Introduction

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (also known as Rio 92 or Earth Summit) was a landmark gathering concerning the international consolidation and acknowledgement of environmental impact assessment (EIA) as a universal approach to inform and influence decision-making on crucial socio-environmental matters . Enforced by legislation in 191 countries (Morgan, 2012), adopted by donors of international development projects, by multilateral banks and by a growing number of private financial institutions, EIA has been accepted as a solid decision support process.

What, then, could be expected, in terms of EIA, from the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20 Conference)? This paper intends to explore the rationale for a reaffirmation of the role of impact assessment (IA) in sustainable development due to its uniquecontribution to publicly accountable decision We start by highlighting the most significant references to EIA in the main documents resulting from the Rio 92 Conference. Then, we highlight a few key developments in the IA field that took place after the Earth Summit, in particular the diffusion of strategic environmental assessment (SEA). In the following section, we review one of the major conceptual assumptions of the Rio+20 Conference, green economy. and its far from unanimous meanings to argue, in the final section, that SEA, and other forms of IA, should play a role in any possible transition to a greener economy. We endeavour to address what we understand to be a major flaw a key gap in the Rio+20 process and its outcome document: a linkage between its objectives and the decision-making process.

One of the defining moments for sustainable development has been the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Rio conference came twenty years after its predecessor conference in Stockholm. UNCED gave birth to a number of international instruments that continue to provide the framework for sustainable development. This included the groundbreaking Agenda 21, which offered a practical approach to applying sustainable development policies at the local and national level, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

Agenda 21 sought to provide a comprehensive blueprint of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the UN, governments, and major groups. The Rio Declaration established 27 principles intended to guide sustainable development around the world.

Environmental impact assessment in the Rio 92 outcomes

The Rio 92 Conference stimulated national governments, international organizations, and the business sector to acknowledge the role of impact assessment in the quest for sustainable development. In the run-up period, a number of countries have reviewed or established their national environmental protection legislation to include provisions for EIA. The Conference has resulted in three documents very important for the consolidation of EIA:

(1) Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states: Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.

(2) Article 14 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, titled Impact Assessment and Minimizing Adverse Impacts, establishes that:

1. Each Contracting Party, as far as possible and as appropriate, shall:

(a) Introduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public participation in such procedures; (b) Introduce appropriate arrangements to ensure that the environmental consequences of its programs and policies that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on biological diversity are duly taken into account; (...).

(3) Agenda 21 refers to EIA in several different chapters.

A fourth document that arose from the Rio Conference, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, does mention impact assessment, but not at the same level of prominence as the other three documents. Under Article 4.1.f, Commitments, this Convention calls parties to Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change.

The Rio documents also have been influenced by (?) spilled over other important preexisting international conventions. Both the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971) and the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (1979) adopted in their respective Conference of Parties recommendations and guidelines relative to the adoption of EIA as a tool for helping parties to meet the conventions' goals.

As well, the Rio 92 Conference created a momentum that inspired other governmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and business initiatives. The World Bank first adopted its policy on environmental assessment in 1989 and updated it in September 1991. The United Nations Economic Commission on Europe and member states adopted, also in 1991, a Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, known as the Espoo Convention. This UN organization also promoted the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, which came into force in 1998. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development, which was founded on the eve of the Rio Conference "to ensure the business voice was heard at the forum", as one of its first initiatives, publishing in 1996 the brochure "Environmental Assessment: a Business Perspective" (WBCD, 1996).

In spite of this success story, it does have shortcomings. One flaw gap in the outcomes of the original Rio Conference concerns the governance of global commons - the atmosphere, the oceans and the poles. Human activities in the Antarctica are addressed by the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1998, though its effectiveness remains unclear (Wood, 2003).

Another flawis found in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which does not consider EIA as a tool for promoting reductions on the emissions of greenhouse gases but only as a consideration in designing strategies of adaptation.

Foremost, no convention signed at the Rio Earth Summit or other international meeting fully tackles the fundamental challenge put forward by the Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987, p. 313):

The ability to choose policy paths that are sustainable requires that the ecological dimensions of policy be considered at the same time as the economic, trade, energy, agricultural, industrial and other dimensions - in the same agendas and in the same national and international institutions. That is the chief institutional challenge of the 1990s.

Unfortunately this challenge has not been met since 1992.. The reasons why it happens will be discussed below.

Development of environmental impact assessment 1992-2012

The fact that EIA is legally (?) required in most countries is an indicator of the concept's success and utility (nonetheless its potential lack of effectiveness ). EIA has been evolving after the Earth Summit. New countries added legislation on the matter and others reviewed or updated their previous legislation.

One significant development in impact assessment was its adoption by financial institutions. As the World Bank pioneered the use and promotion of environmental assessment, other multilateral development banks followed it and progressively approved their own policies and procedures largely influenced by the experience. A refinement of this EIA approach had happened in the World Bank Group, when the branch which specializes in financing private projects, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) launched guidelines for the environmental and social assessment of private sector projects in 2006 (updated in 2011). In addition, commercial banks launched in 2003 the Equator Principles, a set of voluntary commitments by financial institutions to systematically incorporate the results of environmental and social assessments into certain types of credit decisions. Initially supported by ten banks, in June 2012 more than 70 private and public banks as well as export credit agencies supported the Equator Principles.

Another important phenomenon was the emergence and consolidation of strategic environmental assessment (SEA). Defined as the assessment of policies, programs, and plans (PPPs), SEA has been tuned into lawin the European Union, in China and in a number of other countries and is being applied by donors of international cooperation projects and programs. SEA has resulted in a burgeoning literature in the last decade (Partidário, 2011).

