India's Northeast is one of South Asia's hottest trouble spots, not simply because the region has as many as 30 armed insurgent organizations operating and fighting the Indian state, but because trans-border linkages that these groups have, and strategic alliances among them, have acted as force multipliers and have made the conflict dynamics all the more intricate.

With demands of these insurgent groups ranging from secession to autonomy and the right to self-determination, and a plethora of ethnic groups clamoring for special rights and the protection of their distinct identity, the region is bound to be a turbulent one.

The Naga leadership under Z.A. Phizo had challenged their integration into the Indian Union even before India became independent in 1947. The Naga insurgency started way back in the early 1950s.

Since then the insurgencies in this region have multiplied and spread to many new areas. In this extremely diverse and strategically sensitive region, there are different reasons for the ethnic upsurges and insurgencies in different states. 

Some seek secession from the Indian Union, some others seek separate states and yet others greater autonomy within the existing state. The number of such insurgent groups could reach three-digit figures. In Manipur alone, more than twenty-five groups are operating.

Problem Areas

Insurgencies have seriously affected the economic life of the region. The whole developmental process is seriously hampered because of this unending violence.

 The geo-strategic importance of the North-East is not sufficiently appreciated even in the security establishment. All the states in the North-East share an international border with other countries and the seven North-Eastern states are linked to the rest of the country only by a narrow strip of land.

The lack of physical, cultural and emotional links has encouraged a feeling of alienation, which is being exploited by the not too- friendly neighbours to pursue their own agenda. They are giving support and sanctuaries to many of these groups to use them as leverage against a much bigger and more powerful neighbour.

Another intractable problem is created by the influx of migrants from East Pakistan and now continuing from Bangladesh. In the beginning it was confined to the Hindus leaving East Pakistan due to insecure conditions, but later, because of intense population pressure even Muslims started migrating. The fear that immigrant population will one day dominate them is keeping many of the insurgent and secessionist movements alive.

The terrain in this region is eminently suitable for insurgency. The hilly terrain and dense forests provide convenient hiding places to mount ambushes on the moving convoys of the security forces. Large parts of the interior areas have little or no police presence. The insurgent groups virtually control the administration in these areas.

The dispersion of ethnic groups across the international boundaries has profoundly influenced the nature of political conflicts. 

The riots in Manipur in 2001 following the extension of the ceasefire to the areas beyond the boundaries of Nagaland are a pointer to the difficult road ahead.

The situation in Assam has shown some signs of improvement, but large-scale extortion by the ULFA and other groups is posing serious problems.

The NLFT and the ATTF continue to be active in Tripura. They have sanctuaries in Bangladesh.

Mizoram is quiet, but there are problems between the Mizos and the Chakmas, and the Mizos and the Reangs. Thousands of Reang refugees from Mizoram are staying in camps in Tripura.

Most of these states are not financially viable. They hardly collect any revenue and depend almost entirely on the Union government for financial support. This has caused lack of responsibility in incurring public expenditure. 

Extortion by the insurgent groups, the leakages of huge funds through corrupt practices leave very little for development. And they conveniently put the blame on the Centre for not giving them adequate funds.

Through years of neglect this potentially rich region is today the most backward, almost primitive, part of our country. In these appalling conditions an alienated population becomes an easy target for the secessionist propaganda.

The North Eastern Region which comprises eight States viz. Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim, presents an intricate cultural and ethnic mosaic with over 200 ethnic groups with distinct languages, dialects and socio-cultural identity. The NE Region covers8% of the country’s landmass and has 4% of the National population. About 99% of the 6387 Kms border of this Region is international border along Bangladesh (2,700 kms), Myanmar (1,643 Kms), China (1,345 Kms) and Bhutan (699 Kms).

The security situation in the North Eastern States has remained complex for quite some time because of diverse demands of ethnic groups and various militant outfits and has been gradually improving in terms of reduction in violent incidents, lower civilian casualties and increasing number of arrests and surrender of militants. The States of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Meghalaya continue to account for the bulk of insurgency related incidents of violence in the North Eastern Region. Tripura, Mizoram and Sikkim remained peaceful. In Arunachal Pradesh, barring a few incidents, there was a general atmosphere of peace.

