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Borders shape the nation and provide access to various opportunities for cultural-social and economical interactions and at the same time provide access to the people of ill-intentions. Global interconnectedness makes ample scope for greater opportunities and wide space for security vulnerabilities.
The lifting of trade barriers, liberalization of world capital markets, and swift technological progress, especially in the fields of information technology, transportation and telecommunications, have vastly increased and accelerated the movement of people, information, commodities and capital across the borders. Many of the problems afflicting the world today - such as poverty, environmental pollution, economic crises, organized crime and terrorism - are increasingly transnational in nature
On the other hand in everyday life of people, borders still count, local realities are still complex and very different among themselves, and most fundamentally where social and economic problems still need to be addressed. Today borders of countries reflect the dynamism of global realities and hence their efficient management can provide opportunities for regional and international progress.
There are four formal steps which form a “Border:
(i). Description or establishment of a definition of a boundary,
(ii). Delimitation by cartographers,
(iii). Demarcation on ground, and
(iv) Regular administrative practices. These four steps are very essential in forming the border.
The concept of the border security is not sufficient to deal with complex challenges and it requires a mechanism which ensures the security of national borders and at the same time regulates the legitimate movements for essential interactions. In order to leverage benefits from the borders and to contain ill-practices over there simultaneously, a very efficient, comprehensive and integrated border management policy is needed.
Border management is a fluid concept in the sense that the level of security arrangements along a particular border would depend upon the political relations, the economic linkages, the ethno-religious ties between people across the borders and the configuration of the border itself
Strong border management is vital for national and regional stability - as well as for economic growth. Good management of borders helps reducing the cross-border movement of illegal trafficking, drugs, militants, weapons and radioactive materials, while at the same time facilitating trade and legal movement of people.
Indian Borders
India is a seventh largest country in area in the world, so the country possess not only lengthy borderline and but also the coastline. India shares 15106 kms of boundary with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh and a small segment with Afghanistan (106 kms) in northern Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), now part of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Out of 28 states of India, 17 states are bordering states.
As the global prospects for India is emerging, various security concerns are also increasing for the country. India also provides a connecting link among the geopolitical areas of West Asia and East Asia. This strategic location offers formidable geo-significance and it also poses deeper security challenges.
India's international borders are a unique intermixes of mountains, plains, deserts, riverside and jungle terrain with varying degree of habitation and ethnic mix residing. Their social, historical, political and geographical profiles are having only few things in common. Almost each boundary and border of India has own distinct history of evolution. Every border wields a separate cultural individuality. Borderland areas and borderland people often belong to diverse social grouping. So each border really represents its unique identity which is constructed by respective surroundings and the people.
International borders are fully demarcated and delineated and also well recognised by sharing parties and others with a very few instances of exceptions.
Disputed/contested boundaries. are generally outcome of ceasefire and aggression. Line of Control (LoC) and Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Jammu & Kashmir are disputed boundaries of India with Pakistan. Both parties have own version of interpretation, reservation and justification regarding the disputes. With China, India has to bear another disputed boundary again in J&K, which is called Line of Actual Control (LAC), a ceasefire line, which came into being after India-China war in 1962.
Open Border Settlement: With Bhutan and Nepal with India has a special kind of border-arrangement keeping in view the long historical and cultural connectedness. With both countries India shares virtually an open-border settlement. The bilateral Indian-Bhutan Group Border Management and Security has been established to collaboratively asses and secure the open border between India and Bhutan. Articles VI and VII of „the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which the two countries India and Nepal signed in 1950 specify that, citizens of both countries have equal rights in matters of residence, acquisition of property, employment and movement in each other’s territory, thus providing for an open border between the two countries
In addition to avoidance of threats or use of force (Article 2.4), the United Nations Charter places states under an affirmative obligation to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” (Article 2.3.). The Charter1 additionally obliges the state parties to a serious dispute to seek alternative, peaceful means for its resolution.
The Security Council has primary authority to address international conflicts, and states are obliged to abide by and implement its decisions in this regard. Security Council jurisdiction includes disputes that are likely to endanger international peace and security, as well as threats and breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Its proceedings with respect to disputes are oriented mainly toward their peaceful resolution (under Chapter VI of the Charter), but its actions related to threats to peace and security may take the form of crisis response and the employment of mandatory political or economic sanctions or even use of force (under Chapter VII).
General Considerations. Since the Security Council is a political body, the U.N. Charter envisions that disputes of a legal nature involving states would normally be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ receives submissions of cases from states (“contested cases”) or through requests from authorized U.N. bodies and agencies for advisory opinions. The Court is constituted under a separate statute, 8 of which all U.N. member states are considered signatories
Intra-sub regional trade in South Asia is only two per cent as compared to 26 per cent in South East Asia. Despite the long land border between India and Pakistan, there are only a few border crossings and the cross-border movement of goods is severely restricted. On the Indo-Nepal border there are numerous Land Customs Stations (LCSs) but traffic is high only at two of them. There are also no institutional arrangements for coordinated border management or joint controls to facilitate cross-border movement of goods. Nepal is a landlocked country and the transit trade of Nepal is governed by an Indo-Nepal trade and transit treaty that is renewable every five years. Most of the countries in the sub region have not acceded to the Harmonization Convention.
Inefficient border crossings are a major deterrent to growth of intra-sub regional trade in South Asia. A study16 conducted in 2008 regarding transit regimes and border crossings in the eastern part of South Asia found that out of the nine border crossings in India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, only one was relatively efficient while the rest were relatively inefficient in both physical and non-physical parameters. Among the non-physical barriers, the study found that customs authorities in the sub region still require excessive documentation for imports. It further found that implementation of e-governance at the border, including e-Customs was a significant determinant of intra-sub regional trade. Another finding of the study was that a 10 per cent reduction in the border transaction cost can lead to a three per cent increase in the exports of the country.
To realise full benefits of trade liberalisation, the countries in the sub region should give top priority to improving the efficiency at border crossings and bring adjacent border crossings up to similar levels of efficiency to remove asymmetries and to expedite the movement of goods. Despite this state of affairs in general, some scattered efforts are being made in the sub region to facilitate cross-border trade. In May 2011 India and Bangladesh Customs agreed upon a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to be followed at the four border crossings to expedite customs clearances.