In the international arena, efforts to disseminate and provide the bases of SEA's implementation are promoted by development agencies. A recent noteworthy initiative is supported by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

At the OECD DAC High Level meeting of 21 May, 2008, members adopted the Policy Statement on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). DAC recognizes that poor people suffer more than everyone when policies, plans, or programs are poorly designed and implemented. Such suffering is compounded by the risks posed by environmental degradation and climate change. The inability of central government planning normally amplifies the vulnerabilities imposed on the poor due to existing environmental conditions. The quality of development planning will be affected significantly unless careful attention is to be given to the relationship between policy development and the environment. The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as well as the yet uncertain Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) can also be compromised if the principles of sustainable development, through the application of SEA, are not made part of the development policies and programs. Therefore, the DAC Policy Statement on SEA provides OECD members with a series of commitments on SEA use in developing countries, especially on topics as SEA capacity building, the application of SEA, the effects of SEA on development planning, and the ways SEA could be used in climate change issues, ecosystems goods and services, conflict prevention, and disaster management.

The SEA use in OECD member governments and partner countries has been growing since development assistance is increasingly being provided at the level of policies, plans, and programs, rather than through individual projects. Partner country institutions and systems for the most part are the proper place of these initiatives. Therefore, to respect this development assistance trend, the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness was adopted by the donor community in 2005. The Declaration is very clear about how SEA is to be used. It calls upon donors and their partners to "...develop and apply common approaches for strategic environmental assessment at sector and national levels.". Clearly, at the highest level of OECD governance, SEA is recognized as an intrinsic planning tool to support development initiatives. This recognition was backed by the publication in 2006 by the OECD of the DAC Guidance on Applying Strategic Environmental Assessment (OECD, 2006). This document was developed through extensive collaboration among DAC members, developing country partners, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and a host of different development institutions and agencies.

During the last ten years a growing number of developing countries have enacted policy, legislation or regulations that dictate how SEA is to be used in development cooperation. The publication of various OECD SEA instruments such as the SEA policy and guidance has amplified the need for SEA in partner countries. However, it is the recent activity in the extractive and energy sectors in development countries, which have created the need for applying SEA. More developing countries blessed with natural resource realize that responsible and sustainable natural resource management are capable of provide long term gains in social, economic, and environmental issues for their respective societies through SEA's application. SEA will also help developing countries to determine if policy and legislative gaps do exist in a particular sector, or what kind of institutional capacity issues should be faced . SEA also builds public support for policy making and can enable transboundary cooperation around shared natural resources. Unique opportunities are now being created for improving policy, plan, and program making by integrating environmental and related social considerations into the highest levels of government decisions. This also provides new ways to reach consensus on development priorities and mechanisms among various development stakeholder groups.

Finally, at same token important developments have occurred regarding public participation in the IA process,. The Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration calls for enhanced public involvement in environmental matters, including decision-making. It goes hand in hand with Principle 17, since public participation is one of the pillars of IA and promoting access to information, one of its goals . According to Principle 10: Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.

Principle 10 was applied by the UN Economic Commission for Europe in the design of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, approved in 1998. Under this Convention, decision-making ought is to be informed by environmental impact assessment which, in turn, needs to be coupled with public consultation procedures.

The participation of indigenous peoples in the process is a matter of particular concern and it brings specific challenges. The International Labor Organization approved in1989 thought the Convention 169, a legally binding international instrument which deals specifically with the rights of native and tribal peoples. it is open to ratification. In fact it gained force in 1990 after Mexico, following Norway, had assigned it. However, it has been ratified only by 20 countries, mostly in Latin America. It was followed by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved by the General Assembly in 2007. Both documents advanced the need for Free, Prior and Informed Consent to be obtained from indigenous people by governments employing culturally appropriate consultation approaches. As applied to impact assessment, requirements and guidance for taking seriously indigenous peoples rights and interests, are the subject of a World Bank Safeguard Policy and an IFC Performance Standard.

The Rio+20 preparatory process and its outcomes: implications for environmental impact assessment

A first intergovernmental conference to assess progress since Rio 1992 was held by the United Nations ten years after in Johannesburg. Although another Conference ten years later was not initially planned, Brazilian government advanced a proposal to the UN to host a new Summit to assess progress towards sustainable development. Accepted by the UN, the meeting was named UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD). This marked an interesting shift in terminology since the 1972 UN Conference on the Environment held in Stockholm -, which was the first major intergovernmental gathering on environmental issues. Twenty years later, the Rio Conference was labeled "Environment and Development". Then in 2012 the term "environment" disappeared and instead of that the conference focus was on "sustainable development".

Although intending to attract dozens of heads of state and several thousand participants, the Conference goals were extremely ambiguous when compared to the 1992 Earth Summit. This is not surprising since, to a large extent as a result of Rio 92, high-level intergovernmental meetings on environmental issues multiplied enormously. Both the climate and the biological diversity conventions engendered periodical official meetings or Conference of Parties (CoPs). In these meetings negotiations take place to devise strategies or to agree on rules to their respective objectives. The Kyoto Protocol, establishing greenhouse gases emissions targets, was signed in one of those CoPs. The proliferation of CoPs and other sorts of environmentally-oriented intergovernmental meetings is a post-Earth Summit trend and unknown as such in international scale pre-1992. Therefore, Rio+20 could not expect to have a similar effect on the international environment and sustainable development agenda as did the 1992 Conference.

Notwithstanding this context, many environmental stakeholders had high dreams. A strong political commitment to the protection of the oceans and a new and strengthened global environmental governance structure, including a higher status for the UN Environment Program (UNEP), were among such expectations. Impact assessment scholars and practitioners also had expectations that, in the final and official outcome document, the importance of EIA could be reinforced and especially that SEA could be recognized as a tool for achieving sustainable development or for supporting the transition to a green economy.

