Non-state actors (NSA) are entities that participate or act in international relations; they are organizations with sufficient power to influence and cause a change even though they do not belong to any established institution of a state

The admission of non-state actors into international relations theory rebukes the assumptions of realism and other black box theories of international relations, which argue that interactions between states are the main relationships of interest in studying international events.

Definition: an NSA is defined as any organized group with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives.

Such factors include ‘rebel groups’ and governments of entities which are not (or not widely) recognized as states

Types

• Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—typically considered a part of civil society.
• Multinational corporations—for-profit organizations that operate in multiple sovereign states.
• Violent non-state actors—Armed groups, including groups such as Al-Qaeda or Criminal organizations, for example drug cartels.
• The International Media
• Cell-based, independent intelligence agents.
• Transnational Diaspora communities—Ethnic or national communities that to influence their original and current territories.
• Religious Groups—Quakers and other religious sects are quite active in their international advocacy efforts. They have in part founded other non-state actors such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and OXFAM.

Characteristics

The use of (political) violence as a defining aspect of their activities

A certain relationship to territory

The provision of some level of material and immaterial (including identity) resources to group members, but also to surrounding communities

Varied levels of marginalization and ‘embeddedness’ in the wider society

Role of Non-State Actors

Most of today’s armed conflicts take place within states and are waged by at least one NSA fighting state forces and/or other NSAs. In these conflicts, frequent violations of humanitarian norms are committed by both state and non-state parties.

NSAs also frequently control or heavily influence areas where civilians live. Consequently, efforts to protect civilian4 populations should address not only the behavior of states, but also that of NSAs.

The study of non-state actors does not fit into conventional paradigms of international relations based on a state-centric worldview. As for armed groups, NSAs have traditionally been considered challengers without formal responsibility, while governments are the upholders of order and security, the providers of public goods. Yet, it is increasingly recognized that NSAs are key actors in contemporary armed conflicts.

Territory

Some NSAs operate openly in international fora and have representations in different countries, while others operate clandestinely.

In fact, many NSAs control or significantly influence activities within a territory and thereby the lives of thousands of individuals. Notable current and former examples of NSAs in a position of territorial control are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Sudan People’s Liberations Movement/Army in South Sudan and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists.

Many NSAs do not necessarily aim at regime change or total power seizure, but rather employ strategies to deny control to the adversary by causing insecurity and instability.NSAs that do not control territory include for instance the Colombian National Liberation Army, the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

Impact

Whether they control territory, supply members and constituencies with services or are embedded within the wider society, NSAs are capable of endangering the lives of communities.

They may do this by hindering humanitarian aid, planting landmines, recruiting and using child soldiers and by trafficking and misusing small arms and light weapons. Such violent acts, paired with an increased presence of international and transnational actors in internal armed conflicts, have made ‘humanitarian engagement’ a topic of vital interest for humanitarian and human rights practitioners.

In fact, the very presence of NSAs on its territory is proof that a state is incapable or unwilling to extend the rule of law all over its territory; hence the need for external assistance.

Approaches To Improve Civilian Protection

Some non-military approaches for making NSAs responsible are:

• Inclusive approaches: dialogue/negotiation and dissemination, training/ capacity building, intermediation (between conflict parties) and direct services.
• Coercive approaches: denunciation/’naming and shaming,’ sanctions, individual criminal prosecution and ‘terrorist listing.

The different inclusive approaches focus on understanding and involving NSAs, and trying to foster a sense of ownership of humanitarian norms within them. They provide NSAs with a possibility to develop and take on different commitments, as well as sensitize, train and monitor them.

The principal aim of these approaches is to provide better protection to civilians, through encouraging NSAs to take on responsibilities towards them. Secondary aims are confidence-building between conflict parties (through humanitarian negotiations or agreements) and a contribution toward the concerned state’s implementation of its international obligations.

Coercive approaches can be used in combination with inclusive approaches, but generally they are employed by actors other than human rights or humanitarian activists.

The different approaches can either reinforce or work against each other, mainly depending on the reaction of the NSAs to the coercive approaches. In general, coercive mechanisms have not proven to be sufficient to enforce rules on NSAs.

Challenges

Inclusive approaches face important challenges. First, concerned states are sometimes unwilling to facilitate such work by international and national NGOs and agencies. Indeed, states can be reluctant to acknowledge the existence of an internal armed conflict on their territories, wanting to avoid international scrutiny into what they consider internal affairs, and fearing the granting of a perceived legitimacy to opposition NSAs.

Second, the existence of a number of different ‘terrorist lists’ complicates the work of humanitarian actors by placing logistical and political limits to meetings and other humanitarian activities (notably training).

Finally, the objectives and strategies of some NSAs may present important hinders in the process. For instance, NSAs may refuse to respect the applicability of humanitarian norms to them either because they are not familiar with them or do not feel bound by them or, simply, they consider that the ‘ends justify the means.’