Recent Strain INDO- USA relations

What is the issue?

•  In 2017, India and U.S. commissioned the ?Finance and Defence Ministers 2+2 format for enhancing bilateral engagement.
•  But a scheduled meet was called off recently and the format remains a non-starter, partly due to the straining of Indo-U.S. ties.

What are the stress points currently in the Indo-U.S. ties?

•  U.S. administration recently enhanced sanctions against Russia and Iran in addition to pulling out from the Iranian Nuclear Deal.
•  Further, Trump‘s toughening stand against countries and entities conducting business with ?Iran and Russia? directly affects India.
•  India has, in turn, tightened its engagement with Russia, China and Iran, with PM Modi advocating a course of ?strategic autonomy?.
•  Indo-U.S. tensions have also been playing out amply in the context of bilateral trade, and even verbal exchanges are being exchanged.
•  While their strategic relationship was recently upgraded to ?major defence partnership?, there hasn‘t been much progress here too.
•  The 3 critical ?foundational agreements?, which are ideal for enhancing defence ties and procurements haven‘t moved ahead.
• What are the perceptible changes in the U.S.-Pak equations?
• ? Recent months have seen a sharp betterment in Af-Pak relationship alongside an improvement in the U.S.-Pak ties.
•  Multiple diplomatic visits by government officials of ?U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan? had been organised in successions.
•  Additionally, the politically influential Pakistani military and the Afgani-Taliban have also been kept in the loop throughout.
•  Concurrently, there has been a softening of U.S. line on Pakistan ‘s overall terror record, all of which seems to be clearly coordinated.
•  The U.S. has asked Pakistan to act against all terror groups on its soil, but it seems focused just on groups targeting Afghanistan.
•  More importantly, terror groups and operatives targeting India are being provided a free run and are even fighting elections in Pakistan.

Relook at India-US Nuclear Deal

It's been nearly a decade since the memoranda of understanding on India-US civil nuclear deal was inked. It calls for a reassessment of the deal in the context of the newly emerged global realities over the years.

Background of the deal

• The U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement or Indo-US nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement was signed between US and India in 2005.
•  Under the agreement, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear activities.
•  It also agreed to open up the civilian part to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
•  In return, the US offered to resume full nuclear trade i.e selling of reactors, Transfer of Technology, Uranium sale with India.

 The deal went through several complex stages including:

i. amendment of U.S. domestic law (Atomic Energy Act of 1954)

ii. civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India

iii. India-IAEA safeguards agreement

 Around 3 years ago, during the then U.S. President Obama's visit, India-U.S. civil nuclear deal was announced.

•  This finalised the agreement between India and the U.S. on supplier liability and tracking requirements.
•  It enabled American companies to build nuclear power reactors in India.
•  In 2016, during Indian PM's visit to US, 6 nuclear reactors were decided to be built in India by the American firm Westinghouse.
•  Despite bilateral agreements, there is no sign yet of any contract between an American company and the Indian authorities.

What are the challenges?

 The U.S. sending the Westinghouse officials to India will reopen negotiations on the deal.

 Before deciding on a go ahead with the commercial contract, the Indian government should consider the following:

Liability - Westinghouse went into major cost overruns leading to a financial crisis.

•  It had to halt two of its reactors projects in the U.S, by when the construction was already 5 years over schedule.
•  Amidst this, the Westinghouse‘s new buyers have already diluted the arrangement in India.
•  They will not construct the nuclear power project in India, and will only supply reactors and components.
•  Even if the India-U.S. techno-commercial contract gets finalised in 2019, it would take nearly another 10 years to construct a reactor.
•  Given this, in case of a Fukushima-type nuclear accident in India, the liability that U.S. companies would carry is highly uncertain.

Trump effect - Trump‘s US presidency has taken a sharp turn away from renewable energy.

•  There are increased calls for mining, exporting and encouraging oil, gas, coal and shale trade into its foreign outreach.
•  Notably, India recently, made orders for both oil and gas shipped from America.
•  India may stand to loose Obama era support in financing renewable energy projects and facilitating India-U.S. nuclear deals.
•  Also, the US has pulled out of the Paris climate change accord, coming as a shock for India.
•  Notably, Obama administration had promised to help India reduce its dependence on fossil fuels on India's entry into Paris accord.

India's requirements - India‘s own requirements from the India-U.S. civil nuclear deal have changed considerably.