The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), a nongovernmental organization registered with the UN Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) compounded by a network of professionals and researches, submitted a short document stressing the role of impact assessment as a contribution to the "compilation document" - an initial aggregation of submissions intended to contribute to the Conference's outcome document. Some key considerations advanced by IAIA about the role of impact assessment in general and strategic environmental assessment in particular are:

• it helps to ensure that high level policies, programs, and projects are designed and implemented with more sustainable outcomes while also reducing poverty and advancing green economy objectives;

• it helps to ensure that development activities of individual sectors complement each other rather than undermine themselves by providing a systematic means for minimizing potential adverse outcomes and maximizing benefits early in policy, program, and project design;

• it can alert decision makers to risks, improve community engagement, incorporate traditional knowledge, and facilitate cooperation across sectors and boundaries before strategic decisions had been taken.

Governments and international organizations also supported impact assessment, including Canada, Ghana, and the World Bank. However, by no means has SEA or IA in general been recognized as such in the outcome document.

From an initial document, which gathered and assembled contributions from governments, international organizations, and major civil groups, a draft document has evolved thought several discussions. . In the Rio Convention Centre, more than 20,000 people - government delegations, UN staff, major groups' representatives and journalists - met from the 15th to the 22nd of June, 2012. A special pavilion hosted side events promoted by governments and major groups, while open and closed meetings took place in other rooms. Hundreds of side events were also promoted by businesses, academia and civil society, including a "People's Summit for Social and Environmental Justice" held at the very same place of the "Global Forum" in 1992, the civil society meeting.

To many observers, especially from civil society organizations, the outcome of the Rio+20 was disappointingly modest. The final declaration entitled "The Future We Want" - a 53 page long document containing 283 paragraphs- was considered by many a weak and uninspiring document. Indeed, NGOs dubbed it as "The Future We Don't Want"

Disagreement is found regarding many key issues, including "green economy" - a central concept at this Conference. Not only is its meaning not widely agreed, but is its rationale not shared by a number of CSOs (Bosselmann, Brown and Mackey, 2012) and even among UN bodies, as exemplified by contrasting the relatively optimistic view and proposals of UNEP (2011) with those advanced in UNRISD (2012), which calls upon careful consideration of its social dimensions.

The Rio+20 outcome document repeats previous commitments, as in the example of paragraph 99: We encourage action at the regional, national, subnational and local levels to promote access to information, public participation and access to justice in environmental matters, as appropriate. This is a short version of Principle 10 of Rio Declaration. Other paragraphs sound quite cynical, e.g. We reaffirm that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, and we express profound alarm that emissions of greenhouse gases continue to rise globally (190), in face of the several decades of sustained unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement to curb greenhouse gases emissions

The outcome document has only one direct mention to impact assessment, under the "Oceans and Seas" subsection (part of V. A. Thematic areas and cross-sectoral issues): We also commit to enhance actions to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems from significant adverse impacts, including through the effective use of impact assessments (paragraph 168). A related topic is the recognition of the importance of technology assessment, under the "Means of Implementation" section: We recognize the importance of strengthening international, regional and national capacities in research and technology assessment, especially in view of the rapid development and possible deployment of new technologies that may also have unintended negative impacts, in particular on biodiversity and health, or other unforeseen consequences. (paragraph 275).

Technology assessment (TA) is one form of impact assessment which, for many years, had been stimulated by the Office of Technology Assessment of the US Congress. Although this office was closed in 1995 and political support for TA dramatically decreased worldwide, it is still seen by academics as a powerful tool for supporting decision-making procedures (Vanclay and Porter, 2009).

Although these paragraphs are a welcome reaffirmation of the importance and role of IA, they are extremely timid both in scope and reach. In addition, the generic wording of these and other paragraphs of the outcome document allows for multiple (though possibly contradictory) interpretations that will have to be explored and debated.

The Rio+20 outcome document lacks the desirableconnections with the decision making processes. Governments and private agents take daily decisions that impact our collective future. There are tools and procedures for assessing to which extent those decisions advance sustainable development objectives. Impact assessment provides such linkages in a structured and accountable way.

Hence, one outcome of the Rio +20 Conference that has potential implications to IA in general and SEA in particular is the agreement to start a process of establishing Sustainable Development Objectives (SDO). Although not a part of the initial set of goals of the Conference, SDO were incorporated in the agenda after a proposal has been made by Colombia. At a certain point during the pre-Conference period, there was some hope that a set of core objectives could be adopted at the Conference, but the challenges of reaching an agreement on the objectives that should have been pursued rapidly became clear. Since the deadline to attain the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) is 2015, there was time to agree on new sustainable development objectives.

A key difference between the SDO and MDG process - and a reason why agreement on the SDO is and will remain difficult - is that the former are intended to apply to every country, while the latter are goals for the developing countries only. SDO are potentially important to SEA because policies, plans, and programs (or PPPs, the subject of strategic assessment) could be assessed in terms of how do they converge to or deviate from reaching the SDO.

Impact assessment in the transition to a greener economy and the way ahead

Regardless of an agreement on the meaning of a green economy, or on the need and urgency to set out a shift from growth, as the driver of development, to degrowth, as a means to reduce mankind's ecological footprint (Jackson, 2011), changes in consumption patterns must also be made (Munasinghe, 2012). Impact assessment and especially strategic environmental assessment can tackle with the still unaddressed "chief institutional challenge of the 1990s" (in the words of the Brundtland report) of choosing sustainable policy paths. As the effectiveness of SEA is being better understood through theoretical proposals and lessons from case studies (Loayza, 2010; Doren et al, 2013), it has been proving valuable in providing fresher and contemporary approaches to development.

That the Rio+20 Conference has not acknowledged the role and potential contribution of SEA to policy choices is something regrettable. Notwithstanding, work is now being done in development agencies and developing countries to show how SEA can increase (?)green growth initiatives. In three cases, out of the six UNEP's "enabling conditions" to pave pathways to a green economy (UNEP, 2011), SEA can be especially relevant:

(1) to prioritize government investment and spending in areas that stimulate greening of economic sectors;

(2) to limit government spending in areas that deplete natural capital;

(3) to employ taxes and market-based instruments to promote green investment and innovation.

