Sea power is not a synonym for naval might, nor can it be strictly associated with military prowess only. The enlarged understanding of sea power is the capability of a state to accelerate its technical and industrial progress backed by research and development in the field of seabed resources, fishing and merchant seafaring with a navy to safeguard these interests.

India is a major maritime nation by virtue of its long coast line of around 7517 Kms on the western and eastern shelves of the mainland and also along the islands, bejewelled with 13 major and 176 non-major ports, strategically located on the world’s shipping routes, its long tradition of seafaring with a large pool of trained maritime personnel, and its dynamic and rapidly globalizing economy with a vast potential to expand its participation in trade and development.

 With 11 maritime states and island territories India’s geophysical configuration and geo-political circumstances makes it as dependent on the seas as any island nation. The country's maritime interests encompass maintenance of the territorial integrity of India against seaward challenges and threats as well as protection of our maritime trade. Our coastline today faces significant security challenges from malevolent 'non-state', as well as 'state-sponsored' elements.

In case of Maritime Security India has adopted an inclusive approach comprising a collection of all the issues that pertain to the seas, and have a bearing on national security. These include seaborne trade and infrastructure for its pursuit, management of sea resources, protection of territorial waters and sea lanes, environmental issues and employment of naval forces.

Why Marine Security Is Important For India?

For national prosperity peacetime trade, ensuring access to sources of economic well-being is critical. To achieve these objectives, foreign trade, commerce and natural resources are of paramount importance and sea power has potential to provide a means to this end.

In last two decades India’s economy has been stimulated by the powerful phenomenon of globalization; leading to not just large foreign direct investment in India, but also heavy Indian investment abroad. Thus, along with an Indian diaspora of over 20 million, we also have growing economic interests world-wide. India’s economy as well as progress and prosperity depend on international trade, which is carried overwhelmingly by sea; as is energy, the lifeblood of our industry.

Considering that 90% of our merchandize trade is carried by sea, the civil maritime sector, defined by the Ministry of Surface Transport as encompassing port operations, the merchant fleet, the shipbuilding industry and trained human resources, is a vital component of maritime security.

The geo-strategic position of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has risen in economic and political significance in the last two decades that have witnessed a tectonic shift in international power play from the Atlantic Ocean to the Asia-Pacific—more specifically to the IOR. There is a growing maritime awareness in the IOR as most developmental indices of the littorals are closely linked to the Ocean. The development of maritime capacity, thus, has become an imperative for national progress.

These factors, coupled with the prospects of harvesting oceanic resources and India’s growing international profile, have underlined the need for increased importance of maritime security.

Over the past decade and a half, the trauma of rampant piracy, the 26/11 exposure of India’s soft coastal-underbelly, its ‘Look East’ initiative, and the looming menace of China’s Navy have stimulated a sharper focus on maritime security.

Reasons escalating Maritime Challenges

India’s main strategic challenge comes from its prosperous northern neighbour; China. The all weather Sino-Pakistan alliance, with its strong anti-Indian slant, further complicates our security problems.

The rapid growth of both economies has led to increasing reliance on energy and raw materials, and transported by sea. This has focused sharp attention on the criticality, for both economies, of uninterrupted use of the sea- lanes for trade and energy transportation. Thus, while the PLA Navy makes forays into the Indian Ocean, the IN has newfound commitments in the South China Sea.

The seas around us are rife with hazards and uncertainties; whether it is rampant piracy, maritime terrorism, and proliferation or inter-state tensions. Natural disasters and the impact of climate change, too, present a severe threat to coastal nations and low-lying islands in our region.

China’s pursuit of a, so called, ‘string of pearls’ strategy tends to draw considerable attention in strategic circles due to its high-profile economic connotations. While India may not be able to match China’s financial munificence, the navy’s ‘foreign cooperation’ initiatives have ensured creation of a favourable maritime environment in the region. Apart from activities such as exercises, joint-patrolling, port calls and flag-showing deployments, the navy’s out-reach also includes provision of maritime security on request by neighbours. Agreements exist with almost all IOR countries that permit IN ships, submarines and aircraft to avail of refueling and turn-around facilities at very short notice.

The absence of a nodal agency on maritime policies has resulted in 'sea blindness'—a phenomenon that explains the lack of appreciation of ocean related problems, compensating instead with “continental solutions”.

At present there are as many as sixteen ministries, agencies and departments within the Government of India that oversee policies related to the seas. For example, while fisheries is under the care of the Ministry of Agriculture, offshore hydrocarbons is under the purview of the Ministry of Petroleum.