The entire State of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and parts of Sikkim are “protected Areas” under Foreigners (Protected Area) Order, 1958 issued under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Some areas of Sikkim have also been declared “Restricted Areas” under the Foreigners (Restricted Areas) Order, 1963. In terms of Foreigners (Protected Area) Order, 1958 and Foreigners (Restricted Areas) Order, 1963, no foreigner shall enter into or remain in any protected area/restricted area except under and in accordance with the permit issued by Central Government or any officer authorized by the Central Government in this behalf.

For promoting tourism in North Eastern States, guidelines regarding relaxation of PAP/RAP regime havebeen issued from time to time by the Ministry. The entire area of the States of Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland continues to be excluded from the Protected Area Regime notified under Foreigners (Protected Area) Order, 1958 subject to certain conditions.

Manipur is a melting pot of diverse cultures and ethnicities and has gradually evolved into a dynamic multicultural society. Naga, Kuki and Meitei stayed together side by side for centuries and developed their heritage in parallel within their respective ethno-social boundaries. But the ‘divide and rule policy’ of the colonial administration in relation to administering the hills and plains of Manipur and the introduction of Christianity widened the cultural gap among these communities. Although they continued to coexist peacefully in the aftermath of independence, over a period of time separate aspirations and perceived insecurity regarding overlapping claims over natural resources led them to gradually move apart. Developments like the demands for Nagalim and Kukiland as well as divergent aspirations for cultural identity and land rights deepened prejudices and led to inter-community clashes. These clashes also hastened the formation of various armed groups affiliated to the respective ethnic communities.

Merger with India in 1949 is a political, social and emotive issue for the Meiteis. The NSCN(IM)’s demand for the formation of Nagalim, which included four districts of Manipur (Chandel, Senapati, Tamenglong and Ukhrul) was seen as a threat to Manipur’s territorial integrity. Till date, Meitei insurgent groups continue to wage insurgency in the name of self-determination and restoration of lost sovereignty. For their part, Kuki insurgents want a state within-a-state under the Constitution while Naga insurgents are still divided between the demand for greater Nagalim (a separate entity carved out by merging the Naga-inhabited areas of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and Myanmar) and shared sovereignty under the Constitution. Since the Kuki and Meitei insurgencies have primarily gained ideological strength and relevance as tools to safeguarding their respective community interests, the Naga Peace accord with its non-territorial resolution framework is likely to have a definite and positive impact on the Kuki and Meitei insurgencies in Manipur.

Kuki Insurgency

The areas in Manipur which NSCN(IM) is demanding be merged with Nagaland as part of greater Nagalim included large areas of Kuki inhabitancy. Kukis in Manipur consequently felt the need to organise themselves so to protect their interests more forcefully. Kuki insecurity also stemmed from the reciprocal distrust and dislike for the Meitei community due to non-inclusive development, the absence of a clearly defined space for Kukis, and a feeling of alienation which has only been fanned by their perception the recently passed Protection of Manipur Peoples Bill 2015 is partisan in nature.

The Kuki National Army (KNA) was formed in 1958 to address the social, economic and political interests of Kukis. But the Kuki movement could not take concrete shape, as elements within did not associate with the Thadou tribe that was spearheading the movement for an Autonomous State. Paites and Hmars formed their own political parties, namely, the Paites National Council (PNC) and Hmar National Union (HNU). PNC’s political aim was to establish an Independent State of Chinland comprising areas inhabited by the people of Chin origin in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Myanmar and Bangladesh. At the same time, differing aspirations led to the formation of a large number of Kuki groups with varied interests and political alignments.

Naga-Kuki Clashes- In the backdrop of continued socio-political rivalry, Naga-Kuki clashes erupted in 1992-94 due to the refusal by the Kukis to pay land tax to NSCN(IM) as well as their share of the Maphau Dam compensation. As a follow up to these clashes, on September 13, 1993, a major incident took place known as the Joupi massacre in which 88 Kukis were killed. This day is marked as a “black day” by the Kukis. These were followed by the Kuki-Zomi clashes in 1997-98, during which the worst affected area was Churachandpur. This led to large scale migration of the Kuki population.