• The Cabinet recently approved the 7,000 MW construction plan for 10 Indian-made pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs).
•  With existing constructions and the current capacity of 6,780 MW, India hopes to have 14,600 MW of nuclear power by 2024.
•  Besides the nuclear power plants, the Department of Atomic Energy is advocating PHWRs in more inland sites.
•  This includes sites in Rajasthan, Haryana, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh.
•  It comes in the backdrop of concerns on too many nuclear projects in the southern coastline lying along tsunami and earthquake faultlines.
•  India has also found much more comfort in its existing agreement with Russia‘s Atomstroyexport.
•  This began with the Intergovernmental Agreement for Kudankulam 1 and 2 in 1988.
•  It has kept a slow but steady pace in delivering reactors and operationalising power projects.
• Cost - Another issue relates to the cost that India is prepared to pay for nuclear energy through foreign collaborations.
•  Indo-French negotiations for six 1,650 MW European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs) in Maharashtra‘s Jaitapur is delaying.
•  This is notably over the differences between Department of Atomic Energy and the French company Areva (now handed over to EDF Energy company, UK).
•  It pertains to arriving at the cost per unit.
• Besides - India must consider the shifts in the world nuclear industry before getting into negotiations with new companies.
•  Many nuclear companies globally are facing with major losses over their nuclear businesses.
•  As the pressure to lower nuclear power tariffs increases, nuclear safety requirements have become more stringent.
•  More countries now see nuclear power as a ?base-load? option.
•  It is only preferred as a back-up option for unstable, but infinitely less costly and eco-friendly, solar and hydroelectric power options.
•  All these signal that nuclear power is losing its primacy in the energy mix, which India must be aware of.

The USA- PAK equation

• Recent months have seen a sharp betterment in Af-Pak relationship alongside an improvement in the U.S.-Pak ties.
• Multiple diplomatic visits by government officials of ?U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan? had been organised in successions.
• Additionally, the politically influential Pakistani military and the Afgani-Taliban have also been kept in the loop throughout.
•  Concurrently, there has been a softening of U.S. line on Pakistan‘s overall terror record, all of which seems to be clearly coordinated.
•  The U.S. has asked Pakistan to act against all terror groups on its soil, but it seems focused just on groups targeting Afghanistan.
•  More importantly, terror groups and operatives targeting India are being provided a free run and are even fighting elections in Pakistan.

Indian stand

CTBT

The Prime Minister stated that India was prepared to bring the discussions on CTBT to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT was not delayed. India had announced a moratorium on conducting more nuclear tests, and agreed to join the CTBT before the Indian elections were announced; and the Kargil conflict and military coup in Pakistan intervened. The current Indian position is that a national consensus must be reached before it can enter the CTBT; this is a useful ploy to buy time. Besides the defeat of the CTBT ratification bill in the US Senate ensures that it can only be taken up by the next administration in 2001

FMCT

India had expressed its willingness to join the FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva to arrive at a non-discriminatory treaty, that would end the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes and to work for the early conclusion of such a treaty. India has made clear that it would not halt fissile material production for military purposes ahead of the FMCT. That treaty is yet to be drafted; even its broad contours are presently unclear. India has withdrawn its objections to the FMCT being negotiated, but has taken no initiative in the matter, despite having cosponsored the treaty in 1993.

Defence Posture

India’s talks with the US were based on the fundamental premise that India would define its own requirements, for its nuclear deterrent, on its own assessment of the security environment. The US and other interlocutors, were interested in understanding India’s position and policies better. Meeting the benchmark on non-deployment of nuclear weapons and missile systems is the most problematical. It questions the logic of the nuclear tests, the BJP’s ideology of military power premised on nuclear weapons, and the influence within the government of the defence nuclear-scientific lobby. The enunciation of the nuclear doctrine, currently in draft form, commits the government to pursuing the deployment of nuclear weapons and missile systems for equipping itself with a “credible minimum deterrent”; its structure is no different from that of the other nuclear weapon powers. The present government cannot halt that process; to cap that process, however, is an article of faith for the United States. There is nothing to suggest, at present, that either government is prepared to compromise on this basic issue.