In addition, there is a growing business case for both project EIA and SEA. Many companies, all over the world, both in developed and developing countries, are struggling against obstacles in obtaining approval for new projects, especially in the natural resources sector. The emerging concept of "social license" conveys the idea that in some cases a government approval is not enough and that the consent of host communities is needed to establish long-term and strong relationships (Prno and Slocombe, 2012) that enables continuous operation.

Impact assessment aims at facilitating more accountable and transparent decision-making thought building in its environmental, social and economic consequences. The main challenges ahead are:

(1) Maintaining acquired gains and building on progress achieved to date by showcasing the many contributions of IA to better decisions, i.e. decisions where IA makes a difference, as avoiding impacts and achieving effective mitigation and compensation.

(2) Expanding IA to encompass initiatives potentially affecting global commons - in particular the oceans and seas beyond the coastal zone.

(3) Consolidating SEA in jurisdictions where it has already proved successful and expanding its acceptance into places where its contribution has not been yet fully appreciated.

(4) Expanding both project and strategic assessments beyond the perspective of "doing no harm" to "doing good" or "ensuring net gain".

But the biggest challenge of all remains what the Brundtland Commission has expressed: mainstreaming sustainability into policy making.

Conflict at all levels can no longer be accepted as part of the development and decision-making process. The continuing global economic crisis and the fast deterioration of ecosystem's goods and services, call for all actors in the decision-making and development process to use impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment more aggressively. The use of IA or SEA is no longer about protection of the environment; rather it represents a shift in the way business and policy making that respect global realities are made. SEA and IA should show that profits can be made, jobs created, and, at same time, that a balance can be achieved among societal needs and the planet's ability to provide them.

Twenty years after the Rio summit, this study aims to provide an assessment of the progress and gaps made in the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles. 

Implementation of Agenda 21 When it was adopted in 1992 at the Earth Summit, Agenda 21 was meant to be “a programme of action for sustainable development worldwide”. Furthermore, as stated in its introduction, it had the ambition of being “a comprehensive blueprint for action to be taken globally, from now into the twenty-first century”. The ambition was high, and so were the stated goals of the Agenda: improving the living standards of those in need; better manage and protect the ecosystem; and bring about a more prosperous future for all.

Agenda 21 have progressed at different paces. Information on progress and gaps in the implementation of sustainable development commitments and decisions exist, but is often scattered. On some of the topics, global assessments have been undertaken by the international community (IPCC reports; Global Energy Assessment; IAASTD for agriculture). Academic institutions and think tanks often produce reports on specific sectors or topics (e.g. oceans, renewable energy, climate change). 

Agenda 21 were produced by the UN for the Commission on Sustainable Development sessions in 1997 (“Rio+5”) and 2001 in preparation for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. These reviews, were produced by the UN agencies in charge of specific chapters of Agenda 21 according to the arrangements agreed by the now extinct Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development.

The UN Division for Sustainable Development (DSD) regularly undertakes reviews of progress made under the clusters of issues in different CSD cycles, in the form of both issue-specific (sectoral) reports, socalled “overview reports”, and trends reports. Since the Trends report produced by DSD for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 there has been no fully-encompassing review exercise done by the Division for Sustainable Development.

This study aims to provide a systematic, although not by any means fully comprehensive, assessment of the progress and gaps in the implementation of the programmes of action of Agenda 21.

The study thus aims to complement existing exercises by:

1. providing a basic but systematic coverage of issues in Agenda 21 (as opposed to a subset of issues under each CSD cluster), including state of progress, institutional changes since 1992, outstanding issues that were either not included in Agenda 21 or rose to major importance since then;

2. assessing the main factors having caused progress or lack of progress on the different chapters, and suggesting alternative approaches to facilitate faster progress; and

3. synthesizing the lessons from the detailed examination of the chapters of Agenda 21 and suggesting priorities for progress across the board.

Implementation of the Rio Principles The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by 178 Member States in 1992 at the Earth Summit, was at the time perceived as a progressive statement by all nations that enshrined the recognition of the indivisibility of the fate of humankind from that of the Earth, and established sustainable development in an international framework.

The Declaration, a compact set of 27 principles, promoted concepts such as the centrality of human beings to the concerns of sustainable development (Principle 1); the primacy of poverty eradication (Principle 5); the importance of the environment for current and future generations and its equal footing with development (Principles 3 and 4); the special consideration given to developing countries (Principle 6); the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR, Principle 7). It also enshrined the two critical economic principles of polluter pays (Principle 16) and the precautionary approach (Principle 15). It introduced principles relating to participation and the importance of specific groups for sustainable development (Principles 10, 20, 21, 22). Lastly, it requested Member states to put in place adequate legislative instruments to address environmental issues.

A review of the Rio principles was conducted by the UN Division for Sustainable Development for the 5th session of CSD in 1997 (“Rio+5”). Some of the principles have given rise to considerable amount of literature. While the underlying causes for the success of specific principles may be understood by experts in various fields of international law and sustainable development, a short and simple but all-encompassing summary seems to be missing. Yet, understanding why some of the principles have not succeeded in passing the test of inclusion in international and national law, or at least become the basis for accepted normal practices is critical to furthering sustainable development. 

This provides a systematic assessment of the state of implementation of the 27 Rio Principles; based on individual assessments, it also provides an overview of progress and identifies some areas where actions should concentrate for further progress.  

The UN Division for Sustainable Development (DSD) commissioned Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future (SF) to undertake this review to provide an assessment of the progress and gaps made in the implementation of the above mentioned Rio outcomes; Agenda 21 and the Principles of the Rio Declaration. Stakeholder Forum has a strong institutional memory that spans over two decades and has been deeply engaged in the processes that were developed out of the UNCED in 1992 – such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) conferences as well as the UNFCCC negotiations and other conferences organised both by the UN and other stakeholders (CSD, NGOs, local authorities, trade unions, youth, businesses, etc.). 