Subsequently, 20 militant groups under two umbrella organizations, fifteen with Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and five with United People’s Front (UPF), were formed to negotiate with the Government. The historic tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement was signed between the Government of India, Government of Manipur and the KNO UPF in New Delhi on August 22, 2008 under a certain set of ground rules.3 The SoO agreement was extended by one year on August 22, 2009 and the agreement is being extended periodically, although intermediary problems led to a period of non-extension of SoO. Presently, there are ten SoO camps with approximately 1400 cadres. But these cadres have not completely stopped their illegal activities like tax collection, extortion and kidnapping, which has also often led to inter-factional clashes owing to competing areas of dominance.

Demand for Kuki Land/Kuki State- The Kuki State Demand Committee (KSDC) was formed on November 2, 2010 to seek statehood for the Kukis. This Kuki-land / Kuki state is to be carved out of their ancestral land in Manipur. Central to this demand is the motive of historical revenge on the Nagas. According to social scientist Homen Thangjam, the message the Kukis were sending was that the Nagas could not hope for a political solution to their problem bypassing the Kukis, meaning that the existence of Kuki pockets in Naga areas was a reality that would have to be accounted for. At the same time, the idea of a Kuki state comprising areas covering Ukhrul, Senapati, Tamenglong and Chandel districts, which the Nagas have been claiming as part of Greater Nagalim, makes the demand for Kuki-land appear farfetched under the present circumstances. This is substantiated by the Sadar Hills tussle, wherein the Kukis were not able to convert the Kuki-dominated area as a full-fledged revenue entity due to opposition of the Nagas who consider Sadar Hills as part of the Senapati District, which they claim as part of Greater Nagalim.

Demand for Sadar Hills District - The demand for the creation of the Sadar Hills district first came from the Kuki Chiefs’ Zonal Council at its meeting held on September 3, 1970. Numerous rounds of talks with the government that followed the raising of this demand failed to produce any result. Under the auspices of the Kuki National Assembly, the Sadar Hills District Demand Committee (SHDDC) was formed in 1974 to demand full-fledged revenue district status for the Sadar Hills Autonomous District Council. The election of new SHDDC leaders in June 2011 led to the revival of the demand for Sadar Hills district. The Sadar Hills District Demand Committee was thereafter renamed as Sadar Hills District-hood Demand Committee. The demand to upgrade Sadar Hills to full-fledged district status continues to remain as a bone of contention between the Kukis and Nagas of Manipur. While the Kukis term the delay in granting district status as “justice denied” and feel ignored by the state government, the Nagas see it as an attempt to encroach upon their traditional land. The Meiteis, who are in a majority in the government and administration, view this development very warily and have been conveniently trying to maintain the status quo on the issue.

The SHDDC requested the state government to declare Sadar Hills a full-fledged district before July 31, 2011. The lack of response from the government led SHDDC leaders to impose a blockade on the two life-lines of Manipur, NH-2 and NH-37, with effect from August 1, 2011, which was later converted to an economic blockade. This led to the imposition of a counter blockade by the United Naga Council (UNC) on August 21, 2011, to stall the Manipur government’s alleged attempt to bifurcate the Naga-dominated areas to create new districts. After 120 days, the longest ever blockade in Manipur, the UNC lifted the blockade on November 29, 2011. The blockade led to the loss of innocent lives, government property and caused immense inconveniences to innocent locals.

Important Implications:  To sum up, there are three important implications of the Naga Peace Accord for the Kuki insurgency:

The relevance of Kukiland in the backdrop of the Naga non-territorial agreement.

The viability of opposition by the United Naga Council for the creation of Sadar Hills as a district.

The consequences of the existence of Kuki SoO designated camps on closure of NSCN (IM) “Taken-Note-Off camps”.

Meitei Insurgency

The Meitei insurgency has its origin in Meitei revivalism, which started in 1930 against Hindu Vaishnavism imported from Bengal into Manipur. Subsequent to the accession of Manipur to India, the movement spread and gained prominence under the banner of ‘Meitei Marup’. A strong feeling that domination by outsiders in all spheres of activities including administration was responsible for the economic ills of Manipur spread among the Meiteis. The non-inclusion of Manipuri language in the eighth schedule of the Constitution until as late as 1992 also caused alienation among the Meiteis.