US attitude

• US now realizes that for India, the issue of determine is complicated by the China factor. Indian officials point to security concerns not just with Pakistan but with their giant neighbor to the north as well. But US advocates that the best way for India and China to stabilize and normalize their relationship, it seems to us, is for New Delhi and Beijing to resume an intensive bilateral effort to enhance transparency and confidence and to overcome, or at least narrow, existing differences.
• It is understandable how, from an Indian or Pakistani vantage point, the monopoly of the non-proliferation treaty’s recognition of only five nuclear-weapons states might look discriminatory. But it is our hope that, over time, Indians and Pakistanis would not try to redress what they might see as an historical injustice by embracing the Bomb just as the rest of the world is trying to wean itself off the view that the Bomb bestows either safety or stature on those who possess it.

Reasons fortheImprovementin Relations

Indo-US relations are at present better than before.

• There is appreciation in India for the rational and practical response of the US to the Kargil crisis and the role it played in defusing tensions. The US support for India on the Kargil issue should not be interpreted as the beginning of a creative and positive period in Indo-US relations.
• The Jaswant-Talbott talks have resulted in a better understanding of each other’s security concerns. The deep-rooted prejudices from the V.K. Krishna Menon era seem to be receding.
• The US seems to have come to realise that with all its weaknesses India has a stable democratic system which has taken deep roots. The US has urged India to join the concert of democracies and make a contribution towards deepening the rule of law worldwide.
• American policy-makers have also found India economy in the post-liberalisation period to their liking. American business organisation has started looking at India as a growing market and investment destination.
• Recent bitterness with China and Pakistan also played an important role in softening US’s stand against India.
• Recent US decision to ease the sanctions to a larger extent Anti-India Goodling Amendment Defeated. The Goodling Amendment (after the Republican, William Goodling) seeking to deny military assistance to India for its failure to support the USA in the UN General Assembly was rejected by the US House of Representatives by a margin of 256-169.Anti-India Burton Amendment Withdrawn. Mr. Dan Burton, the Republican Congressman from Indiana, United States, was forced to withdraw his anti-India amendment to the Foreign Operations Authorizations for the year 2000, when he failed to find the support for it in Washington in early August.
• Recently both the US and India have taken economic measures against Taliban, and the two are calling upon the United Nations Security Council to impose an expanded regime of sanctions against Kabul. The Washington talks are part of India’s wider diplomatic engagement of Afghanistan that India has initiated with the international community, including Russia and the Central Asian republics, Western Europe, Iran and the Gulf countries. All these nations are alarmed by the new threats emanating from Afghanistan.

New Contours ofIndo-US Relationship

• The United States is already beginning to envisage a new post-nuclear relationship with India, with the assumption that its non-proliferation concerns with India would be resolved satisfactorily. The Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks are seen as unique by the Americans-not only because they are unparalleled in Indo-US relations but also because for the first time the two sides have come to appreciate the complexity of each other’s concerns in a collegial atmosphere.
• There is a view in the Clinton Administration that a significant potential exists for the expansion of security relations with India. After the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks conclude, it is being suggested that the US maintain a strategic dialogue with India in an attempt to identify areas of common interest globally and regionally.
• The China factor in India’s security concerns is being increasingly recognised by the US. While not advocating anything like an anti-China alliance, it is being suggested that both India and the US share their different perceptions of China with each other. This is both a recognition of the potential of India to emerge as a serious player both globally and regionally and of the importance of this development to American interests.
• The US believes that it suits its interests that there be counter-veiling powers in Asia-like  India, China or Japan-that prevent the domination of the region by any one power. Since the game of balance of power requires a constant calibration of relationships, the US wants good relations with all these powers.
• Globally, India and the US share interests in cooperating in peace-keeping operations, counter-terrorism and maintaining the freedom of the seas. In the area of maintaining the sea lines of communication, it is being suggested that cooperation be explored between the Indian and the US navy. However, were India to define its interests as excluding an American naval presence in the Indian Ocean that would be a nonstarter.

Areas ofConvergence - Peace inSouth andEast Asia

The U.S.–Indian convergence of interest is indispensible to regional peace, security, and prosperity especially in regional context of Southwest Asia and East Asia. These include the:

• Management of the regional consequences of growing Iranian power, especially in the Persian Gulf, where India has huge stakes;
• Dampening of religious and sectarian extremism that is gathering traction;
• Stabilization of Afghanistan;
• Promotion of economic modernization and political moderation in Pakistan;
• Encouragement of responsible Chinese behavior and peaceful management of its territorial disputes;
• Prevention of the neutralization of the Chinese periphery;
• Avoidance of the breakdown of the nuclear order in East Asia; and
• Security of the maritime commons of the Indo–Pacific.