India has a long coastline that is dotted with numerous ports that carry much of its international trade; therefore development of land routes as an alternative did not get much attention in the past. But things are beginning to change as the increase in intra-regional trade has made the development of land routes a necessity. India has taken a major step in this direction by setting up the Land Port Authority of India (LPAI) that is overseeing the establishment of 13 Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) along international borders with Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh. The authority has been set up under the Department of Border Management, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Government of India. Plans are afoot to equip these border crossings with all modern facilities to encourage cross-border trade. The facilities will include immigration points, cargo inspection sheds, scanners, quarantine laboratories, customs clearances, banks, currency exchange warehouses/cold storage, parking facilities, and hotels/restaurants.
One of the functions of the LPAI is to provide an institutional mechanism for coordination and facilitation among various agencies to undertake a range of activities at the ICPs. The first ICP at the Indo-Pakistan border became operational in late 2011. The experience of how these ICPs work, the institutional mechanism for inter-agency coordination at these ICPs and their cooperation with their counterparts in neighbouring countries needs to be monitored and if successful, replicated elsewhere.
Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) are being set up at major entry points on the land borders by Government of India.Existing designated entry and exit points on the international borders are characterized by unplanned growth leading to delays and traffic jams. The need to develop infrastructure was recognized by the Government and after due consultations and deliberations, the concept of Integrated Check Post was devised.
ICP is conceived as a sanitized zone having adequate passenger and freight processing facilities. The term integration refers to integration of sovereign functions and not of inter-modal integration of several transport modes such as; rail, road waterways etc.
The ICP concept being new in the country, the planning was carried out through regular consultations with sovereign authorities and stake holders.
The ICPs would house all regulatory agencies like Immigration, Customs, border security, etc. They would be a sanitized zone with dedicated passenger and cargo terminal providing adequate customs and immigration counters, X-ray scanners, passenger amenities and other related facilities like parking, warehousing, banking, service stations, fuel stations, etc. in a single modern complex equipped with state of the art amenities.
Seven Integrated Check Posts are planned in two phases
The Western and Eastern border of India has the peculiarity of restriction on vehicles of originating country to be allowed beyond a designated point in the destination country. The planning of ICP at these locations provides solution to this limitation. In these situations, while most of our neighboring countries are relying on solution linked to time separation, we have adopted the space separation approach. The solution involves provision of separate delivery and collection zone within ICP. This is achieved by treating passenger terminal and warehouse as interface where, unloading is done along one face and loading on the other face.
The ICPs along Nepal Border are planned along the concept of primary and secondary checks to induce efficiency in regulatory process. This concept is similar to RED channel and GREEN channel witnessed at the airports. Government has initially identified 13 locations along the land borders of India seven out of the thirteen are placed under priority.
seven ICPs are being set up at Raxaul and Jogbani (in Bihar) along the border with Nepal, Attari (in Punjab) along the border with Pakistan, Moreh (in Manipur) along the border with Myanmar and Akhaurah (in Tripura), Dawki (in Meghalaya) and Petrapole (in West Bengal) along the border with BangladeshICP Attari is the first one to be completed and was inaugurated by Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on April 13, 2012 India's second international-standard multi-use Integrated Check Post (ICP) and the first along the Bangladesh border was opened at Akhaurah in Tripura on November 17, 2013.
To restore the traditional system of marketing the local produce through local markets, India and Bangladesh decided during the visit of Prime Minister of Bangladesh to India in January 2010, to establish border haats on a pilot basis at selected areas along the border. In October 2010, an MoU on Border Haats was signed between the two countries. To view the text please clicksMoU on Border Haats and Addendum to Mode of Operations of Border Haats.
Two Border Haats have been set up in:
Four more Border Haats are proposed to be set up along the Tripura-Bangladesh border at Kamlasagar, Srinagar, Palbasti and Kamalpur in Tripura.
Commodities permitted to be traded in the border haats are:
Each individual is allowed to purchase only as much of the commodities produced in Bangladesh/India which are reasonable for bona-fide personal/family consumption. The commodities are allowed to be exchanged in the border haats in local currency and/or barter basis. The estimated value of such purchases cannot be more than respective local currency equivalent of US$ 100 for any particular day. The commodities sold in the border haats are exempted from payment of customs duties.
India has 15,106 km of land border and a coastline of 7,516 km including island territories. The length of the land borders with neighbouring countries:
Neighbouring
country
Land Border
(Kms)
Bangladesh
4,096
China
3,488
Pakistan
3,323
Nepal
1,751
Myanmar
1,643
Bhutan
699
Afghanistan
106
India has a total of 1197 islands accounting for 2094 kms of coastline. There are 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (area involved 7,110.02 acres) in India and 111 Indian enclaves (area involved 17,158.13 acres) in Bangladesh. In fact, barring Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Delhi and Haryana, all other States in the country have one or more international borders or a coastline and can be regarded as frontline States from the point of view of border management.
The proper management of borders is vitally important for national security. Different portions of our extensive borders have a variety of problems specific to them, which have to be appropriately addressed. These problems have become aggravated in recent times with Pakistan’s policy of cross border terrorism, along with its intense hostile anti-India propaganda designed to mislead and sway the loyalties of border population. The intensification of cross border terrorism, targetted to destabilize India, has thrown up new challenges for our border management policy.
The term border management must be interpreted in its widest sense and should imply co-ordination and concerted action by political leadership and administrative, diplomatic, security, intelligence, legal, regulatory and economic agencies of the country to secure our frontiers and subserve the best interests of the country. Looked at from this perspective, the management of borders presents many challenging problems.
The dynamic nature of the problems concerning management of borders is brought out by the manner in which the sensitivity of India-Nepal border has changed over a period of time. This border, which has been an open one, was once peaceful and trouble-free. However, with the increasing activities of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Nepal, the nature of the border has changed completely. These security concerns need to be addressed urgently. The concept of border security has undergone a sea change with the growing vulnerability of the coastline and also of the airspace. In response to the gradual expansion and strengthening of security, so far, mainly along what has long been perceived as a sensitive land border, the transgressor is already on the lookout for soft gaps, either on the land or along the coast and if need be, from the air. The Purulia incident of 1995 has already demonstrated our vulnerability from the air. The transgressors, with unprecedented money power, access to latest technology, organisational strength, maneuverability and scope for strategic alliances with other like-minded groups, can select their theatre of action for surprise strikes. While land borders have from time to time received Government’s attention primarily because of the wars with Pakistan and China and the problems of insurgency, illegal migration from Bangladesh and smuggling activities, the same cannot be said of our coastal areas or of our airspace. It is necessary to adopt a holistic approach in formulating a comprehensive strategy towards improvement of border management.