Nagalim and Its Relation- The present Meitei insurgency traces its origins to the foundation of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) on November 24, 1964. Radicalism spread further after the formation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1978. The PLA has a leftist ideology, and it wanted to unite all ethnic groups in the North East. Meiteis also feel that the denial of Schedule Tribe status led to discontent and increase in insurgent activities as employment avenues for Meiteis were reduced significantly.

With the Nagas demanding Naga dominated areas, the very existence of the state of Manipur was being questioned, which the Meitei population vociferously resisted. As a result, numerous other groups were formed primarily in the Imphal valley region. On June 14, 2001 the ceasefire between NSCN(IM) and the Centre was extended to all Naga inhabited areas outside Nagaland. This led to the eruption of an upsurge among the Meiteis. Although the ceasefire was retracted from Naga inhabited areas outside Manipur on August 1, 2001, it acted like fuel to the fire of Meitei insurgency, which gained momentum and became unbridled. This rift between Nagas and Meiteis continues to date and manifests in violence on the slightest of provocations.

For instance, the proposed visit of Th Muivah, the NSCM(IM) leader, to his native village after 47 years, approved by the Central government on April 29, 2010, was perceived by the valley people as a threat to Manipur’s territorial integrity owing to the well-publicised demand of NSCN (IM) for merger of all Naga inhabited areas into one political unit – Nagalim. Taking a cue from their past experience and apprehending a divisive political agenda behind the visit, the State government, in its wisdom, turned down the proposed visit, citing law and order problems, reflecting the deep rooted apprehensions and positions of the opposing parties.

Surrender and Memorandum of Understanding Camps- The Meitei insurgent groups have been most active in Manipur. But they are under pressure because of the intensive operations launched by the security forces. There have been surrenders by the cadre of many Meitei insurgent groups. These cadres are housed in six camps, also called the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) camps, with an approximate strength of 390 to 400 cadres. Like Kuki militants, they are also continuing their unlawful activities.

Apprehension of Meitei Leaders- A large number of senior Meitei insurgent leaders have been arrested. The arrest of Rajkumar Meghen, head of India's oldest and richest militia, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), on November 30, 2010 was a big blow to the outfit. Meghen posed a much larger threat as he, by virtue of his acceptability among the 25 biggest militant organisations in the Northeast, was working on a unification plan and had been articulating on certain international aspects of the movement.

Important Implications

To sum up, there are two main implications of the Naga Peace Accord for the Meitei Insurgency:

Relevance of the demand for sovereign Manipur and continuation of insurgency.The need to engage with Meitei Leaders like UNLF Chief Raj Kumar Meghan in the peace process in order to progress towards peace in Manipur.

Recommendations-

1.    Closure of Kuki Designated Camps and Rehabilitation of Cadres-  If the proposal for closure of NSCN(IM) Taken-Note-off Camps is accepted in Manipur, then it is important that the Kuki SoO camps in Manipur should also be closed and the cadres located there rehabilitated. If this does not take place, it may give rise to the formation of another Naga splinter group to safeguard the interests of the Nagas of Manipur. The fact is that most of the cadres in these camps want to join the mainstream, stay with their families, obtain a government job and lead a peaceful life. There is a need to plan the comprehensive rehabilitation of Naga, Kuki and Meitei cadres in designated camps to ensure peace in Manipur.

2. Engage Meitei Leaders in Peace Talks -Many Meitei leaders have been apprehended and are in jail, including Rajkumar Meghen. This is the right time to initiate talks with them. They can be given general amnesty, as has been done with other insurgent leaders in the Northeast, a recent example being the self-styled Chairman of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) Ranjan Diamery and the General Secretary of ULFA Anup Chetia. Such negotiations have brought peace to Mizoram, Nagaland and Assam in the past.