All these challenges demand innovative thinking, more intensive bilateral political consultation, and stronger policy coordination.

Bilateral Trade Ties betweenIndia andUSA Since 1991

• With the opening up of the Indian economy to the outside players India embarked on the path of liberalization and globalization in 1991 bringing it closer to the US economic model and proved a great boost to the bilateral trade allowing greater foreign participation in the retail, aviation and broadcast services helped India attracting increasing foreign investments.
• Transparent U.S. licensing arrangements for Indian imports of sensitive items and technology have led to an enhancement in the high-tech trade between the two countries.
• India-US economic ties are characterized by growing and balanced trade in goods and services as well as a rising flow of investments in both directions. The FDI and Portfolio investment from the US is among one of the largest from any country and these are also increasing every year.
• In 2000 establishment of India-US Economic Dialogue during President Clinton’s visit revitalized the trade ties. CEO Forum has also been launched for utilizing the energy and enthusiasm of private sector between two countries.
• Open Skies Agreement between the two nations in the year 2005 increased the air connectivity between the two countries, thereby improving the commercial and trade relations.
• For promotion of trade between the two countries there is ministerial level meeting between United States-India Trade Policy Forum (TPF) after regular intervals. The US is also cooperating with India in the field of development of infrastructure as one recent example could be seen in US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) clearing grant to the Airport Authority of India.
• The U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, launched in 2009, provides opportunities to strengthen collaboration in areas including energy, climate change, trade, education. More than 30 forums of bilateral U.S.–India consultations are currently underway to strengthen bilateral engagement on economic and trade issues, including a Ministerial Trade Policy Forum (TPF) and a Ministerial Economic and Financial Partnership. The areas covered under the dialogue include macro-economic policy, financial sector reforms & infrastructure finance, anti money-laundering/ combating financing of terror (AML/ CFT) and taxation. India and U.S. are negotiating the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).
• As part of the Economic Dialogue, a separate Commercial Dialogue has been set up to cover (a) Trade Defence Measures (b) Small and Medium Enterprises and (c) capacity building on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs).
• For greater involvement of private sector in discussion on issues involving trade and investment the bilateral India-US CEO’s Forum was reconstituted in 2009. The last round of the reconstituted CEOs’ Forum was held in July 2013 in Washington D.C.
• MoU on agricultural cooperation and food security was initiated in 2009, which has three working groups under the dialogue: strategic co-operation in food security; food processing, farm-market linkages and agriculture extension; and, weather, crop and climate forecasting.
• Total bilateral trade in goods touched USD 62.8 billion in 2012, registering growth of about 9% over the last year and a trade surplus of around USD 18 billion. U.S. is the third largest source of foreign direct investments into India. The cumulative FDI inflows from the US from April 2000 to March 2013 amounted to about $ 11.1 billion constituting nearly 6.0 percent of the total FDI into India. In recent years, growing Indian investments into the US, estimated by independent studies to be around US$ 26.5 billion between 2004- 2009, has been a novel feature of bilateral ties.

Defence Cooperation between India and USA

The United States and India share common security interests and place each other at the same level as their closest partners. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called India as the “lynchpin” of Americas new “rebalancing” strategy in Asia.

US-India defense relationship has grown from solely military-to-military links into a mature partnership that encompasses dialogues, exercises, defense sales, professional military education exchanges, and practical cooperation

The ‘New Framework for India-US Defense Relationship’ was signed between the two sides on June 28, 2005. This agreement will apply with respect to defense technology transfer, trade, research, co-development and co-production for defense articles and services, including the most advanced and sophisticated technology.

India regards technology transfer as the “acid test” of US commitment and a “touchstone” for forging a long and stable US-India strategic relationship. India expects that the US defence industry will be able to transfer some latest technologies and help it establish the much needed military-industrial complex. The recent reform in India’s defence research, development, planning, procurements, defence finance and foreign direct investments (FDI) and off-setting is a clear indicator of what Indian defence policy makers want in the field of defence modernization and industrialization.

U.S. has signed nearly $10 billion in defense contracts with India over the past few years, and holds regular joint exercises across all services at increasing levels of complexity. India conducts the maximum number of joint military exercises with the US, and their growing strategic partnership is taking these operations to highly advanced level. In the last decade, India and the US have held over 60 exercises.