Moreover, these sixteen organisations do not include the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard which report directly to the Ministry of Defence. Consequently, India has failed to coherently exploit the potential wealth of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 2.02 million square kilometers.

India’s Present Level of naval preparedness

The Indian Navy’s present force level comprises about 150 ships and submarines. The Indian Navy’s perspective-planning in terms of ‘force-levels’ is now driven by a conceptual shift from ‘numbers’ of platforms - that is, from the old ‘bean-counting’ philosophy—to one that concentrates upon ‘capabilities’. In terms of force accretions in the immediate future, we are acquiring ships in accordance with the Navy’s current Maritime Capability Perspective Plan.

There are presently more than 50 ships and submarines under construction. The GRSE has already delivered all three of the large amphibious ships and ten water-jet Fast Attack Craft. The yard is presently constructing advanced Anti-submarine Corvettes and has been recently awarded a contract to build LCUs.

In the South, Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) is progressing the construction of our most ambitious ship yet – the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier.

At Mumbai, premier warship-building yard Mazagon Docks Ltd, is engaged in the construction of Kolkata Class and P-15B destroyers besides stealth frigate of the Shivalik Class. Submarines of the Scorpene Class are also under construction at MDL.

Goa Shipyard Limited, which has built a number of Offshore Patrol Vessels for the Navy and the Coast Guard, has advanced versions of this type under construction. 

Indian Navy's Submarine Arm

The submarine arm of the Indian Navy has made notable accomplishments since its inception. This is possibly due to the professionalism of the human resource that lies at its core.

 India acquired its first submarine, the INS Kalvari, on December 8, 1967. In the intervening decades, the Navy has progressed to designing and indigenously building SSBNs (Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear), the INS Arihant. T

he Navy has also invested in building conventional boats in India through partnership programmes with foreign suppliers.

Notably, India is the first country in the world to move straight to SSBNs, without moving up the scale from conventional boats. The combination of warship building, submarine building and finally the nuclear submarine building has supported a whole range of SME/MSME segments of industry in India.

Further the plans for acquisition in place and operationalising them would give India a very credible underwater capability.

Shortfalls of submarine arm

DSRV - Submarine arm is one of the most hazardous and high-risk military specialisation.

To prepare for any exigency, every submarine-operating navy also invests in a deep submergence rescue vessel (DSRV).

Or it supposedly has access to DRSV with navies that have such a capability. Sadly, the Indian Navy does not have a dedicated DSRV even as it enters its 51st year. This void is expected to be filled only later in 2018. Administrative - The long-delayed DSRV acquisition symbolises the systemic incompetence of the Indian military machine.

The inability of the Indian higher defence management ecosystem has deprived the Navy‘s submarine arm of a critical rescue capability.

The complacency in decision-making and ineffectiveness in policy formulation have adversely affected the Indian military profile. Corruption - It was attempted to build two of the most advanced design of the German HDW submarines under the =buy and make‘ concept.

However, it had to be prematurely abandoned due to the infamous HDW scandal and allegations of financial impropriety in the deal. Resultantly, the indigenous submarine programme was set back by three decades. It has taken decades for the procurement procedures to be revised to address issues related to blacklisting and the role of agents.

Manpower constraints - Constraints related to recruitment significantly impacts the modernisation and acquisition process. Decommissioning old platforms to compensate for the immediate requirement of new induction has its own challenges. A new platform demands trained manpower, logistics and repair support facilities.

Way Forward

The navy has to strategically overcome the challenge of balancing the short and long term implications on manpower. The core national security interests should be insulated from the vagaries of political/electoral compulsions. Beyond the ceremonial symbolism, the Indian Navy should be given due focus for its substantive policy-related issues.

Engaging the Private Sector

Over the years, the Indian Navy has taken a conscious decision to encourage other shipyards, including private yards, to enter the specialised field of warship-construction. The response has been encouraging.  Contracts have been concluded with M/s Pipavav Shipyard Ltd and ABG Shipyard for construction of a few NOPVs and a couple of Cadet Training Ships, respectively.

Bridging the Gap

The indigenous warships construction has come a long way since the commissioning of INS Nilgiri on 03 Jun 72. There are not many countries in the world having capability to produce such a wide variety of warships ranging from Fast Attack Craft to Aircraft Carrier. However, few ships are being inducted from abroad also to bridge the gap in the capabilities envisaged in the Master Plan of Navy. These include the carrier Vikramaditya, and follow-on ships of the Talwar Class from Russia.