3. Creation of Sadar Hills District - Sadar Hills has the requisite infrastructure in place, including the Sadar Hills Autonomous Council. In view of this, the conferment of district status to Sadar Hills may be considered and expedited in the light of the Naga Peace Accord. At the same time, the apprehensions and sensitivities of the Nagas of Senapati District should be addressed in consultation with the Naga leaders.

4.    Policy on Apprehension/Surrender- In a clear message to insurgent groups in the Northeast, the Union government has temporarily suspended the surrender and rehabilitation policy in Manipur. It is an extension of a strategy which was adopted in Assam a few months ago to successfully crack down on the Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland.9 Presently, no surrenders are being accepted in order to convey a strong message to the militants and discourage fake surrenders. However, there is need to have a flexible policy in this regard. During the field survey conducted by this author, it emerged that more than 80 per cent of cadres join militant groups because of coercion or compulsion and not for the sake of ideology. As a policy, the surrender of such cadres should be accepted and insurgents groups should be encouraged to engage in peace talks.

Conclusion

The Naga peace accord is a historic step. It needs to be followed up by correct policy interventions that serve to undercut the relevance of the Kuki and Meitei insurgencies and thus usher in peace in Manipur.

Nagaland

The violence in Nagaland has been mainly in the form of inter factional clashes between different groups. The major insurgent groups operating in the State of Nagaland are the factions of National Socialist Council

of Nagaland (NSCN) which came into being in 1980 following the failure of the 1975 Shillong Accord.

These insurgent groups are NSCN(IM) led by IsakSwu and Th. Muivah, NSCN(K) led by S.S.Khaplang, a Naga from Myanmar and a new faction formed in June, 2011, NSCN/KK led by Khole-Kitovi. Though various steps have been taken by the Government from time to time to control insurgency, the NSCN factions continue to indulge in factional violence and other violent/ illegal activities affecting normal life in the State.

The Eastern Naga People Organization (ENPO), an apex body of six Naga tribes, has raised the demand for creation of a separate State comprising the four eastern districts of Nagaland (Mon, Tuensang, Kiphire and Longleng) and three districts (Tirap, Changlang and Longding) of Arunachal Pradesh, with a special status within the Indian Union. Bilateral talks with ENPO leaders were held on 10.9.2015 at New Delhi todiscuss their demands.

National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN/Isak Muivah) and NSCN/Khole-Kitovi, the major outfits of Nagaland, are in ceasefire agreement with the Government of India. NSCN/Khaplang has unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Government in March, 2015. The NSCN/K has been declared as unlawful association and terrorist Organization under UAPA, 1967. The Government of India and National Socialist Council of Nagaland(Reformation) [NSCN/R], a breakaway faction of NSCN/Khaplang, have signed Ceasefire agreement for a period of one year w.e.f. 28.04.2015 and mutually agreed Ceasefire Ground Rules.

SoO Agreement signed with NSCN/KK is valid upto 28.04.2016. NSCN/IM has signed Ceasefire Agreement for an indefinite period. A review meeting was held on 02.06.2015 with NSCN/IM leaders under the chairmanship of Secretary (IS) to discuss various issues which could not be resolved at the level of Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CFMG). Shri R.N Ravi, Chairman, JIC, Government of India’s Representative and Official Interlocutor has been holding peace talks with Naga insurgent groups.

Assam

Barring a few incidents of violence in Assam, the security situation has improved since early 2010, with minor variations from year to year. The major militant outfits presently active in the State of Assam are United Liberation Front of Assom – (Independent), (ULFA-I), National Democratic Front of Bodoland - (Saoraigwra), (NDFB-S). ULFA and NDFB have been declared as Unlawful Associations under the provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Besides, Karbi Longri NC Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) and Karbi Peoples Liberation Tigers(KPLT) are also active in Karbi Anglong District of Assam. The Security Forces are able to contain activities of these insurgent groups and situation has improved remarkably in 2015.After the brutal mass killings of Adivasis in Sonitpur, Kokrajhar and Chirang districts of Assam during December, 2014, sustained counter insurgency operations are continuing against NDFB (S) group.