The offensive agenda of Pakistan’s ISI to promote international terrorism and subvert India is expected to intensify. The J&K cauldron is expected to continue. Vigorous efforts are on to revive militancy in Punjab. Insurgent groups in different parts of the country are receiving support and encouragement. Illegal infiltration and smuggling of arms and explosives, narcotics and counterfeit currency are pressing problems. The porosity of our borders, in many parts, makes the task of anti-national forces that much easier. All this underscores the need for utmost vigilance on the borders and strengthening the border guarding forces.
In recommending an in depth review of the management of our borders, the Kargil Review Committee had in mind only our land borders. The GoM, however, felt that the scope of such a review should be wider and apart from including the land borders, should also include management mechanisms designed to help ensure the safety of our coastal areas and airspace. In undertaking this exercise, the GoM was assisted by a multi-disciplinary task force under Dr Madhav Godbole. Based on the report of the task force and the ensuing deliberations, the GoM have made a series of recommendations designed to better manage our borders, our coastline and our airspace.
Some of the main problems currently afflicting the management of our borders may be listed as follows:-
(a) Some of our maritime boundaries are still undefined and much of our land borders are not demarcated on the ground. The disputed and unsettled nature of our boundaries has made them a source of tension and made their policing much more difficult.
(b) Since many of our borders are man-made artificial boundaries and not based on natural features such as rivers, watersheds etc, they are extremely porous and easy to cross.
(c) Multiplicity of forces on the same borders has inevitably led to the lack of accountability as well as problems of command and control.
(d) Border Guarding Forces need to be distinguished from central police organisations. Being more akin to the Army and different from central police organisations which are called in aid of civil power from time to time, they need to be appropriately strengthened both in terms of equipment and manpower.
(e) The repeated withdrawal, in large numbers, of para-military forces from border guarding duties for internal security and counter insurgency duties has led to a neglect of the borders. These forces have also been unable to perform optimally due to cannibalization of battalions and even companies.
(f) Lack of institutionalised arrangements for sharing and co-ordination of intelligence at various levels and particularly at the field level, is a primary weakness in proper management of borders. The present tendency on the part of each agency to guard its turf, even at the cost of compromising national security interests, needs to be deprecated and put down sternly.
(g) Illegal migration from across our borders has continued unabated for over five decades. We have yet to fully wake up to the implications of the unchecked immigration for the national security. Today, we have about 15 million Bangladeshis, 2.2 million Nepalese, 70,000 Sri Lankan Tamils and about one lakh Tibetan migrants living in India. Demographic changes have been brought about in the border belts of West Bengal, several districts in Bihar, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya as a result of large-scale illegal migration. Such large-scale migration has obvious social, economic, political and security implications. There is an all-round failure in India to come to grips with the problem of illegal immigration. Unfortunately, action on this subject invariably assumes communal over-tones with political parties taking positions to suit the interest of their vote banks. The massive illegal immigration poses a grave danger to our security, social harmony and economic well being.
(i) Smuggling of different consumer and intermediate goods, trafficking in drugs and narcotics etc. flourish through large parts of our border. For clandestine cross border transit, communities of professional couriers have come up in the villages and towns close to our land borders and maritime coasts. Smugglers are given assistance and facilities, in exchange of services for organizing infiltration of terrorists and saboteurs and landing of explosives, arms and ammunition. A smuggler-drug trafficker-militant nexus engaged in anti-national activities has emerged.
(j) India’s long coastline and coastal areas have remained largely unprotected and unguarded. The presence of the Coast Guard is minimal. For a country of our size, the Coast Guard must be a strong and vibrant organisation. There is also need for a greater clarity in the role of the State Governments vis-à-vis the Coast Guard in so far as shallow water surveillance of the coasts is concerned.
Keeping in view the aforesaid problems and to improve the management of India’s land boundaries, as well as its coastal and airspace security, the GoM has made a series of recommendations, as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.
Concerted action needs to be initiated at the earliest by the Government to urgently take up the demarcation on the ground of our land boundaries and the settlement of our maritime borders with our neighbours. For this purpose an official level standing steering committee may be set up. Apart from the representatives of the concerned Central Ministries, the concerned State Government may also be represented thereon. A Group of Ministers, specially appointed for the purpose, may periodically and at least once in a quarter, review the progress of work in this behalf.
In order to pay focused attention to the issues pertaining to border management, it would be desirable to create a separate Department of Border Management within the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) under the overall charge of the Home Secretary.
At present there are instances of more than one force working on the same border and questions of conflict in command and control have been raised frequently. Multiplicity of forces on the same border has also led to lack of accountability on the part of the forces. To enforce the accountability, the principle of ‘one border one force’ may be adopted while considering deployment of forces at the border.
Border Guarding Forces need to be distinguished from other CPMF and the Central Police Organisations because of their distinctive functions. It is imperative that the Border Guarding Forces are not deployed in the States to deal with internal disturbances, law and order duties and counter insurgency operations. Withdrawal of Border Guarding Forces for such duties limits their capabilities to guard the borders effectively. While there may be exceptional circumstances where it may be necessary to utilize the services of Border Guarding Forces for performing law and order/counter-insurgency duties, as a rule, these forces should not be withdrawn from the borders.
The Border Guarding Forces will also have the responsibility bearing on internal security like preventing illegal immigration, carrying out anti-smuggling activities, checking infiltration, collection of intelligence etc. Therefore, for effective execution of these duties on the border, the ITBP and the Assam Rifles should be conferred with powers under the Customs act and Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), as in the case of the BSF. Whenever a border is placed under the charge of the Army, directly under it or through Border Guarding Forces placed under its operational control, it would be the responsibility of the Army to perform these and allied duties.
Business ties between India and China are booming. But despite rounds of talks, the two countries have yet to resolve their decades-old dispute over the 3488 Km -mile border between the two countries. It remains one of the most militarized borders in the world.
SNo.
State
Total Length
1.
Jammu & Kashmir
1597
2.
Himachal Pradesh
200
3.
Uttarakhand
345
4.