Mid-Life Upgrades

In addition, Mid-Life Upgrades (MLUs) of ships are also being progressed.  After their MLU, ships of the Rajput Class as also those of the Brahmaputra Class will emerge as potent 21st Century combatants with significant residual life.

Steps

After 26/11 steps been taken to strengthen the intelligence system and surveillance

Consequent to the unfortunate events of 26/11, the coastal security has been reviewed at appropriate levels and the Cabinet Committee on Security in their meeting held in Feb 09 has approved certain proposals. The Indian Navy has been designated as the authority responsible for overall maritime security, which includes coastal security and offshore security. The Indian Navy, in this regard, will be assisted by Coast Guard, State Marine Police and other Central and State agencies for the coastal defence of the nation. The other initiatives to strengthen the coastal security are as follows:-

(a) Setting up of Joint Operation Centres (JOCs) at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair under the charge of the existing Naval C-in-Cs. In case of Port Blair, the JOC is under the charge of CINCAN. The JOCs are jointly manned and operated by the Navy and Coast Guard with inputs from diverse agencies such as Navy, Coast Guard and other Central and State Government agencies dealing with maritime aspects.

(c) Formation of the Sagar Prahari Bal of the Navy comprising 80 Fast Interceptor Craft and 1000 personnel.

(d) Regular conduct of Coastal Security exercises in all States in conjunction with the Coast Guard, State and Central Government agencies.

(e) Enhancement of surface and air surveillance by Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships and aircraft along the coast and in all offshore development areas.

(f) Conduct of awareness drives by the Navy and the Coast Guard to sensitize the fishing and coastal community and coastal/port authorities on issues related to security against threats from the sea.

(g) Setting Up of Coastal Radar Chain and Coastal AIS chain in a time bound manner.

(h) Progress on registering of all vessels and issue of identity cards to all fishermen/coastal population is well underway and is being closely monitored by the MHA.

(j) National Command Control Communications and Intelligence (NC3I) Network is being set up as part of the maritime security measures post 26/11. As an interim measure, hotline connectivity between the IN, ICG and other government authorities involved in coastal security on the Western and Eastern Seaboard have been provisioned.

How is India securing its trade route from pirates? What kind of protection is provided to the ships moving off Indian coast?

A large percentage of India’s trade, including oil and fertilisers, passes through the Gulf of Aden. The Ministry of Shipping has estimated that, Indian imports through the Gulf of Aden route were valued in the order of USD 50 Billion and exports at USD 60 Billion. The safety and unhindered continuity of maritime trade, through ships that use this route, is a primary national concern as it directly impacts our economy.  Although this task accounts for only 13% of our trade (the remainder is carried in foreign ‘bottoms’), the crew of most foreign flagged vessels comprise Indian nationals, as India’s large seafaring community (approximately 100,000 in number) accounts for 6-7% of the world’s seafarers

Piracy in Gulf of Aden, Somalian Coast, Omani Coast and seas between the African coastline and Maldives is a global menace, being fought not only by IN, but also by numerous Navies of the World. India on its part is actively engaged in anti piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Eastern Arabian Sea. The Indian Navy commenced anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden from October 2008 and since then a ship has been deployed continuously. Besides escorting Indian flagged vessels, ships of other countries have also been provided protection. No ship under Indian escort has thus far been hijacked by pirates.

MILAN Initiative

The MILAN initiative is a naval interaction held biennially at Port Blair wherein some navies represented by one/two ships each, as also delegations, interact with each other to discuss issues related to maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief etc. MILAN has been conducted so far in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010 & 2012.

17 Nations, including India, had come together in MILAN 2014 making it the biggest edition since its inception in 1995. Six days of engagement included an International Seminar on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) with participating Nations sharing lessons from their recent first hand experiences in handling disasters such as cyclones, earthquakes and Tsunamis

The objectives of exercises with foreign navies are:-

(i)    To gain operational and doctrinal expertise.

(ii)   Share transformational experiences

(iii) Examine and imbibe 'best-practices'.

(iv)         Achieve a high level of inter-operability.

(v) Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness through a variety of information-sharing mechanisms.

Challenges facing Indian Navy

The navy’s biggest challenge is going to be the timely replacement of ageing platforms and obsolescent equipment. The envisaged order of battle of about 150-170 ships and submarines, and possibly 250-300 aircraft assumes certain delivery rates from shipyards and aircraft factories; which they seem incapable of meeting.