Election to the Bodoland Territorial Council was conducted peacefully on 08.04.2015. No incident of violence was reported in Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) area after 25.12.2014. Hon’ble Union Minister of State for Home Affairs has taken review meetings on 09.01.2015 and 10.02.2015 at Guwahati with Chief Secretary, DGP Assam and other senior officers to review the security situation in the State of Assam

Arunachal Pradesh

In Arunachal Pradesh, barring a few incidents, there is general atmosphere of peace. The State of Arunachal Pradesh does not have any indigenous insurgent group. The State has spillover militant activities of Naga insurgents from Nagaland-based UG factions, as also activities of Assam based United Liberation Front of Assom (ULFA-I), besides National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S). Battle for supremacy between NSCN/IM and NSCN/K continues in Longding, Tirap and Changlang districts, with cases of extortion.

Cadres of NDFB(S) and ULFA (I) frequent the State (for shelter/transit) sharing borders with Assam and Myanmar. These outfits sometimes interfere in the political/economic process of the States, primarily for raising money through extortions. The NSCN factions have also been indulging in forced recruitment to their cadres.

Government is implementing an Action Plan for upgradation of police set up as well as for development of infrastructure projects in Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts. Under this Action Plan, the activities viz. creation of new police stations and construction of new buildings for newly created police stations, recruitment of police personnel and procurement of arms, ammunition and vehicles etc. have been undertaken.

Meghalaya

Militant activities mainly by the Garo outfit, the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) which emerged in the year 2009 in Meghalaya, are centred around the Garo Hill areas comprising 5 districts of the State and also parts of West Khasi Hills District. GNLA is indulging in extortion from shopkeepers, businessmen and Coal merchants. ULFA(I) and NSCN/IM are also active in Garo Hill areas of Meghalaya. The Hynniewrtep National Liberation Council (HNLC), a Khasi Militant group which was set up with encouragement and support from NSCN/IM and had suffered major reverses due to sustained CI operations, has tried to revive its activities in Khasi Hills and Jaintia Hills districts, without any tangible success. The militant outfits of the neighbouring States have encouraged, trained and nurtured the Garo militant groups like the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC) Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA).

The Government of India has decided not to engage in peace talks with GNLA & go all out against the outfit. As a result of massive operations against the outfit, violence by the Group has reduced and 39 cadres have been arrested and 12 cadres killed in 2015.

Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) was signed on 24.09.2014 between the Government of India, the State Government of Meghalaya, the ANVC (Achik National Volunteer Council) and its breakaway groups ANVC/B in New Delhi in presence of the Hon’ble Home Minister and the Chief Minister of Meghalaya. The ANVC has dissolved itself in a ceremony held at Tura (Meghalaya) on 15.12.2014 and 161 UG Cadres and 236 over ground workers of ANVC and 277 cadres of ANVC/B along with huge quantity of arms and ammunition surrendered. 1st review meeting of Monitoring Group for implementation of MoS (Memorandum of Settlement) was held with Achik National Volunteers’ Council (ANVC), ANVC/B and Officers of Govt. of Meghalaya on 06.05.2015 at New Delhi.

Manipur

The State of Manipur continues to account for a large number of incidents of violence in the North Eastern Region. Manipur is an insurgency-ridden State affected by activities of Meitei, Naga, Kuki, Zomi, Hmar and Muslim UG outfits. The Kuki/Zomi/Hmar UG outfits are currently under SoO Agreement with the

Governments of India and Manipur. The violence by Naga UG outfits has been restricted mostly to extortion related incidents.

A total of 25 UG outfits [under two umbrella groups i.e., United People’s Front (UPF- 8) and Kuki National Organization (KNO-17)] are currently under SoO Agreement with the Government of India and the Government of Manipur. Meetings of Joint Monitoring Group was held on 09.06.2015 and 22.07.2015 at New Delhi with the representatives of United People’s Front (UPF) and Kuki National Organization(KNO) respectively.

As decided mutually, Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreement signed with UPF and KNO has been extended for a further period of one year upto 08.06.2016 and 21.07.2016 respectively.On 04.06.2015, underground militants of Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) [NSCN/K] ambushed a convoy of Battalion of Dogra Regiment of Indian Army in Chandel district of Manipur which resulted in killing of 18 army men and injury to 15 other soldiers. National Investigation Agency has been investigating the matter.

