Introduction

India’s current economic slowdown is due to a combination of two underlying trends.

• First, there is the short-run cyclical slowdown exhibited by a number of high-frequency indicators, reflecting a significant fall in demand, especially for sectors such as automobiles, consumer durables and housing.
• Second, there is the more serious long-term fall in investment and savings rates. Raising growth requires that attention be paid to both cyclical and structural dimensions of the problem.

Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)

• As per RBI, Gross capital formation refers to the ‘aggregate of gross additions to fixed assets (that is fixed capital formation) plus change in stocks during the counting period.’
  • It consists of resident producers’ investments, deducting disposals, in fixed assets during a given period.
  • GFCF is not a measure of total investment, because only the value of net additions to fixed assets is measured, and all kinds of financial assets are excluded, as well as stocks of inventories and other operating costs
• Fixed asset refers to the construction, machinery and equipment.
  • They are tangible or intangible assets produced as outputs from production processes that are used repeatedly, or continuously, for more than one year.
• The most important exclusion from GFCF is land sales and purchases.
• Any rise or increase in GFCF means an increase in investment in fixed assets which gets translated into higher rate of economic growth in long run.

Stats

• When it comes to the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) relative to GDP at current prices, a steady fall has been visible since 2011-12, when it was 34.3%. By 2017-18, it had fallen by 5.7% points, to a level of 28.6%.
• Assuming an Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) of 4, this meant a fall of nearly 1.4% points in the potential growth rate. The fall consisted of sectoral decreases in the household, private corporate and public sectors
• It is noticeable that the fall in the household sector’s investment rate got arrested by 2015-16.
  • However, by then, the rate had already fallen by 6.3% points.
  • From 2016-17, the sector’s investment rate even showed some recovery.
• In contrast to the household sector rate, the private corporate sector investment rate did not show any fall up to 2015-16 when, at 11.9%, it was in fact higher than the corresponding rate for 2011-12 (11.2%).
  • It fell in the subsequent years, but only by 0.7% points.
  • This near-constancy runs counter to what industry leaders have been saying and what other data sources such as CMIE indicate, casting some doubts on the veracity of the figures.
• In the case of the public sector, the rate fell by 0.3% points between 2015-16 and 2017-18.
• Thus, the period from 2011-12 to 2017-18 can be seen as consisting of two parts:
  • 2011-12 to 2015-16, when the household sector investment rate fell sharply;
  • 2015-16 to 2017-18 when the investment rates of the private corporate and public sectors fell marginally.

Fall in household savings rate

• The Gross Domestic Savings Rate also fell between 2011-12 and 2017-18 by 4.1% points, from 34.6% of GDP to 30.5%. However, this fall was entirely due to the household sector, with the private corporate and public sectors showing increases in their savings rates by margins of 2.2% points and 0.2% points, respectively.
• Throughout the period from 2011-12, the savings rate of the private corporate sector increased, reducing its dependence on the surplus savings of the household sector.
• Given this pattern, at present, all the surplus savings of the household sector is available for the public sector. With private corporate sector’s investment demand being largely met by its own savings, public sector’s borrowing requirements can be fully financed using the surplus from the household sector, supplemented by net inflow of foreign capital without any fear of crowding out.

In 2018-19, the real GDP growth rate was 6.8%. Two critical policy challenges need to be addressed.

• First, a countercyclical policy should increase growth rate to its current potential of 7%-7.5% and then
• Second structural reforms should raise the potential growth itself to above 8.5% if India is to attain a size of $5 trillion by 2024-25.

More capital expenditure

• From the monetary side, reducing the repo rate by a cumulated margin of 110 basis points in 2019 has not as yet induced a noticeable growth response.
• Complementary fiscal stimulus, in the form of additional public sector investment, may prove to be more effective.
  • However, given the fiscal deficit constraint, there is limited flexibility for increasing center’s capital expenditure directly.
• There may be some expansion, if additional dividends from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) flow to the government. Further, there may be some possible additional disinvestment. However, care should be taken to deploy all of these additional funds for capital expenditure.

Prescription to meet slowing demand is to increase government expenditure.

• In the current situation, there can be an increase in government expenditure but it has to be directed towards an increase in investment expenditure.
• A similar effort may be made by State governments and non-government public sector enterprises to increase capital expenditures. All these measures may also crowd in private investment.
  • Another area that needs immediate attention is the financial system, which must be activated to lend more.
• Thus, this fiscal push, together with the already-initiated monetary stimulus, may help raise the growth rate.

Conclusion

On the structural reforms that are needed to push the economy onto a sustained high growth path, much can be said.

• We need a re-look at the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM) Act.
  • The government should actually move towards reducing the revenue deficit to zero.
  • This can happen if the Centre focusses more on items on the Union list.
• Once this is achieved, the Central Government can be given full freedom over fiscal deficit, as the entire deficit will be directed towards meeting capital expenditures. This was described as the ‘golden rule’ in U.K.