Sikkim
220
5.
Arunachal Pradesh
1126
India and China fought a brief border war in 1962. Ever since, the relationship between the neighbouring Asian countries has been mired in distrust. China lays claims to more than 35,000 square miles of land in the eastern sector of the Himalayas, while India says China occupies 14,600 square miles of its territory on the Aksai Chin plateau in the west. Last year in May the two armies ended a three-week standoff in the Ladakh region after Chinese troops entered at least six miles into territory claimed by India. China denied that troops had crossed into Indian territory.
Construction of roads of operationalsignificance inborder areas along Indo-chinaborder
To redress the situation arising out ofpoor road connectivity which has hampered theoperational capability of the Border GuardingForces deployed along the India-China border,the Government had decided to undertake
phase-wise construction of 27 road linkstotaling 804 km. in the border areas along theIndia-China border in the States of Jammu &Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand,Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh at an estimatedcost of Rs.1,937 crore.
New mountain strike corps
India is raising a new mountain strike corps of nearly 90,000 soldiers to strengthen its defence along its disputed border with China in the high reaches of the Himalayas.
The strike corps will have its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns, and radio equipment. Over 35,000 soldiers have already been raised in new infantry units in India’s northeastern state of Assam. The entire corps will be fully raised over the next five years with 90,274 troops at a cost of $10.6 billion. The proposal to raise a new strike corps was recommended last year by India’s China Study Group, a government body that considers all strategic issues related to China.
In 2013 during visit of erstwhile Prime Minister of India to China, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese premier Li Keqiang signed a BDCA (Border Defence Co-operation Agreement) which stipulates among a set of confidence building measures that in any face-off on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) they will not use force or threaten to use force against each other and prevent exchange of fire or an armed conflict. The pact was signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.
The BDCA was among nine agreements signed by both sides, of which an MoU on Strengthening Co-operation on Trans-border Rivers was another significant agreement.
The two sides also agreed that as large neighbours following independent foreign policies, the relationships pursued by India and China with other countries must not become a source of concern for each other. On the Indian side, this points to China’s strategic ties with Pakistan, while China’s main concern would be India’s relations with the United States.
India raised the issue of terrorism generating from Pakistan, and Chinese infrastructure-building in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, as well as Indian concerns about China issuing stapled visas to people from Arunachal Pradesh.
Highlights of the BDCA (Border Defence Co-operation Agreement) between India and China:
In the event of a face-off in areas having differing perceptions of the LAC, “both sides shall exercise maximum self-restraint, refrain from any provocative actions, not use force or threaten to use force against the other side, treat each other with courtesy and prevent exchange of armed conflict”.
The border areas on both sides of the Indo-Bhutan border do not have basic infrastructure such as communications, roads, health, education, drinking water facilities etc. These areas are often used as sanctuaries by the insurgent groups of the North East particularly the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Police, intelligence machinery and administrative arrangements on both sides of the border need to be strengthened so as to ensure regular and effective monitoring of the activities of insurgent groups along the border. This matter requires a careful re-look as a means to promote better border management.
Settlements of Bangladeshis are coming up along either side of the Indo- Bhutan border. Many of them are reportedly seeking jobs and employment in the Bhutanese territory, in the garb of Indian citizens. This is another reason to closely monitor the Indo-Bhutan border.
In the immediate future much more attention must be paid to the problem of anti-India insurgent groups operating from Bhutan. An effective and capable counter insurgency network, to adequately cover all important roads, both land and riverine, connecting India and Bhutan, is necessary. The BSF should be entrusted with this task.
There is an urgent and important need to entrust the policing of the Indo-Nepal border to the ITBP, which is already deployed on the Western border from Ladakh to Lipu Lekh Pass. A number of steps may also be taken to strengthen policing on this border as follows:-
(a) The existing police stations in the border areas should be suitably upgraded and strengthened with sufficient number of trained personnel for crime investigation and intensive village surveillance.
(b) The border district police headquarters should have sufficient trained personnel for adequate intelligence work and providing police support to assist Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI)/Customs in organizing anti-smuggling raids/ambushes.
(c) Immigration Check Posts (ICPs) should be increased to cover all transit points. All ICPs should have Land Customs Stations (LCS) integrated with them with adequate facilities for the integrated posts to function from. Computers linked to Kolkata customs should be provided to ensure efficient recording of all movement of material and personnel, including those from third countries. This will also help in cargo profiling.
(d) At present all vehicles registered in India require a pass clearance at the Nepal border check post while entering Nepal. A similar system should be introduced for vehicles of Nepal registration entering India as reciprocal measures.
To further improve bilateral relations, expeditious action should be taken on following points:-
(a) Demarcation of the border should be completed and the Joint Working Group should meet more frequently.
(b) Scope for co-operation in border area development should be enlarged.
(c) The agreement on mutual legal assistance should be finalised.
Consequent to the fencing/floodlighting of the Indo-Pakistan border and the development of patrolling tracks there is need to review the tactical deployment of the Border Guarding Forces and patrolling arrangements. Notwithstanding the fact that much of the Indo-Pakistan border has been fenced and provided with floodlighting, it remains vulnerable to smuggling activities and clandestine contact with anti-India elements. This, together with Pakistan’s efforts to rekindle terrorism in Punjab, leaves no room for complacency and calls for maintenance of utmost vigilance on this border.
Security and checking arrangements at Attari need to be strengthened, in the context of the fact that the Samjhauta Express is being used for gunrunning and drug trafficking. Similar arrangements are needed to ensure foolproof security checks, in respect of buses that ply between India and Pakistan.
As in the case of Punjab, so too in the case of Rajasthan, the MHA must take suitable action to step up vigilance, as there is not only gunrunning and drug trafficking across the Rajasthan border but also infiltration of terrorists.
The harsh living conditions in many parts of the Rajasthan – Gujarat border, particularly the desert and the Rann of Kutch, adversely influence the morale of the personnel posted in the area. Special attention needs to be paid on a priority basis to the problems being faced by the border guarding forces. The MHA should work out the financial implications of implementing this recommendation and process the same for approval.