Our other major source, of hardware, the Russians, have brazenly reneged on costs as well as delivery schedules, in violation of solemn agreements. One of the more serious challenges before the navy’s leadership will be to persuade the Russians as well as Indian DPSUs to deliver on time and within cost.

The failure to acquire even a reasonable level of self-reliance in major weapon systems in the past 66 years has made India the biggest importer of arms world-wide; and this must count as a failure of the DRDO and DPSUs. Crafting a viable and time-bound strategy which will persuade the DRDO to develop, reverse-engineer or import the technology for weapons and sensors for our indigenously built warships will constitute another major challenge for the IN.

How Is Indian Navy (IN) Responding To Challenges

Some aspects of the Navy’s force-accretion plans, which will endow the nation with a number of powerful maritime capabilities are:

• Intense maritime activity in the Indian Ocean and the huge area that has to be kept under surveillance requires substantial reconnaissance and anti-submarine capabilities. The advent of the Chinese PLA Navy, especially its nuclear submarines, into the Indian Ocean has accelerated the challenges. The IN has evolved a multi layered surveillance capability with deployment of task-optimized aircraft, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles for each layer. The recently launched GSAT-7 communication satellite, meant exclusively for IN use, which will facilitate the networking of sensor and weapon data across its vast footprint.
• The arrival INS Vikramaditya, with its complement of MiG-29K fighters and Kamov-28/31 helicopters, has boosted the navy’s capability to exercise sea-control and to project power over the shore. Current plans envisage a second (and perhaps third) indigenously-built carrier joining the fleet in the 10-15 years. Given the wealth of carrier operating experience available in the IN, these ships are capable of tilting the balance of power in our region.
• The SSBN Arihant will ensure that India has an invulnerable 2nd strike capability; thus enhancing the effectiveness and credibility of its nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis adversaries; China and Pakistan. As the Service responsible for safe and efficient conduct of SSBN operations, the IN will also be custodian of their nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, thus enhancing its status and importance in the national security totem-pole.
• The induction of the nuclear-powered attack-submarine (SSN) INS Chakra has placed a powerful weapon of offence and sea-denial in the hands of the IN. Unlike warships which remain vulnerable to detection and attack from all three dimensions, a SSN on patrol vanishes from sight; to reappear as the deadly nemesis of ships and submarines. Apart from the anti-shipping role it can also undertake, with virtual impunity, tasks as varied as surveillance, special-operations, intelligence-gathering and land-attack.
• Variant of Light Combat Aircraft is being tested by HAL for induction in Indian Navy.
• The DG Shipping has set up Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of all ships at sea in the Indian LRIT Region and has provided feeds to the Navy and Coast Guard. All these are being linked to the National Command Centre. The systems deployed are very advanced, and call for highly skilled manpower with adequate training, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
• The Indian Navy is setting up a new green field submarine base on the East coast under Project Varsha near Vishakapatnam, where the nuclear submarines of INS Arihant class are being built at the Ship Building Centre (SBC) by DRDO and L&T. Vishakhapatnam is also the home base of the nuclear-propelled INS Chakra, leased from Russia.
• The Navy had ordered six Australian design Catamaran survey ships at around Rs 100 crore each at Alcock & Ashdown Yard in Gujarat and acquired Huggins-1000 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), sometimes known as underwater drones, from Kongsberg.
• Three Krivacks, INS Teg, Tarash and Trikand with BrahMos missiles from Yantar shipyard and 44,500-tonne aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya from SEVMASH in Severonodnisk and 22 MiG-29Ks have arrived from Russia.

The Civil Maritime Domain andChallenges

Three major aspects of the civil maritime sector are ports, the shipping industry, shipbuilding and sea bed exploration.

Indian Ports

India has 13 major (12 in Public Sector and one in private sector) ports and 176 non-major ones. The major ports carry about 3/4th of the total traffic. The government has allowed FDI of up to 100 per cent under the automatic route for projects related to the construction and maintenance of ports and harbours.

The government has allowed FDI of up to 100 per cent under the automatic route for projects related to the construction and maintenance of ports and harbours.

Major problems facing Indian ports are:

• Currently, ports and harbours in India are governed by a number of laws resulting in a lack of standardization and management.
• Indian ports have problem of high turnaround time of 4 days which in international arena is less than 10 hours.
• use of outdated and obsolete equipment and rigid management, customs and labour practices
• The top management of these ports comprises officers of the Indian Administrative Service, who do not have
• Specialised knowledge of this sector.