Due to intensified security in Manipur, the number of incidents carried out by the insurgents has declined and the militants have been surrendering in small numbers.

Steps taken by Government to deal with the situation

Keeping in view the multiplicity of diverse ethnic groups, and the resultant complex situation in the region, the Central Government is pursuing a policy for talks/negotiation with such groups which categorically abjure violence, lay down arms and seek solutions for their problems peacefully within the framework of

the Constitution of India. As a result, number of outfits have come forward for talks with Government and have entered into Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreement, and some of them have signed Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) and yet others have dissolved themselves. Those who are not in talks are being dealt with by the Central Armed Police Forces and the State Police through Counter-Insurgency Operations.

The Central Government is supplementing efforts of the State Governments for curbing the illegal and unlawful activities like abductions, extortions, killings, recruitment and training of cadres and conducting explosions and attacking infrastructural installations perpetrated by militant/insurgent groups of North Eastern States through various measures. These include deployment of Central Armed Police Forces, reimbursement of security related expenditure to the State Governments under SRE Scheme, central assistance to the State Governments for modernization of State Police Forces, sanction of India Reserve Battalions, banning the Unlawful Associations operating in NE Region under UAPA, declaring specific areas/states as ‘disturbed areas’ for the purpose of AFSPA and issuing notifications for Unified command Structure etc.

The implementation of the agreed Ground Rules of insurgent outfits is periodically reviewed by Joint Monitoring Groups comprising representatives of the Government of India, State Governments, Security Forces and the outfit concerned.

To review the security situation in the North Eastern States, a meeting was held under the Chairmanship of Union Home Minister with Chief Ministers of North Eastern States at Guwahati in Assam on 11.07.2015. In the meeting, security situation in the North Eastern States, strengthening & equipping of State Police, effective guarding of international borders such as, Indo-Myanmar border, Indo-Bangladesh

border and Indo-Bhutan border, preparedness of the State Governments to deal with the natural calamities and other development related issues were discussed.

To curb the illegal and unlawful activities like abduction, extortions, killings, recruitment and training of cadres and conducting explosions and attacking infrastructural installations by militant/insurgent groups of North Eastern States, Ministry of Home Affairs issues notifications for banning these organizations under Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967.

The entire State of Manipur (except Imphal Municipal area), Nagaland and Assam, 16 Police Stations of various districts of Arunachal Pradesh bordering Assam alongwith whole of Tirap, Changland and Longding districts and 20 km belt in the States of Meghalaya having common border with Assam are declared as ‘Disturbed Areas’ under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.

Central Government has deployed Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) to aid the State authorities for carrying out counter insurgency operations and providing security for vulnerable institutions and installations. CAPFs including CoBRA teams are deployed in the North Eastern States for Internal Security and Counter Insurgency (Operations) duties.

Major Schemes administered by NE Division

Factors That Sustained Insurgency:

• Failure of the national leadership in constitutional and cultural integration of the various ethnic groups of isolated northeast with the rest of diverse Indian society.
• Multiplicity of insurgent organisations.
• Top leaders of prominent insurgent groups are seldom interested in negotiated peace as "their children study in the best schools abroad and their family live in luxury".
• Obstacle by Drug Traffickers, who control huge amount of underground economy with their money-spinning strength. Return of normalcy will hamper their unlawful business.
• Higher levels of corruption in State agencies, which are responsible for utilisation of substantial fund allocated by the centre for developmental programmes. Central Government has been bearing about 90% of the state budget but economic and industrial development is negligible.
• Negligible benefit to the common people through developmental programmes alienated them from the centre.
• Connivance between corrupts officials and the insurgents created underground economy under the control of the secessionists.
• Prolonged stay of security forces in the region has annoyed the people.
• Poor generation of employment opportunity for educated youths.
• Constant external support to all the insurgent groups.
• Liberalised trans-border movements with weak neighbours like Burma and Bangladesh wherefrom the insurgents operate conveniently.
• Demographic imbalance due to unabated illegal infiltration from Bangladesh, which has not been tackled by the Central Government effectively.