to take place.

• The India-China relations received a major boost in 2003. China recognized India’s sovereignty over Sikkim. The continued trade at Nathu la holds significance in this regard.
• The Recent informal summits first at Wuhan followed by the one at Mamallapuram were intended to address the growing mistrust between the two neighbours.
• Clearly, the policies have helped avoid any major escalation but have not been successful in avoiding repeated skirmishes and hence have not sufficed in realizing a solution to the long-standing disputes. A status-quo exists owing to the face-off between differential aspirations of the two nations.

Way forward

President Xi Jinping’s statement after the Mamallapuram informal summit “In accordance with the agreement on political guiding principles, we will seek a fair and reasonable solution to the border issue that is acceptable to both sides.”  Needs honest attempts from both sides.There is a need to review the Swap agreement as suggested by China earlier since a “package settlement” is the only way forward along with a mutual recognition that this would involve only minor territorial adjustments and help maintain the status quo along the border. This will ensure that India and China have a good future together and the “Asian Century” will be realized.