Success on Agenda 21 has been highly variable. Despite being a comprehensive plan to deliver sustainable development, implementation has not always been systemic. However, there are good examples of where Agenda 21 has achieved positive and lasting outcomes. 

Rio Principles - Overview

Rio Principles shows that many of the principles have been transposed into further international laws or national instruments, but have not necessarily filtered down into meaningful action in practice. Without full compliance and enforcement mechanisms there is little to ensure that States comply with the objective and aspiration of the principles. However, there are some successes in this regard, such as Principle 10 (Access to Environmental Information) as enshrined in the Aarhus Convention which covers most European Union (EU) members.

Successes

As a soft law instrument, successful implementation of the Rio Declaration takes many shapes and can be loosely understood through analysing the various ‘offspring’ agreements or national laws that have transposed aspects of the Principles. Where such a transposition has occurred, and the principle has been applied in practice, its application has often been tested in the courts; the result of which is that some of these principles have been widely accepted as part of international jurisprudence.

The most prominent examples of this legal application are Principles 10 and 15, along with Principles 5, 17 and 24, all of which demonstrate varying elements of successful transposition and wide adoption of the principle in laws. Principle 3 and 21 are steadily gaining momentum on implementation and of latter years, in conjunction given their interrelation, both have seen an explosion of activity where increasingly more effort is being made to apply them in practice.

Principle 5 – eradicating poverty and raising the standards of living for all – helped put the spotlight on the inequity that exists in the world and the wealth divide between rich and poor. Popular campaigns have shown that the relevance of Principle 5 reached much wider audiences than those involved in the multi-lateral processes, and the desire and intent to act captured the imagination of society on the whole. As such, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were agreed with sincere intent to secure poverty eradication. Focussing on key indicators the MDGs are a direct heir of Principle 5. In 2015 the MGDs expire and there will be a review of their successful application and whether or not the goals have been achieved.

Principle 10 – access to justice, information and public participation – is the foundation of the successful regional instrument that enshrines the principle in the Aarhus Convention, which applies to most EU member States as well as a handful of other acceding parties that elected to participate in it. The Aarhus Convention has provided valuable means by which the various elements of the Principle have been promoted through application at the national level, as well as providing a forum (the Compliance Committee) that can hear complaints where it is claimed that Nation States are not adhering to the Convention. Notably, cases have been brought by civil society organisations that have challenged their government’s lack of implementation or compliance to the Convention, which has resulted in the development of a body of case-law that has strengthened the Principle overall. In addition, the elements of Principle 10 have been borne out in jurisdictions that are not parties to the Aarhus regional instrument, but have nonetheless used it as a persuasive example to underpin activities such as establishing national environmental courts or tribunals.

Principle 15 – the precautionary principle – is widely accepted as a foundation of environmental law at both the national and international levels. It has been tested in a range of courts and jurisdictions, notably the World Trade Organisation (WTO) arbitral body where initially it was found in some cases that trade rules superseded the precautionary principle; however in more recent years this has not been the approach adopted by most states and the principle itself is well established in international jurisprudence and is increasingly becoming more accepted at the national level. Environmental impact assessments (EIAs, Principle 17) – are commonly used as national instruments that are integral to the planning and development processes. Whilst the efficacy of these instruments has been challenged, the process by which EIAs as well as other strategic impact assessments have been transposed into national legal instruments provides an instructive framework for how soft law can be applied in a very practical way. The popularisation of such tools demonstrates that where there has been the impetus to develop such a ‘national instrument’ (as defined in the Principle itself), the regulation to support it and the subsequent application of it in practice can develop with reasonable speed and intent.

Principle 24 – relating to the destructive nature of warfare – has been well implemented in national and regional instruments. There are multiple examples of where the principle of “respect[ing] international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict”, as the principle itself states, has been enshrined in national legislation and there are various international inter-governmental and non-governmental bodies that focus specifically on ensuring the successful application of these instruments. In practice, however, it has been difficult to quantify how, and if, the principle has been successful in achieving the overall objective.

Challenges

The drive to eradicate poverty, stemming from

Principle 5 as outlined above, successfully led to the MDGs; however the final aspect of the principle – that of “reducing disparities in standards of living”, which can be read as referring to both within and across-country inequalities, has been relatively forgotten, or left out of the development discussion, as attention has become almost exclusively focussed on reducing income poverty. The MDGs reinforce this approach, as does the theme of the Rio conference on ‘green economy in the context of poverty eradication.’ It will be important to ensure that discussions about reducing the disparities in standards of living and wealth distribution are incorporated into the Rio+20 discussion and any subsequent regimes that stem from it.

Principle 7 – global co-operation to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem– enshrines the principle that was already gaining traction before UNCED, that of common but differentiated responsibilities. This concept has successfully filtered out into discussions in the multi - and bi-lateral regimes, at both international and national level and in specific areas including from climate change (under UNFCCC). It is now seen as a “mandatory” element to every development discussion since UNCED. However, increasingly conflicting interpretations of this principle have stalled progress in the climate change discussions.  

A critical dimension of the sustainable development concept is that of public participation in the decisionmaking as well as implementation process. This has been successfully adopted as practice in the various international framework regimes (CBD, UNFCCC) and as noted above, the concept has been successfully enshrined in instruments such as Aarhus and others. However, the lack of ability for many groups and stakeholders to participate in the process at national and local level remains an issue.

Additionally access to justice remains a barrier for many who seek legal redress for environmental damages or concerns. Notably, a claim was brought to the Aarhus compliance committee against the UK, arguing that the costs of bringing an environmental case in the UK was ‘prohibitively’ expensive, undermining one of the cornerstones of the Aarhus Convention. The compliance committee found in their favour, declaring the UK non-compliant to Aarhus, and time will now tell how the UK responds to such a declaration and whether this ‘gap’ will be filled. 