Some of strategic military purchases by India include: INS Jalashwa, Boeing P8I Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft, C130J Super Hercules aircraft for special forces, Boeing C-17 Globemaster heavy military transport aircraft, ,

The U.S. continues to fully support India's full membership in the four international export control regimes, (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) etc) which would further facilitate technology sharing.

Negatives: There is a perception in Washington that New Delhi is focused primarily on technology acquisition rather than discussing strategically significant issues with U.S. counterparts. The complex nature of the Indian military acquisition process and its lack of connection to overall strategic planning have also contributed to limiting the scope of U.S.–India military planning discussions.

Indo US Cooperation in Field Of Higher Education

India and the United States share strong linkages and a history of collaboration in the field of higher education. Keeping in view interest of more than 100,000 Indian students in USA and academic communities in both countries led to the establishment of an annual bilateral Higher Education Dialogue. Key areas of collaboration include student and faculty exchange, research cooperation, implementing technology-enabled education strategies such as e-learning and online courseware, cooperation between community colleges, and facilitating partnerships between Indian and American universities. Some other important initiatives are:

Fulbright-Nehru Partnership (Since 1950): faculty exchanges.

Singh-Obama 21st Century Knowledge Initiative Awards (2009) Focus on priority areas of food security, climate change, sustainable health and public health.
Raman Fellowships: (2011) for post-doctoral research in U.S. higher education institutions.

Development of Community Colleges for professional development and capacity building:University Grants Commission (UGC) for twinning arrangements between Indian and foreign educational institutions.

The India-Support for Teacher Education Program (In-STEP) a joint project between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ministry of Human Resource Development to build the capacity of teacher educators in India.

Passport to India: Initiative seeks to increase significantly the number of U.S. students in India through partnerships with the private sector and non-governmental organizations

EducationUSA: virtual advising, a new mobile app, social media outreach, and a nationwide advising hotline.

Indian Diasporain Influencing Indo US Relations

Now numbering more than 2.2 million, Indian-Americans have average household incomes topping $70,000 and are one of the most affluent immigrant groups. They are also one of the most highly educated. Indian-Americans have become a factor in the 2008 U.S. presidential election.

Indian-Americans will play a large role in the future of the India-U.S. relationship. The nuclear deal benefited from intense lobbying by business interest groups such as the Confederation of Indian Industry and the United States India Business Council. Their efforts, and those of the administration, were bolstered by Capitol Hill’s newest lobbying force: Indian-Americans. Groups such as the United States India Political Action Committee played a major role in helping members of both houses of Congress understand that any vote against the nuclear deal would be perceived to be a vote against India, something that would not sit well with Indian-Americans.

Pivot To Asia Policy of US

“Pivot to Asia” strategy qualifies to be called as Obama Doctrine or a part of obama grand strategy.This policy has radically redefined not only the US engagements with Asia but also the Asain Strategic dynamics.This initiative has all the necessary components namely military,political,ideological& economic.

Maintaining peace & security across the aisa pacific has become increasing crucial for global progress i.e whether through defending freedom of navigation in south china sea or countering the nuclear proliferation efforts of N.korea.

Proponents of this theory claims that U.S needs a weak china to continue its hegemony in Asia. The theory claims that the U.S is trying to accomplish this by establishing military , economic  & diplomatic ties with countries adjacent to china’s border.Though U.S has claimed that its following this policy to deepen its relations with the countries of Asia-Pacific including china. Many reports by western media have pointed out that U.S is putting more efforts to make India to act as a partner in supporting Washington’s pivot to asia strategy.

Nuclear security summit

The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC in 2010, and was followed by additional Summits in Seoul in 2012 and The Hague in 2014.  These Summits have achieved tangible improvements in the security of nuclear materials and stronger international institutions that support nuclear security.

There were twin goals for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit: advancing tangible improvements in nuclear security behavior, and strengthening the global nuclear security architecture.

As was the case at previous Summits, countries announced significant nuclear security commitments and accomplishments, both through national statements or in association with multilateral Gift Baskets. Action Plans were endorsed for five key international organizations and institutions (International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations, INTERPOL, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction) that will reflect the intent of Summit countries, in their roles as members of these organizations, to strengthen their contributions to nuclear security.