The guarding of the coastal and creek areas of Gujarat pose extreme challenges due to the hostile terrain, inhospitable climatic conditions, hazardous nature of the sea and creek areas on this side of the border, the existence of about 400 sq. kms of mangrove swamp with interlacing intricate stretches of sub-creeks and deep inlets of varying dimensions and further complicated by the ever shifting sand bars. The resources presently available to the BSF, Police and the Customs are inadequate to meet these challenges in coastal and creek areas. This matter calls for urgent and immediate attention. Provision of resources to equip these forces suitably would have financial implications. The MHA should process the same for approval.
Since it is quite possible that Pakistan may use the Gujarat route to push Bangladeshi nationals to India, the MHA should take necessary action to prevent any such influx.
One of the major problems afflicting the India-Bangladesh border is the smuggling of a wide range of goods. It is a matter of concern that organised criminal gangs and syndicates with powerful political and communal influence and patronage have cropped up at different places on the border. It is important to remove the factors which promote organised criminal activity in the border areas involving the local population on a large scale and closer co-operation needs to be established between the BSF and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) to work out strategies to deal with organised criminal activities in these areas.
It is necessary to involve all law enforcement agencies including the Customs in formalising day to day working arrangements and for ensuring co-ordinated action amongst them at the ground and the State levels.
There should be renewed efforts to formalise cross border trade between India and Bangladesh to curb large-scale smuggling. A Joint Expert Group has already been set up, and Foreign, Home and Commerce Secretaries’ level talks are pursuing this objective vigorously.
Notwithstanding the friendly ties between India and Bangladesh, much of the illegal cross border activities take place at the behest of the Pak ISI which has also spread its tentacles in that country. This is an area where concerted diplomatic action needs to be taken. The MEA may take diplomatic initiatives in this direction.
There is an urgent need for addressing the problems arising out of inadequate immigration and custom facilities on this border with a view to rectifying the existing shortcomings and inadequacies. The MHA and the MEA to take necessary action.
The joint Indo-Bangladesh guidelines for border authorities 1975 has laid- down clear and precise rules and procedures, to guide the two forces employed to look after a common border. The guidelines also envisage the establishment of joint check posts to help the nationals of both countries to use main channel of the river wherever the boundary, runs through the mid-stream of a river. The guidelines for setting up of joint check posts between the BSF and the BDR should be implemented. If necessary, the matter should be given definite shape through diplomatic efforts.
The responsibility for repair and maintenance of boundary pillars on the Indo- Bangladesh border has been placed on the respective border district authorities of the two countries. This has led to poor maintenance and also avoidable delays in the repair of boundary pillars.
Free movement across the Indo-Myanmar border has been the practice from times immemorial due to the ethnic and cultural similarity in the areas adjoining the border. Illegal trade activities in a variety of contraband items flourish at Moreh on the Indo-Myanmar border. In order to check these practices, the following measures may be adopted:-
(a) Trade should be regulated only through one gate.
(b) Border fencing should be undertaken in the area of Moreh.
(c) Free movement regime should be restricted to tribals moving with head loads, comprising authorised local produce.
(d) A composite checkpost should be located at Moreh comprising representatives from Customs, Immigration authority and National Narcotics Control Bureau, with the State police providing protection.
(e) The number of check-posts established on NH-39 from Moreh to Imphal should be reduced. These should be composite check-posts of all concerned agencies
(g) To arrest the ongoing illegal trade, items of third country origin may be brought under the provisions of the India-Myanmar Trade Agreement or under the clearance of the third country origin goods, vide Luggage Rule 1944. The quantum of free baggage also needs to be determined for the passengers.
It would be desirable to establish additional trading points in Tirap and Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. Border trade with Myanmar is expected to not only lead to economic upliftment but also wean away the populace from insurgency.
The boundary issue with respect to the area of Molcham needs to be resolved bilaterally between the Surveyor Generals of the two countries. Periodic survey and inspection of boundary pillars, by both sides, will help to obviate any encroachment.
There is a need for raising of additional forces with the Assam Rifles for performing counter insurgency duties and border management related activities.
Little has been done over the years to understand or take action to create the infrastructure for the protection of India’s vast coastal areas. The new regime of the oceans enacted under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in 1982 has greatly expanded India’s jurisdiction as a coastal state, through the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf. With an extensive coastline and numerous Island territories, India is endowed with an EEZ of 2.013 million sq kms. After the delimitation of the continental shelf, the sea area of responsibility of maritime agencies will increase to 2.9 million sq kms, which would be almost equal to India’s entire landmass.
The policy for maritime shipbuilding and acquisition should aim at increasing the share of Indian bottoms ferrying Indian trade from the present low of 27-30 per cent to atleast 50 per cent in the next five years. Efforts are also required to be made to augment the Indian coastal fleet to the projected one million GRT in the next 2-3 years.
A Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) needs to be installed in approaches to ports and channels to effectively monitor and control movements of ship entering/leaving ports or channels. In principle, VTMS should be installed in all major ports and Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands. In addition, the proposal for VTMS schemes for the Gulf of Kutch and our offshore oil platforms, should be expedited.
The issue and accounting procedures of the maritime landing certificate should be made more stringent so that the same cannot be misused after persons issued with it have been deported.
The laws and procedures relating to detention and prosecution of poachers and confiscation of boats need to be tightened. The concerned Ministries/Departments of the Government of India should consider setting up Maritime Courts or alternatively, giving powers of prosecution and detention to the Coast Guard and to the proposed Marine Police.
Conclusion:
Border disputes often flare up after they become linked with important economic or social interests. Disputed territories may contain important natural resources, such as hydrocarbon, mineral reserves, or water sources; provide access to the sea or shared terrestrial resources, such as grazing areas; or be a strategic location. Such areas also may be subject to irredentist claims based on historical or cultural factors or demands for self-determination by their inhabitants.
Competition for contested or shared resources has become more intense in recent years due to economic developments, such as higher commodity prices, and environmental changes, such as overutilization of agricultural land, overgrazing, and desertification, as well as regional and global climate change. It is unlikely that increasing stresses among states resulting from these factors can be successfully resolved using traditional legal methods, particularly adjudication.
Many cooperative approaches to resource and border issues can be used like joint management and exploitation of contested or shared resources,; joint regulation, or cooperative sharing, of contested and/or shared resources, such as grazing rights or water supplies; negotiated access to the sea for landlocked states or through territorial waters for neighboring states; agreed rights of transit for states with noncontiguous territories; and/or commitments to respect the cultural, historical, or social heritage, as well as political autonomy of national minorities.