The precautionary principle, whilst successfully implemented in a range of instruments and tested in case-law, remains mired by ideological divergence, which is undermining the achievement of the overall objective of eliminating those actions that have the potential to cause serious and irreversible harm. Prominent examples where this tension is not resolved include the discussions under UNFCCC. The debate around Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) also suffers from divergences in ideology relating to the potential harm that could be caused, but which are as yet unknown.

Whilst the polluter pays principle (Principle 16) has been transposed into a range of legal instruments in a number of jurisdictions and contexts, there remain ideological differences to its practical application which have undermined the successful implementation of the principle on the whole. Such ideological differences in some areas have led to the development of parallel systems that are not based on the polluter pays principle, such as in the case of waste disposal supply chains. In practice pollution and waste continue to pervade our lifestyles, reflecting the less than successful implementation of the principle.

Principles 3 and 21 focus on the concept of intergenerational equity. Justice for future generations has been a key element of sustainable development since the Brundtland report. There has been a range of initiatives to bring the principle into the processes of decision-making at both the national and international levels. However on the whole the principle has not been reflected at the institutional level and has not had the governmental support that reflects the civil society and wider stakeholder appetite to bring the concept to the heart of sustainable development governance. 

Principle 8 – sustainable production and consumption and the promotion of appropriate demographic policies – is deemed to have been unsuccessful in achieving its intended goal. Unsustainable consumption patterns have continued to rise, at a steady pace in industrialised countries. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are seeing blooming consumer classes that aspire to high per capita consumption levels and other developing countries will follow suit in time. Population projections are estimating a 30% rise in population by 2050. These trends are compounding each other and increasing the unsustainable impacts of human activities beyond the ability of ecosystems to recover.

Other specific difficulties identified in the review include:

• The tension between national sovereignty on resources, a fundamental tenet of Principle 2, and the issues associated with management of the commons that relates to trans-boundary pollution, climate change and biodiversity is starkly borne out as international multilateral regimes fail to adequately implement an approach to overcoming this contradiction; and 

• A potential contradiction in the set of Principles between Principle 12 (growth and free trade as the model) and Principle 8 (addressing unsustainable consumption patterns). Over the last two decades it has become increasingly apparent that where and when trade and a need for rethinking of consumption patterns come up against one another, trade wins. This results in an undermining of the practice of sustainable development. Overall, Principle 8 remains largely unaddressed. Instead a “business-as-usual, growth at all costs” paradigm has continued to dominate.

Conclusions

The Rio Principles are the heir to the Stockholm principles agreed in 1972, and both have a primary focus on environment and development. The construction of a whole set of principles clearly intended to find a common ground between developed and developing countries. However, this framework left largely open interpretations about was how to achieve sustainable development in practice. In particular, the lack of guidelines to accompany the Principles resulted in little cohesion for the implementation of the majority of the principles, and ultimately many principles remain aspirational soft law instruments that countries do or do not transpose into national legislation. Overall, the social equity dimension is not prominent in the Rio principles. A decade after Rio, the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg brought the social dimension the fore, but did not re-open the discussion on the Rio Principles. As such, one of the three pillars of sustainable development remains relatively absent from the highest-level sustainable development document (the Rio Declaration) that have been developed and agreed these past two decades.

What happened to the Rio deal?

The Original Rio Deal Rio recognised the need to redirect international and national plans and policies to ensure that all economic decisions took into account environmental impacts. The deal arising from Rio took a three-pronged approach:

1. Developed countries would take the lead in changing production and consumption patterns (their economic model);

2. Developing countries would maintain their development goals but take on sustainable development methods and paths;

3. Developed countries committed to support developing countries through finance, technology transfer and appropriate reforms to the global economic and financial structures or practices.

Issues requiring an integration of economic and environmental concerns (such as climate, the interaction of trade and environment, and the relation between intellectual property rights and environmental technology and indigenous knowledge) were to be resolved through international cooperation, in which the development needs of developing nations would be adequately recognised.

At the end of Rio there was a perceived agreement that funding, capacity building and technology transfer would be forthcoming once developed countries moved out of recession. What was seen as the ‘peace dividend’ from the fall of the Soviet Union was where funding would come from. 

Agenda 21 had an implicit framework for action relying on nation states acting on their own for delivery, with some top-level international coordination. Agenda 21 was costed out at $625 billion USD a year as developed countries sought to address their own unsustainable development patterns. It also had meant to create a doubling of Official Development Aid (ODA) to $125 billion USD a year after Rio.

What happened?

Despite this well-meaning deal, reality has fallen considerable short of ambition. Significantly developed countries did not curb their consumption patterns and failed to find sustainable development path built on sustainable production methods. As a result, pressure on the global environment continued to rise since 1992. Specifically, despite continued intergovernmental process (e.g. climate change talks and further Earth Summits) little progress has been made toward implementation of the deal. Most recently an international agreement on climate change has all but stalled.

Funding arrangements and transfers of technology from developed to developing nations around the Agenda 21 outcomes have been not delivered as promised. No “additional resources” were provided to facilitate the transition. In fact, Official Development Aid (ODA) fell from $62.4 billion in 1992 to $48.7 billion in 1997. It was not until 2002 that it again topped the $60 billion mark. This “lost decade” was marked by regression of key development statistics with many of the world’s poorest countries suffering from worsening poverty. However, aid flows from donor countries totaled $129 billion in 2010, the highest level ever. At the Monterrey Financing for Development Conference in 2002, world leaders pledged “to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7%” of their national income in international aid. However, as of 2003, only five countries had already met or surpassed the 0.7% target: Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. In 2005, total aid from the 22 richest countries to the world’s developing countries was just $106 billion—a shortfall of $119 billion dollars from the 0.7% promise.In practice, ODA is often unpredictable, poorly targeted and does not make it to where it is needed. It is estimated that about “only about 24% of bilateral aid actually finances investments on the ground”.