Shipping Industry

India’s merchant fleet, 15th largest in the world, has been almost static, for some years, at 1000 ships totaling 10 million tons. This fleet can carry just around 10% of our foreign trade. A nation’s merchant fleet is yet another strategic asset, and now crude-oil and natural-gas carriers and container ships are almost as important as warships in the security matrix. During war, a key objective of the belligerents will be to deprive the opponent’s industry of vital raw materials and fuel, and to starve his civilian population by attacking merchant shipping. Ideally, therefore, the country should own and control as much of its shipping as possible so that it can ensure adequate reserves.

Dependence on foreign shipping means not just a loss of earnings but also represents a strategic vulnerability.

Shipbuilding

Apart from constituting the foundation and support of a nation’s naval power, the shipbuilding industry generates huge secondary and tertiary benefits in terms of ancillary industries, skilled manpower and employment creation, which can transform the economy.

Indian shipyards contribute just 1% of the global market share. The target of achieving 5% share of global shipbuilding in next seven years set by the Maritime Agenda-2020

Of India’s 28 shipyards (China has over 800) eight are owned by the MoD.

The public sector work-culture has kept the efficiency and productivity of these shipyards at dismal levels. Most warship building projects have been afflicted by huge time delays and embarrassing cost overruns. This has not only had an adverse impact on the navy’s force-levels but also eroded its credibility with the Ministry of Finance.

Seabed Exploration

The seabed promises to yield vast resources of mineral wealth, embedded in poly-metallic nodules, which lie on the ocean floor. Main departments dealing with it are Department of Ocean Development and Ministry of Earth Sciences. Compared to China we are far behind in technology, and exploitation of such resources.

Other Recent Indian Achievements

“Maritime Agenda 2010-2020” (MA-20), envisages an ambitious vision to create, build and sustain a maritime infrastructure for the nation by 2020. It has a financial outlay of Rs. 5 lakh crores for the development of ports, cargo handling, shipping, shipbuilding, etc.

Over the next decade, the Indian Navy (IN) navy expects delivery of; seven stealth frigates, six diesel submarines, and 30 other warships, apart from over 150 fighters, maritime-patrol aircraft and helicopters.

The Indian government has initiated a number of coastal security measures has set up radar and monitoring facilities that cover the entire coastline of India. Marine police forces have been raised by state governments to address coastal security concerns. The establishment of multi-agency centres to coordinate with all stake holders in addressing safety and security concerns has been a step in the right direction. Apart from these steps, investments have been made in automated vessel traffic management systems, vessel identification systems and other monitoring and communication systems.

What Needs To Be Done?

A strong shipbuilding (both warship and commercial ships) and shipping infrastructure is imperative for enhancing the maritime capacity of any country. In the Indian context, however, the monopoly of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) has stalled progress—largely because of inefficient management practices, resulting in cost and time overruns that eventually nullify national implementation plans.

The government should revisit its existing policies in this sector and focus on domestic capacity building. Ninety per cent of India's international trade is being carried out by foreign vessels.

The nation should focus on indigenously developing critical technologies for the Navy. Future conflicts would be a mix of conventional, irregular and asymmetric engagements spread over land, sea, air, space and cyberspace that would demand tactical and technological superiority. Therefore, the focus would have to be in areas of network centric warfare, action information organization, combat management systems, and command and control.

There is also a need to revisit the country’s tariff and tax policies to provide a level playing field to Indian shipping entities. This is important as foreign shipping companies do not have to bear an unfavorable tariff regime unlike their Indian counterparts.

It is also necessary to have a dedicated organisation for education and training of personnel engaged in this domain. This would serve to address human resource problems currently affecting this sector. The institution could help imbibe the latest technological regimes, professional management and administration methodologies in this sector

The term 'maritime infrastructure' not only covers coastal infrastructure like ports and yards but also includes roads and railheads, warehouses, financial institutions, legal assistance and allied services that facilitate maritime activity. An incremental enhancement of these support facilities is equally important for the main infrastructure to function optimally.

The need for cooperation between international actors

Cross-border cooperation, information sharing and joint maneuvers create trust between countries and new protocols are making it harder for criminals seek shelter in a neighbouring jurisdiction, making interdiction hugely more effective. As we build security communities we also need to ensure that they include all the relevant stakeholders and all those who can contribute to a positive outcome.

We also need to find bridges between the private sector, the humanitarian sector and the security forces when tackling problems of maritime security and in the aftermath of natural disasters.