Part of the overall solution will be improved coordination among regulators and lawmakers across the globe so that the inherent differences in law or practice do not result in unnecessary confusion, delay, or conflict as our world economy continues to overlap and interact in new and more expansive ways. Today the borders should work efficiently not only as a barrier and also as a bridge because borders bisect but they also bind
In view of the very close functional relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard and the requirement for co-ordination between these two maritime forces in both peace and war, the Coast Guard budget may be shifted from the Department of Revenue to the Civil Estimates of the MoD. While Navy-Coast Guard synergy is essential, in order to ensure that the latter continues to function as an independent and distinct force, for administrative purposes, the DG Coast Guard may report to the Defence Secretary, rather than to the Chief of Naval Staff.
The Coast Guard should take steps to recruit more men to make good its personnel shortages. In order to enable the Coast Guard to perform its functions efficiently and to grow up as an independent service equipped to fulfill its multifarious responsibilities, particularly in the management of maritime zones, the following measures may be implemented by the MoD:-
(a) The Navy and the Coast Guard may set up Joint Operations Rooms at regional levels.
(b) During joint operations, the command of the tactical situation should at all times remain with the Navy.
(c) Compatibility between the Navy and the Coast Guard in terms of weapons, equipment and training must be ensured.
(d) Coast Guard may induct hovercraft, suitably equipped ships/craft and aircraft in a phased manner.
(e) Coast Guard should set up a coastal station at Jakhau.
The State Marine Police should interact with the Coast Guard and pursue legal cases pertaining to their area of responsibility. The MHA, in consultation with the State Governments, should bring a detailed proposal for establishing the proposed Marine Police before the CCS, after working out the financial implications.
The following measures may be taken to improve effective patrolling of the coastal areas:-
(a) Strengthen the BSF Water Wing in Gujarat and West Bengal.
(b) The placing of orders for Floating BOPs for the BSF may be expedited.
(d) The existing police stations, outposts and infrastructure, both in terms of manpower and equipment, should be augmented.
The MHA and the MoD in consultation with the State Governments concerned should take necessary action, after working out the financial implications.
The Navy’s War Watching Organisation may be integrated into the surveillance and reporting chain of the country. Fishermen watch groups may also be set up in each of the coastal states on similar lines to Gujarat.
The following measures may also be taken to strengthen the security of the A&N Islands:-
(a) All the forces deployed in these islands, including the Coast Guard and the Air Force, should be placed under the operational command of the Fortress Commander to adhere to the unified command concept.
(b) Additional Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) with Integral helicopters and Fast Attack Craft (FAC) should be inducted.
(c) The induction of an India Reserve Battalion, which has been sanctioned for these islands, should be expedited.
(d) Infrastructure for operating long range maritime aircraft from Port Blair should be set-up expeditiously.
There is a need for integrated and clear communication network for effective command and control of the forces of diverse Services. Communications using SATCOM/HF/V/UHF with a suitable security modem should be standardized for the three Services and Coast Guard.
The ingress of illegal Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan migrants, etc. from Kolkata, Chennai and Vishakhapatnam to the A&N Islands should be stopped, by undertaking the following measures:-
(a) Strict verification procedures should be enforced.
(b) Contractual labour on completion of their term of contract should be immediately made to leave the A&N Islands.
(c) Immediate measures should be taken to deport illegal immigrants.
Specific measures as follows may be taken in the Sir Creek area in Gujarat :-
The Coast Guard and the BSF should regularly patrol our side of the Sir Creek Mouth area and the Sir Creek area respectively. An action plan is under preparation. Approval of the action plan may be expedited, after working out the financial implications.
Fishing craft operating on the Gujarat coast should be encouraged to use hand held GPS (Mobile), so as to avoid crossing over the maritime boundary with Pakistan.
An apex body for management of maritime affairs should be formed for institutionalized linkages between the Navy, Coast Guard and the concerned Ministries of the Central and the State Governments.
The BSF has over the years become a very ‘large force’. Accordingly it is desirable that it should have two wings each under the charge of an Additional DG, one for guarding the Western borders designated as BSF (West) and the other for guarding Eastern borders designated as BSF (East).
At the time of the BSF’s inception it was envisaged that one battalion should be provided as reserve to cater to the requirement of rest, relief, collective training and annual change over. The Reserve Battalion is a necessary component of the overall strength and therefore should be sanctioned at the rate already approved by the Committee of Secretaries. MHA should work out the financial implications of implementing this recommendation and process the same, for approval.
The water wing of the BSF does not have adequate repair and maintenance facilities for its marine craft. The existing facilities for maintenance and repair in Indian Navy and private yards need to be assessed and wherever possible, such facilities should be fully utilised. In order that the Assam Rifles may be able to play its role effectively, it should be placed under the complete control of the MHA. The DG, Assam Rifles should be selected and appointed by the MHA and report to it directly. As stated earlier, since the issues, especially in regard to the officering of the Assam Rifles, seamless interface with the Army, logistics etc., are complex, the MHA in consultation with the MoD should set-up a group to go into the details of the modalities and phasing of transference of Assam Rifles from the Army to the MHA
Effective vigilance machinery should be set up immediately in each of the Border Guarding Forces. The set up should be headed by an IPS officer in the rank of IG to be brought on deputation and he should report directly to the head of the force.
The special and vital responsibilities devolving on the supervisory levels in the Border Guarding Forces in toning up the overall ethical and integrity standards within the force should be stressed upon.
There is a need to recruit more personnel from within the areas of deployment of the various forces, as they would be able to withstand weather and difficult living conditions better than the people from other parts of the country. The percentage of recruitment in the ITBP and the Assam Rifles from the areas of deployment should be higher than the present level.
The directly recruited officers of the BSF and the ITBP are put through their basic training in their respective academies. After initial training, it would be advantageous if they are attached to the Army units in the field areas for a period of at least two months for practical training before they are sent on posting. This will enable them to acquire additional skills necessary for their day to day working as well as help in integrating them with the Army whenever circumstances so require.
The question of reducing the colour service of Army personnel and their absorption in CPMFs/State police, is a complex subject. While the Army desires a younger age profile, so do the CPMFs. There are divergent views on the subject. It is, therefore, felt that the entire matter should be considered by a committee comprising the Cabinet Secretary, Chief of Army Staff, Home Secretary, Defence Secretary and Secretary Expenditure who would submit their considered recommendations in the matter for the government’s consideration.