Disputes continue on how to implement Agenda 21. For example, the Group of 77 developing countries still favour the implementation of the financial agreement in Rio and this would include a separate, specific global fund, as well as commitments that financing will not be obtained through reallocation of existing development assistance. Developed nations favor financing it through bilateral, regional and multilateral mechanisms and more and more through foreign direct investment -- a path promoted in the 1990s after Rio and which has been shown to mostly benefit a small number of countries and other funding sources, both public and private (e.g. remittances and future global private equity fund schemes).

At the same time, there came a realisation that the implicit basis for the compromise, which was that globalization in the form of economic growth plus free trade could lift all boats, was not delivering automatic dividends and was in fact further marginalizing some developing regions. Developing nations felt that they were short-changed on trade issues. Due to the lack of change delivered by the historical development model, the major developing countries are following the developed countries model of development and the pressure on the planet is increasing.

In 2000 the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were established following the Millennium Summit. The aim of the MDGs was to encourage development by improving social and economic conditions in the world’s poorest countries. However, in the last decade, the MDGs have taken the focus off of the larger sustainable development agenda and focused the attention of the international community on a narrower set of goals – which did not address any of the fundamental drivers, even more so than Agenda 21. 

The MDGs were adopted as “the” reference framework by the development community leading to the aim of alleviating poverty without properly addressing underlying causes. For example, the MDGs were focused solely on developing countries and did not address consumption issues of developed countries, which were a central tenet of the Rio package. Also, after the Earth Summit and increasingly in the 2000s, resources started to flow to climate change-related issues, further marginalizing sustainability as the integrated concept needed to resolved interconnected issues.

During the 2000s, a divergence of outcomes developed among developing countries. Some countries registered rapid and sustained economic successes, whereas many others saw at best limited progress. Despite still officially speaking with a unified voice, there was recognition of the divergent interests and needs between countries. How this divergence will affect the approach to development in the discourse and in practice is still unclear, but is certainly one of the questions that will loom large on the development agenda for the next decades.

The last Principle included in the Rio Declaration, Principle 27, called for ways of working for sustainable development based on ‘good faith’ and ‘a spirit of partnership’.

Since 1992, progress has been made on environmental, social and economic fronts, and many developing countries have increasingly been able to improve their own chances for prosperity and sustainable development. However, the general pace of progress, and the deficiencies and stalls seen in many crucial multilateral processes, question the notion that action has truly been guided by good faith and a spirit of partnership. Challenges and examples noted throughout this report show that huge strides have yet to be taken, and in the prevailing economic crisis of the time any ‘good faith’ is likely to be further tested. Weak, non-committal outcomes from major opportunities for partnership working such as Copenhagen, with its backdrop of slow progress against Kyoto commitments, climate scepticism and MEA fatigue; backwards trends on some of the MDGs; a prevailing aversion of governments to actively engage in changing unsustainable consumption patterns in favour of the pursuit of economic growth; and the long drawn-out Doha Rounds of the WTO, are all striking examples where good faith and partnership working seem to have been eschewed for individual goals and interests.

Acknowledging Contradictions

The international developments on sustainable development have given rise to a contradiction. On the one hand, the Brundtland Commission put on the fore two critical dimensions in its report and definition on sustainable development:

1) caring about future generations (translated in Rio Principle 3) and

2) addressing unsustainable consumption patterns of the rich (translated in Rio Principle 8). Principles 15 and 16 of the Rio Declaration (the so-called “polluter pays” and precautionary principles) provided general guidance for a prudent management of resources and sinks.

On the other hand, one way of seeing the Rio principles is as a “business as usual plus (BAU+)” arrangement. The fundamental assumptions of postwar neo-liberal economics (i.e. economic growth coupled with free trade) were left unchallenged. Instead, they were adorned with “safeguards” that satisfied both North and South. This has resulted in “environmental safeguards” which ensured that discreet environmental issues of concern for the North were managed, and “development safeguards” which ensured economic development of the South could continue unimpeded.

Implicit was a hope that a BAU+ model was able to deliver sustainable consumption and production patterns and longer-term decision-making, and that these were compatible in practice through decoupling of resource use from consumption. However, there was quickly no doubt left about which of the two would prevail when conflict arose or absolute decoupling proved to be difficult to achieve. Business as usual has prevailed and unsustainable patterns of consumption and production persist. This in turn means that global commons (e.g. forests, atmosphere, biodiversity, oceans) are still managed unsustainably, and worse are being degraded beyond their ability to recover unless pressure is lessened.

It has now become clear that humanity’s environmental impact is increasing, and in the future rising population and increased affluence, will compound this impact. Historically, reductions of impacts (e.g. CO2 emissions) through improved technology have been insufficient to counterbalance increases linked with those factors, as per the IPAT equation (i.e. human impact (I) on the environment equals the product of P = population, A = affluence, T= technology). Thus, based on historical evidence, it is unlikely that action on technology alone can keep environmental damage in check in the future.

In order to progress, an acknowledgement of other tensions between different principles included in the Rio declaration will probably have to occur. These include:

• Sovereignty versus global goods – ensuring that the sovereign right to exploit resources (Rio Principle 2) is balanced against the global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem (Rio Principle 7);

• Precaution versus free trade markets – resolving the tensions between the precautionary approach (Rio Principle 15) and unfettered use and diffusion of new technologies with unknown potential impacts, and better incorporating risk in decision-making procedures. This spans a number of areas, including chemicals, agriculture, nanotechnologies, to investment decision tools and climate change;

• Polluter pays versus global markets – ensuring that the polluter should bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment (Rio Principle 16).