The 2016 Summit provided a forum and the opportunity for leaders to engage with each other and to reinforce at the highest levels our commitment to securing and eliminating nuclear materials, and preventing nuclear smuggling. Despite the significant progress achieved through the Summit process, it will be important that leaders recognize that this remains a challenge to global security and that we must continue to maintain high-level focus on steps to address nuclear security challenges.

objectives: The goal of the NSS is to address concerns about fissile material falling into the wrong hands at a head-of-state level. It includes minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), bolstering security at nuclear facilities through enhanced national regulations and implementation of best practices, enhanced membership in international instruments and organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), instituting measures to detect and prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, and Centers of Excellence, build capacity, develop technology and coordinate assistance on nuclear Security.

India has played an active role at the summits with the first two being attended by then Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh. As part of the house gift, India made a voluntary contribution of one million dollars to the Nuclear Security Fund and has established a Global Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCENEP), where more than a dozen national and international training programmes have been conducted so far. Threats faced by India: India is a source of nuclear material and a potential target of nuclear terrorism. While India takes pride in the security of its nuclear installations, ‘orphan sources’ i.e devices with radioactive materials outside regulatory and security measures could pose serious risks. According to a recent report by the Washington DC-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, India also has groups that want to acquire nuclear material. The report that ranked India low in nuclear security measures, cited corruption as a key reason that could compromise its nuclear facilities.

Security experts have identified at least four types of specific threats that terror outfits pose-

1.    These groups could acquire a nuclear weapon from the arsenal of a nuclear state.

2.    They could acquire enough fissile material to construct an improvised nuclear device.

3.    They could acquire radioactive material from civilian sources such as hospitals or university laboratories that could be mixed with conventional explosives to make a radioactive dispersal device or ‘dirty bomb.’

 4.   Terror groups could also sabotage a nuclear facility leading to large-scale loss of lives and destruction.

The fourth NSS, the last in its current format, ended with leaders from more than 50 countries and four international organisations stating in a joint communiqué that “more work remains to be done to prevent non-state actors from obtaining nuclear and other radioactive materials, which could be used for malicious purposes.”India has set up a permanent team of technical and security experts from multiple ministries and agencies that conducts tabletop exercises simulating nuclear smuggling, phased out the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and built a database of all radioactive sources in the country.It has also started real-time tracking of radioactive sources when they are transported and set up a network of 23 emergency response centres across the country for detecting and responding to any nuclear or radiological emergency. India is also in the process of equipping all major seaports and airports of the country with radiation detection machines.  While nuclear security is a serious domestic concern, India also used the platform to push its desire for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the exclusive club that controls global nuclear trade. India’s export controls list and guidelines have been harmonised with those of the NSG, and India looks forward to strengthening its contribution to shared non-proliferation objectives through membership of the export controls regimes.

Indo-US: COMCASA Agreement

• A U.S. team visited India recently to sort out difference regarding ?Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement? (COMCASA).
•  The agreement would facilitate transfer of high-end U.S. technology to India, but there is feared that it would compromise on India‘s defence secrecy.

What is the COMCASA?

• COMCASA is meant to provide a legal framework for the transfer of communication security equipment from the U.S. to India.
•  This would facilitate ?interoperability? between their forces and potentially with other militaries that use U.S. origin systems for secured data links.
•  Importantly, the U.S. has already made some tweaks from its conventional template for agreements in this regard, for accommodating Indian concerns.
•  Significance - COMCASA is said to be part of a set of 3 agreements that the U.S. considers vital for a functional military relationship.
•  Previously, India and U.S. signed the ?Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)?, for mutual logistic assistance between their militaries.
• Negotiations on the third agreement, ?Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA)?, have not yet begun.

Why is the U.S. pushing for COMCASA?

•  U.S. officials state that India‘s armed forces are currently dependent on less secure, commercially available communication systems for surveillance.
•  These platforms are, therefore a hindrance in real time data sharing with friendly militaries, and seamless interoperability during joint missions.
•  Hence, they argue, COMCASA will facilitate the Indian military to use of high-end secured communication equipment from the U.S.
•  Additionally, COMCASA is also said to be imperative if India is to get the armed version of the Sea Guardian drones from the US.

What are the stakes?