Proper training of personnel is very important. Special requirements of each Border Guarding Force based on its role, the terrain in which it is deployed and such other related factors will have to be built into the training facilities in each of them.
Consequent to the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission, the post of Naik has been abolished. It is desirable to encourage development of leadership, at the operational and ground level, and also to provide better promotional opportunities at the lower ranks. Therefore, the rank of Naik should be reintroduced in the three Border Guarding Forces.
Presently, there are many ad-hoc arrangements for deployment of personnel at various levels. Work is being managed by withdrawing personnel from battalions and attaching them to various formations throughout the force. This affects the operational capability of the force. A time bound review of the pending proposals arising out of the attachments be undertaken and formal solutions found so that the attached personnel are restored to their units.
It is desirable to facilitate the integration of the Border Guarding Forces with the Army whenever the situation so demands. This would necessitate that the Border Guarding Forces should be equipped with weapons at par with the infantry or related units of the Army, when deployed on similar tasks. The MHA should take further action.
The Reserve Battalion is a necessary component of the overall strength of a Border Guarding Force and therefore, should be sanctioned at the rate already approved by the Committee of Secretaries in the case of the BSF. A number of other measures also need to be taken with a view to improve the capability and morale of the Border Guarding Forces, to deal with their border responsibilities in an effective manner. These are as follows:-
(a) Continuation of employment beyond the age of fifty years in the Border Guarding Forces should be dependent upon every individual in the Force fully satisfying the prescribed standards of physical fitness and medical category. The BSF has framed appropriate rules for this purpose and the same are being enforced. It may be desirable for the other Border Guarding Forces also to follow suit.
(b) It is necessary for the Border Guarding Forces to introduce and strictly adhere to pre-determined performance appraisal procedures in respect of their personnel at different levels. The ‘Self Assessment’ criteria evolved by the BSF appears to be adequate for the purpose and may also be adopted by the ITBP and the Assam Rifles.
(c) There should be adequate delegation of both administrative and financial powers to all levels from the head of the Force downwards. While powers should be delegated to the maximum extent, required guidelines for exercise of the delegated powers should also be issued.
(d) There is no justification for differences to exist any longer in the matter of supply of rations in kind and other allowances when Border Guarding Forces personnel are posted to areas, similar to the ones where the Army personnel get such entitlements. The existing differences may be removed.
Welfare measures play an important role in keeping the forces at an optimum level of functioning. The personnel posted in border areas face severe problems on account of drinking water shortages, lack of medical and educational facilities, facilities for communication with families etc. A fresh detailed look should be taken at the whole range of welfare measures, which are essential to keep the morale of the Border Guarding Forces high.
Smuggling of different consumer and intermediate goods has been a bane of Indian economy for over four decades. Narcotic trafficking, mainly in opiates and cannabis products, has however been a much older activity. For clandestine cross- border transit and landing ashore, communities of professional couriers have come up. The land borders, except in certain areas, are looked after by Border Guarding Forces. In the case of coastal areas even though certain measures have recently been initiated in certain stretches on Tamil Nadu and Gujarat coasts, there are serious weaknesses in the remaining coastal borders. Since our vulnerability to infiltration and smuggling from the coastal areas has increased, a matching security system along the shoreline has become over-due.
Serious indications of strategic alliances of organisations hostile to India with one or more trans-national criminal syndicates require that the premier intelligence agencies of India should expand their capabilities and coverage to include the local and regional activities of such organisations. Preventive security arrangements are also essential against pre-judicial activities in the territorial water and transgressions of air space.
All matters relating to border management and security should be brought under the co-ordinated over-seeing and strategy-developing responsibility of a Department of Border Management within the MHA as recommended earlier. There should be a Standing Committee with all the heads of the concerned executive and intelligence organisations as members attached to the Department of Border Management proposed to be created. It should monitor, co-ordinate and over-see border management.
Organisations like the NCB have a very onerous task in containing narcotics trafficking. The capabilities of NCB, for the development of dissemination of both strategic and operational intelligence, should be upgraded.
The main task for interception, including that for drugs and contraband, has to be taken up by the forces/agencies present on the borders, such as the BSF, ITBP, Assam Rifles, Customs, Coast Guard and local police. The executive agencies stationed along the border should be appropriately mandated and motivated, with priorities for each stretch of the border laid-down from time to time. Units of different organisations stationed at the same point on the border should be encouraged to form and function as a Joint Task Force.
Border Fencing. Construction of the border fence in Punjab and Rajasthan has helped in checking illegal infiltration from across the borders in these areas. However, border fencing is not the panacea for all the problems afflicting efficient and effective management of the border. It should not be looked at in isolation but as a means of effective border management. It is one of the physical components forming part of the overall measures to make the border secure to the maximum extent possible. To improve effectiveness of the fence, the following measures need to be adopted:-
(a) There should invariably be a jeepable road parallel and close to the fence and care should be taken to see that it is not eroded over a period of time due to rain and weather.
(b) In certain fenced areas, gaps exist where rivers, even small ones, intervene and where bridges have been constructed over the water channels etc. Such places offer sufficient scope for intrusion and there is a need to introduce additional obstacles in such areas.
(c) Habitation/cultivation should not be allowed, in the area between the fence and the border, and this area should be kept sanitized. This would involve relocation of families/villages.
(d) Flood lighting should be done in all fenced border areas in order to augment the capacity of the border force personnel to thwart attempts at infiltration and smuggling.
(e) In order to satisfy the minimum requirement of ensuring a secure border, it is desirable to convert all single fence into double fence with concertina coils, one over the other, in the space between the two rows of fences, in as many places as possible.
Illegal migration has assumed serious proportions. There should be compulsory registration of citizens and non-citizens living in India. This will facilitate preparation of a national register of citizens. All citizens should be given a Multi-Purpose National Identity Card (MPNIC) and non-citizens should be issued identity cards of a different colour and design. This should be introduced initially in the border districts or may be in a 20 Kms border belt and extended to the hinterland progressively. The Central Government should meet the full cost of the identity card scheme. Many people from the neighbouring countries are tempted to cross over to India in search of better job opportunities. In order to prevent illegal migration in future, a `Work Permit for Foreigners` scheme may be introduced.