Based on the detailed assessment of Rio Principles and Agenda 21 chapters, it seems clear that the “market’ outcomes have to be more regulated based on principles that put values first (e.g. the fundamental principles enunciated in the Millennium Declaration: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect of nature and shared responsibility). Currently there is a lack of linkage between commonly agreed values and principle and market practices. This has clear links to the underdeveloped social dimension within the Rio Principles. Further development of such values could help shift behaviours, drive practices and ultimately achieve sustainable outcomes.

Areas for Action

This report, based on the detailed reviews of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles, has outlined areas that would need to be addressed in order to enable more rapid progress towards the objectives set in Rio 20 years ago. As discussed in previous sections, they relate to international economic governance; trade; international cooperation; the role of corporations in the achievement of sustainable development; participation and access to justice; and the incorporation of long-term considerations in decision-making. The list below, based on the submission from Stakeholder Forum to the Rio conference, offers some proposals for action in these areas. This list should not be taken as being all-encompassing, or even as suggesting that these actions are the only ones that should get consideration. In each of these areas, there are probably many ways to proceed, in particular according to the level of ambition that can be mobilized around the achievement of sustainable development. 

1. Progressing and Protecting Human Development

1.1. A Rights-Based Approach – There is a need to propose an explicit global social contract, instead of dealing with social issues as a “safeguard” type of concern. A true rights-based approach to dealing with welfare, well-being and environmental issues is essential to sustainable development. Such an approach would put people at the heart of development that is also sustainable.

1.2. Increasing participation – Access to environmental information, participation in transparent decision-making processes, and access to judicial and administrative proceedings should be basic rights for all, at all levels of decisionmaking, including local, national and international processes. Worldwide implementation of Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration is a priority. This could take the form of regional replications of the Aarhus Convention in other parts of the world, or even more widespread adoption of the Aarhus Convention. More broadly, increased integration between local authorities, national authorities, and other stakeholders in their communities is needed.

1.3. Giving a voice to Future Generations – The needs of future generations are a crucial element of sustainable development, but are not represented in the relevant decision-making processes. A way to remedy this situation and ensure that longterm interests are heeded would be to create High Commissioners/Ombudspersons for Future Generations at UN and national levels.

2. Sustainable Management of the Earth

2.1. Acknowledge Environmental Limits – There is an urgent need to formally recognise key environmental limits and processes within which we must remain, and the thresholds that we must respect in order to maintain the sustainability of our planet.

2.2. Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Capitals – All levels of government should ensure that national accounts reflect the state of natural assets and ecosystems and their role in sustaining human and economic activity; thereby promoting focused investment toward their conservation and enhancement to avoid environmental crises. 

3. The Green Economy

3.1. Beyond GDP – The current reliance on economic growth and GDP as an indicator of success has led to perverse outcomes. It has not delivered fair levels of well-being for society or individuals. One view is that GDP is an inadequate metric through which to gauge well-being over time.

3.2. Fiscal Reform – Taxes should be used to incentivise positive behaviours and discourage harmful ones. Furthermore, a global Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) should be implemented with revenue ring-fenced for implementing sustainability programmes. Lastly, all subsidies that undermine sustainable development should be eliminated, particularly those underpinning fossil fuel use and unsustainable agricultural and fishing practices.

3.3. Re-start a Meaningful conversation about the role of corporations in the achievement of sustainable development – This could take the form of a Convention on Corporate Social Responsibility. As a first step, corporations should report on their environmental impacts and contribution to well-being, or explain why they are not doing so. Furthermore, government could commit to develop national regulations which mandate the integration of sustainability issues in the Annual Report and Accounts, and therefore providing effective mechanisms for investors to hold companies to account on the quality of their disclosures. 

4. Sustainable Institutions and Governance

4.1. Sustainable Development Goals – The introduction of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is a possible foundation for building further international political commitment, providing measurable ‘tangible goals’ for sustainable development. The SDGs would address the Agenda 21 aims produced at Rio 20 years ago. The SDGs would be applicable to all countries, and therefore act as a complementary, successor framework to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which end in 2015 and focuses mainly on the Global South. Furthermore, SDGs would also more evenly spread the focus from only the poverty reduction pillar of the MDGs to better account for the environmental and social pillars of sustainable development. For example, by providing measurements against metrics of planetary boundaries, and a strong focus on consumption patterns in the Global North. However, the SDGs should not detract from the urgent need for a post-2015 framework that focuses on poverty or from funding for that agenda.

4.2. Improving International Co-operation and Development Aid – As outlined in review of Agenda 21 Chapter 33, future agreements concerning sustainable development financing should be centred around measureable and timebound targets, as one of the biggest challenges in implementing future targets has been and will be ensuring the finance committed is truly delivered to developing countries. Improving the quality of aid and ensuring it is delivered on the ground is as important as increasing the amount of aid.

4.3. Reform of International Financial Institutions – As discussed in Agenda 21 Chapters 33 and 38, there must be better incorporation of sustainable development parameters in the existing International Financial Institutions (IFIs), particularly in terms of funding, operations, strategic plans, objectives and implementation. Additionally, governments should seek to strengthen the efficiency of the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

4.4. National, Local and Regional Governance – National and local Sustainable Development Strategies should be revived and refreshed with full engagement and support from business and all parts of civil society. These strategies should be underpinned with route maps outlying national actions towards a green and fair economy. Advisory bodies such as Councils for Sustainable Development need to be adequately resourced to play their full part in bringing forward new thinking and maintaining pressure for progress.

4.5. International Court for the Environment – Environmental problems extend across international boundaries, but there are few effective international institutions to deal with them properly. Strengthening international environmental law mechanisms is essential to securing sustainable development. This could take the form of an International Court for the Environment, which would build trust, harmonise and complement existing legal regimes and provide clarity and access to justice as well as redress.