•  Benefits - U.S. granted India the status of ?Major Defence Partner? during the Obama‘s time, to facilitate transfer of high-end defence technology.
•  Signing of the 3 foundational agreements would underline that status, besides making the transfer of American defence technology possible to India.
•  Risks - New Delhi is believed to be concerned about intrusive access COMCASA would grant the U.S. to Indian military communication system.
•  The violation of Indian sovereignty due to visits by US inspectors to Indian bases to inspect the COMCASA-safeguarded equipment weighs heavy.
•  There is also a fear that a lot of Russian-origin and indigenous Indian military platforms may not be compatible with COMCASA.
• Also, such comprehensive agreements is politically risky for the ruling BJP as even the previous LEMOA (signed in 2016), created a political storm.

LEMOA

• India and USA has signed Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement

Key features of LEMOA agreement are:

•  LEMOA formalises an ad-hoc arrangement already in practice and furthers India-US military-to-military cooperation. The agreement provides access to each other’s military facilities for fuelling and logistic support on a reimbursable basis.
  • The core of both agreements is a regularization of the ability of naval ships and aircraft of both countries to dock in each other’s bases for taking on supplies like fuel. Indian and US naval ships and aircraft have often used each other’s naval and air bases before. Base usage and taking on supplies will now be much easier for naval ships and aircraft under both flags.
  • These activities are limited to joint military exercises, training, port calls and humanitarian missions and other military activities that both sides mutually agree to undertake.
  • It does not give the US automatic access to Indian military bases or to logistical support, but simply smoothen existing practices.
  • The advantage over the current situation is precisely following: Though the US does currently use Indian military bases and logistics during joint military exercises – this is managed on a case-by-case basis, which is simply more cumbersome. LEMOA does not necessarily give anything that the US does not already get, but it makes the process more regularised.
  • LEMOA helps grease the wheels on the bureaucracy underlying defence collaboration, including reimbursements for military logistics sharing.

Significance of LEMOA

• India will be the main beneficiary. While Indian naval ships and aircraft increasingly venture further away from their home, India has no bases and in some cases not even agreements with foreign governments along the Atlantic and Pacific. The US navy and air force, on the other hand, has a global network which is now accessible to Indian ships and aircrafts.
  • US warships and aircraft now have additional sites to use in India, but they already have many bases around the region at their disposal.
  • Indian arrangements with the US for such access open up new options in beefing up India’s logistics capacity for missions in the Indian Ocean.
  • In one of the more concrete benefits, LEMOA strengthens India’s outreach to areas that were not typically within its reach. With one aircraft carrier in operations, India’s capacity to undertake far sea operations has been fairly limited. Signing LEMOA opens up opportunities such as gaining access to US military bases in Djibouti and Diego Garcia.

CAATSA

What is CAATSA?

• Countering America‘s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)?, is a U.S. law that seeks to constrain its enemy powers economically.
•  Through this law, U.S. imposes economic sanctions on its adversaries and all countries and firms dealing with its adversaries.
•  Considering the economic might of the U.S., it would be a big challenge for any nation to overlook U.S. and continue its trade with other partners.
•  U.S. has classified Iran and Russia (and North Korea) as adversary countries, but India has strong and critical trade ties with both these countries.
• Notably, Russia is India‘s major defence supplier for over 6 decades now, and Iran is India‘s second largest oil supplier.
•  Hence, if India doesn‘t cut trade ties with Iran and Russia, CAATSA Act would‘ve kicked in U.S. sanctions against India.
• This has put India in a tight spot as it can neither dare U.S. sanctions nor antagonize Iran and Russia (or forego supplies from them).

India’s Exemption from CAATSA

Recently, USA exemptedan Indian defence acquisition from Russia from CAATSA.

What are the reasons behind this exemption?

•  CAATSA impacts Indo-US ties, and dents the image of the US as a reliable partner at a time when it is projecting India as a key player in its Indo-Pacific strategy.
•  US administration for countries like India has favoured relief, citing the ?strategic opportunity? that India presents, and also the opportunity ?to trade in arms with India?.
•  Indeed, the US defence industry sees India as a major market, Over the last decade, deals with India have grown from near zero to $15 billion.
•  Both in term of the number and value of contracts, the US is way ahead of other major suppliers.
•  The CAATSA exemption also underlines the growing defence and security cooperation that has seen India sign a logistics pact with the US.
•  Also US designated India as a Major Defence Partner, and both countries coming together on Indo-Pacific strategy, the newly resurrected Quad.
•  It also marks an acceptance by the US of the point of principle that as a sovereign country, India cannot be dictated on its strategic interests by a third country.