The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act, 1983 (IMDT Act) was enacted for facilitating effective action against illegal migrants. Ironically, it served the opposite purpose of retarding the deportation of illegal migrants. The IMDT Act should, therefore, be repealed and action taken against illegal migrants uniformly under the Foreigner’s Act. It is noted that a proposal to repeal the IMDT Act is already under consideration of the Government.
For effective action against the illegal migrants, Residence Records of villages in the border districts should be prepared and regularly updated. This will allow easy identification and detection of illegal immigrants, until such time as the scheme of registration of all nationals and non-nationals is introduced.
Indian Census primary data can easily help in the detection of illegal immigrants. This information can be a useful tool in establishing the status of illegal migrants. However, since census primary data is confidential in nature, this matter needs to be further discussed with the Registrar General of India and the Ministry of Law.
The Prevention of Infiltration of Pakistani (PIP) Scheme was introduced in 1962 to deal with the immigration of foreigners from the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The name of the scheme was subsequently changed to Prevention of Infiltration of Foreigners (PIF). Under the scheme, watch posts, patrol posts and check posts were set up in Assam. A revised PIF scheme should be introduced.
People living on India’s international borders, particularly on land borders, face myriad problems, like difficult terrain, harsh living conditions and lack of access to public amenities. Frequent shelling from across the border, thinly spread out administration and inadequate social and economic infrastructure, makes life difficult in these areas. Concerted efforts are being made by our hostile neighbour through allurements, subversive propaganda and promotion of religious fundamentalism to generate a feeling of alienation among the border population. The remoteness of the local administration, its low visibility, illegal immigration, smuggling of arms, explosives and narcotic substance .A number of measures are required to be taken as follows:-
(a) The Border Area Development Programme (BADP) is a step in the direction of addressing the special needs of the border population. To ensure maximum impact of the programme, the present practice of treating community development block on the border as a unit should be continued.
(b) Like the Tribal Sub-Plan and Scheduled Castes Component Plan, a Component Plan should also be prepared for border areas so that border population can partake of their share of development resources.
(c) A perspective plan for integrated infrastructure development of border blocks should be prepared with a 10-year time span.
Madrasa education is part of a Muslim child’s religious tradition. Steps should be taken to encourage these institutions to add inputs on modern education also. Efforts should be made for providing increased facilities for modern education, particularly for the border areas where such facilities are lacking. The Ministry of Human Resource Development is presently administering the Central Sector Scheme for giving financial assistance for modernization of Madrasa education. The scheme should be strengthened and greater publicity given to it.
Disinformation and Subversive Propaganda: The forces hostile to India have tended to occupy the vacuum created by inadequate reach of national media. We must wake up to the harsh reality of the fact that low intensity conflict/proxy war has been unleashed against us by way of (dis) information aggression. A generation thus grows up fed by propaganda and the mischief of hostile forces and battle for the mind of our people is lost. It is, therefore, necessary to initiate measures to combat the subversive propaganda and disinformation unleashed against India through a series of measures as identified below :-
(a) An imaginative media policy and information sharing approach need to be evolved to orient the border population towards national development goals, security concerns and national integration.
(b) National electronic media have to address the needs and concerns of border population as they see it and not as we see it. The hiatus between these perceptions need to be bridged. Border areas have a very rich cultural mosaic. The local culture and traditions need to be highlighted in programmes of AIR and Doordarshan. This calls for developing decentralized production system at local level with greater participation of local professionals.
(c) There is reluctance on the part of the staff of AIR and Doordarshan to serve in the border areas. Existence of many vacancies at critical levels is adversely affecting production and transmission there. These should be filled up expeditiously. High power reviews may be regularly undertaken in this regard. Some incentives should be given to the staff due to the difficult living conditions.
(d) The broadcasting time for the programmes in local dialects needs to be increased. The difficulties in making programmes in local dialects could be overcome by involving local culture groups, NGOs and media professionals.
The officers of the Defence Services and the Border Guarding Force should be imparted skills in communication and media interaction through specially designed training modules. The MHA and the MoD should take action in concert with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS)
Position of the present border guarding
An in-depth assessment of the existing border management system revealed that it suffered from a number of shortcomings which hampered effective functioning. Some of the shortcomings highlighted were:
1. the high-tech equipment being used did not provide all-round security and did not work in adverse climatic conditions;
2. significant gaps remained at rivers and nullahs running along the fences;
3. being manpower intensive, the system was not effective in providing rest and relief to BSF troops
4. it is not an integrated system and therefore failed to provide a common operating picture at all levels.
How CIMBS will help in improving the situation?
At present, the CIBMS is implemented along two stretches in the Jammu sector of the India-Pakistan border. The two stretches were selected for their difficult terrain characterised by several cross-border streams and dense growth of elephant grass.
Obstacles in implementing CIMBS
CIMBS involves high end surveillance equipments and technologies.
Many of the high-tech surveillance that is already deployed are not optimally utilized because the required technical expertise is not uniformly available among the force‘s personnel.
The exorbitant cost of the electronic devices and the lack of easy availability of spare parts act as a deterrent against their use.
The lack of technical expertise, erratic power supply and adverse climatic and terrain conditions in the border areas could potentially undermine the functioning of the sophisticated system.
The Union Home Minister recently announced that a =Border Protection Grid‘ will be set up in Indian states bordering Bangladesh.
What is a BPG?
BPG will comprise of various elements namely physical barriers, non-physical barriers, surveillance system, Intelligence agencies, State Police, BSF and other State and Central agencies. Non-physical barriers will be used where fencing is not feasible like rivers or nullahs etc. In these areas technological solutions of a networked combination of electronic gadgets like radar, day-night cameras, various types of sensors etc. all integrated in a command and control architecture will be used. It gives a multi-pronged and foolproof mechanism to secure our border. BPG will be supervised by a State level Standing Committee under the Chairmanship of respective Chief Secretaries. It will ensure greater help for the States in the overall border security.
What is the need for it?
The Indo-Bangladesh Border covers 5 states of India including Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura & West Bengal and is 4096 km long. So far in only 3006 km border security infrastructure of fence, roads, floodlights and border out posts (BOPs) are in place. India has friendly relations with Bangladesh and these measures will facilitate genuine trade and legitimate cross-border movement of people while curbing radicalization, illegal migration, and smuggling of cattle, fake Indian currency notes and drugs etc.
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